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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relationship between rights-based moral systems and 
climate change.  It argues that supporters of rights-based moralities must give the 
realisation of rights priority over non-rights-based moral concerns.  It further 
contends that future persons cannot possess rights that would place current 
persons under correlative duties towards them before their conception.  The thesis 
then highlights that climate change will need to be combatted through 
programmes of adaptation and mitigation.  Unfortunately, the majority of those 
protected by such programmes will be future persons.  It is therefore argued that 
rights-based moralities struggle to endorse – and might even actively oppose – the 
imposition by states of extensive programmes of adaptation and mitigation.  Such 
programmes actively and directly restrict the realisation of the rights of many 
current persons.  Even if this were not the case, supporters of rights are unable to 
justify the kind of spending that would be needed to finance those aspects of 
adaptation and mitigation which aim to benefit future persons while the 
fundamental rights of a great many current persons go unmet due to a lack of 
funds.  As a result, rights-based moralities must justify climate burdens solely 
through reference to current persons.  It is argued that, in the case of Interest- and 
Choice-based theories of rights, this would encourage an increase in emissions 
through the implication that pollution was permissible provided adaptation 
burdens were met.  Alternatively, support for a rights-based morality akin to that 
put forward by Robert Nozick would enable us to implement mitigation, but the 
system’s disavowal of positive rights would simultaneously cause excessive harm 
to the wellbeing of many.  The inability of rights-based moralities to deal with 
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climate change in an effective and ethical manner leads us to question their 
legitimacy more generally. 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE NATURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Outline of Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that moral (as opposed to legal) 
systems which are based upon rights produce inadequate answers to the unique 
challenges posed by climate change – at least for those of us who feel it to be 
wrong to cause irreparable harm to future persons (let alone non-human animals 
and plants).   
What exactly qualifies as a rights-based moral system is outlined in detail in 
Chapter 2, which also provides a detailed analysis of what I believe to be the three 
fundamental types of such systems (Interest Theories, Choice Theories and 
Libertarian/Nozickian accounts). 
Chapter 3 then explains why future persons cannot be considered to possess 
rights.  Objections to this argument are considered and rejected in Chapter 4.   
Chapter 5 outlines why the status of future persons as non-right-holders is so 
problematic.  It does so, firstly, by explaining how and why programmes of 
adaptation and mitigation will harm the rights of current persons – harm that 
cannot be accepted as the unfortunate consequence of clashes of rights since the 
future persons such policies aim to protect are not right-holders.  It then goes on to 
argue that, even if such programmes did not directly harm rights, they would 
remain unacceptable to supporters of rights as they make distinctly inefficient use 
of significant resources which might otherwise be utilised to greatly improve 
levels of rights realisation across the present generation. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 examines possible attempts to subvert the issues raised in the 
previous chapters through a focus on current persons as the beneficiaries of 
programmes of adaptation and mitigation.  It concludes that, through such an 
approach, some limited programmes of adaptation and mitigation might be 
plausible under certain rights-based moralities,
1
 but that they will nonetheless be 
comparatively ineffective in quelling (and might even increase) the long-term 
dangers of climate change. 
Preceding the above, this chapter seeks to outline the nature of the climate change 
process with a specific focus on the unusual timescales involved between cause, 
effect and catastrophe and the unique influence these have on established ideas 
about ethics. 
 
Introduction 
The next few centuries will be the most important in human history.
2
  In the worst 
case scenario, climate change could cause the extinction of humanity.
3
  Even if the 
best case predictions for the effects of climate change are realised and combined 
with a dedicated, co-ordinated campaign of mitigation and adaptation, much 
damage would still inevitably be caused to the human rights of a great many 
individuals in the future.  It is widely accepted by experts that the extent to which 
the climate changes (and, thus, the extent of the damage to the human rights of its 
victims) will largely be decided by the actions humanity takes in the relatively 
                                               
1 Different rights-based moral systems will permit different programmes of adaptation and/or 
mitigation. 
2
 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1986), p.352. 
3
 McKinnon, C., Climate Change and Future Justice:  Precaution, Compensation and Triage 
(London and New York, Routledge, 2012), p.1 
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near future.
4
  The problem is that, even for the most well-meaning individuals, 
such decisions are extremely complex from a moral perspective.  As De-Shalit 
highlights, “[m]any governments face a new dilemma today. Seeking to improve 
the welfare of the present population, they find that some policies which best do 
so incur some severe environmental risks for contemporary people, but even more 
so for posterity. This raises moral questions of relations between generations”.5  
As this chapter will demonstrate, the negative effects of our (often innocuous and 
even essential) emission-producing actions will primarily be felt by people whose 
existence is both geographically and chronologically remote from our own.  Until 
relatively recently, such a concept was simply beyond the purview of our ethical 
reasoning. 
This chapter aims to briefly outline the manner in which climate change works, 
the effects the process is likely to have on human rights (both now and in the 
future) and what actions humanity might take to lessen and/or slow such effects.  
Most importantly for a proper understanding of the thesis that follows, this 
chapter goes on to emphasise the large timescales involved in climate change with 
regard to both the (often extensive) length of time between cause and effect and 
the (even more extensive) length of time a particular effect lasts for (i.e. the length 
of time certain gases remain in our atmosphere).  The chapter then highlights 
some of the complex ethical questions raised by scholars working in the area in 
light of the unique nature of the climate change process.  Finally, it closes with an 
                                               
4
 Holden, J.P., ‘Introduction’ in Schneider, Stephen H. et al. (eds.), Climate Change Science and 
Policy (Washington:  Island Press, 2010), p.4.  As will become clear in both this chapter and 
throughout the thesis, while the decisions humanity makes with regard to its emissions in the 
near future will be of immense significance in terms of the path climate change takes, it is not 
necessarily the case that any of the decisions humanity makes in the short-term will lead to an 
irreversible level of climate change. 
5
 De-Shalit, A., Why Posterity Matters:  Environmental Policies and Future Generations (London:  
Routledge, 1995), p.113 
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explanation of the relevance of a rights-based approach to the climate change 
problem. 
 
Climate Change is a Fact 
Before commencing with any debate as to whether and how human beings ought 
to adapt their behaviour in order to lessen the negative effects of climate change it 
is, unfortunately, necessary to assert that climate change is a fact and that it is (at 
least primarily) caused by human actions. 
Climate change was described by one US Senator as “the greatest hoax ever 
perpetrated on the American people”.6  This attitude is frequently reflected in the 
popular media.  A study took a wide sample of articles from across various media 
outlets.  It found that 53% questioned either the fact that climate change was 
occurring as a result of human actions or the fact that climate change was 
occurring at all.  The same study found that, in a similarly wide sample of 
academic articles on the subject published in scientific journals, absolutely none 
questioned the existence or cause of climate change.
7
  As Holden puts it, 
(t)he most important conclusions about global climatic disruption – that it’s real, that it’s 
accelerating, that it’s already doing significant harm, that human activities are responsible for most 
of it, that there is a growing danger of its becoming unmanageable, and that there is much that 
could be done to reduce the danger at affordable cost – have not been concocted by environmental 
                                               
6 Guggenheim, D., An Inconvenient Truth (Beverly Hills:  Lawrence Bender Productions, 2006) 
7
 Ibid 
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extremists or enemies of capitalism.  They are based on an immense edifice of painstaking studies 
published in the world’s leading peer-reviewed scientific journals.8 
 
With this in mind, it seems reasonable to assume both that such a wide range of 
experts are highly unlikely to be wrong and that there is little which could be said 
here to convince anybody who still doubts such a fact.  This thesis will therefore 
treat the existence of anthropogenic climate change as a fact. 
 
How Climate Change Works 
The basic process of climate change is succinctly described by Mahlmann when 
he says, 
Surprisingly, all of the physical drivers of the global warming problem are contained within the 
atmosphere.  Despite being a region of relatively inconsequential mass, water amount, and heat 
capacity, it is in the atmosphere that the temperature at the earth’s surface is ultimately determined.  
The special properties of the atmosphere define the essence of how climate works. 
The earth is strongly heated every day by incoming radiation from the sun.  This heating is offset 
by an equally strong infrared radiation leaving the planet.  Interestingly, if the earth were without 
any atmosphere, and if its surface reflectivity did not change, global mean surface temperature 
would be roughly 33°C colder than it is today.  This large difference is due to the strong 
atmospheric absorption of infrared radiation leaving the earth’s surface.  The major atmospheric 
absorbers are clouds, water vapor, and CO2…Simply put, adding CO2 to the atmosphere adds 
                                               
8
 Holden, J.P., Op.cit, p.5 
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another ‘blanket’ to the planet and thus directly changes the heat balance of the earth’s 
atmosphere.
9
 
 
CO2 represents around 76% of all anthropogenic emissions.
10
  The bulk of this 
CO2 (and other anthropogenic emissions) has been released since the 
commencement of the industrial revolution around 250 years ago and it is this 
period which is viewed as a cut-off point marking the beginning of climate change 
by most climatologists.
11
  It is widely accepted that, in order to avoid climate 
change reaching unmanageable, catastrophic levels, the global average surface 
temperature cannot be allowed to rise higher than between 2°C and 2.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels.
12
  This seems increasingly unlikely,
13
 since, in order for this 
to occur, many experts feel that global emissions will need to have peaked and 
begun to decline within the next 10 years.
14
 
Once we reach beyond the 2°C threshold, things will quickly escalate beyond our 
control.  This is because of two factors known as ‘positive feedbacks’ and ‘tipping 
points’. 
                                               
9
 Mahlmann, J.D., ‘The Long Timescales of Human-Caused Climate Warming:  Further Challenges 
for the Global Policy Process’ in Sinnot-Armstrong, W. and Howarth, R.B. (eds.), Perspectives on 
Climate Change:  Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Amsterdam:  Elsevier, 2005), p.11 
10
 United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data’.  
Available at:  https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data. Last 
accessed:  26 November 2017. 
11
 Page, E.A., Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar, 2006), 
p.25 
12
 Holden, J.P., Op.Cit, p.3; McKinnon, Op.Cit, p.4; Humphreys, S., ‘Introduction:  Human Rights 
and Climate Change’ in Humphreys, S. (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.20 
13
 Humphreys, S., Ibid, p.20 
14
 Holden, J.P., Op.Cit, p.4.  Indeed, some scholars feel this peak should have already been 
reached (McKinnon, C., Op.Cit, p.4).  It is, however, incredibly difficult to predict such figures with 
any great accuracy.  It is also not absolutely clear what is meant by climate change having 
reached irreversible levels, or at what point such levels will actually be reached.  If and when 
emissions levels do reach ‘irreversible’ levels, the resultant harm will likely still be many decades 
away.  This chapter will explain why this should be the case. 
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Positive Feedbacks and Tipping Points 
A key difficulty with climate change is the fact that it is neither linear nor gradual 
in nature.  We cannot simply wait until its consequences become intolerable and 
then implement policies to slowly reverse the process.  At a certain point (located 
somewhere after the 2°C threshold) the process simply becomes irreversible.  This 
is due to a combination of the long timescales involved in the emissions of 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) (an issue which will be returned to shortly) and the 
existence of ‘positive feedbacks’ and ‘tipping points’. 
Positive feedbacks are ‘natural’ climatic events which are created by the earth’s 
reactions to anthropogenic emissions.  They will greatly accelerate the climate 
change process, thus substantially diminishing our chances of reversing it.
15
  
Some examples of positive feedbacks include an increased amount of water 
vapour in the atmosphere and a reduction in the amount of ice on the Earth’s 
surface. 
Water vapour has a strong capacity for holding heat, significantly amplifying the 
initial warming of effect of CO2 by as much as a factor of three and a half in some 
circumstances.
16
  The more CO2 in the atmosphere, the higher the temperature, 
causing more water vapour to be absorbed into the atmosphere, thus further 
amplifying the effects of the initial CO2, creating a vicious circle of increased 
warming. 
                                               
15
 Friedlingstein, P. et al, ‘Positive Feedback Between Future Climate Change and the Carbon 
Cycle’, (2001) Geophysical Research Letters, Vol.28, No.8, pp.1543-1546.  Friedlingstein et al 
estimate that positive feedbacks lead to a 15% increase in overall warming (p.1543).  Estimates 
regarding this figure vary substantially across the field, but there is widespread consensus that 
such feedbacks are a fact. 
16
 Stocker, T.F. et al, ‘Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks’, in Houghton, J.T. et al (Eds.), 
Climate Change 2001:  The Scientific Basis (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.425 
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A similarly dangerous cycle can be seen when it comes to ice and snow.  The 
hotter the average global surface temperature, the less snow and ice that will exist 
on the Earth’s surface.  This creates certain difficulties in and of itself – for 
example, many countries rely heavily on snowmelt from mountains for their water 
supplies.  Of greater concern is the fact that snow and ice are much better 
reflectors of solar radiation than the ground, vegetation or water that lies beneath 
them.
17
  Therefore, the less snow and ice that remains on the Earth’s surface, the 
greater the average surface temperature increase, causing the melting of more 
snow and ice. 
These positive feedbacks will combine to greatly increase the speed at which 
climate change occurs in comparison to current levels.  This will mean that certain 
‘tipping points’ will be reached more rapidly, beyond which it will no longer be 
possible to effectively combat climate change through mitigation and adaptation.  
Lynas succinctly explains how such a process might work: 
If…we cross the ‘tipping point’ of Amazonian collapse and soil carbon release which lies 
somewhere above two degrees, then another 250 parts per million of CO2 will unavoidably pour 
into the atmosphere, yielding another 1.5°C of warming and taking us straight into the four degree 
world.  Once we arrive there, the accelerated release of carbon and methane from thawing Siberian 
permafrost will add even more greenhouse gas to the atmosphere, driving yet more warming, and 
likely pushing us on to the five degree world.  At this level of warming…oceanic methane hydrate 
release becomes a serious possibility, catapulting us into the ultimate mass extinction apocalypse 
of six degrees.
18
 
 
                                               
17
 ibid, p.12 
18
 Lynas, M., Six Degrees:  Our Future on a Hotter Planet (London:  Harper Collins, 2007), pp.270-
71 
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It should be noted that, while the threat of tipping points is often the primary focus 
of our concerns when it comes to the dangers of climate change, very real dangers 
are also posed by a more gradual process of climate change regardless of whether 
and when this gradual climate change leads to a tipping point being reached.  
Even if tipping points were not a possibility, the gradual increase in global 
temperatures which continues to occur would remain a morally problematic issue 
because of the many harms it causes (e.g. the increase in cases of malaria that 
result from rising temperatures in many poorer African states).  However, as this 
thesis will explain, it is possible (and, under some rights-based moralities, 
demanded) that the vast majority of the harms human beings face as a result of 
gradual climate change could be avoided through ‘adaptation’ tactics (e.g. 
vaccinating those at risk against malaria).  When it comes to tipping points, 
adaptation ceases to be a possibility.  As a result, to say that people living today 
ought to do something to prevent tipping points is to say that people living today 
must curb their emission-producing behaviours, as opposed to merely making a 
financial contribution to ensure that those emissions cease to be harmful. 
The nature of the climate change process means that its negative effects will 
worsen rapidly once the 2-2.5°C threshold is breached.  If we are to stop the worst 
effects of climate change we will need to act a significant amount of time before 
they occur.  This is particularly true since (as the next section will explain) when 
it comes to GHGs, there is a significant gap between emission and warming, but 
once the warming effect begins it continues to affect the climate for a significant 
period of time. 
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What we do not know about tipping points is when they will occur.  As a result, 
knowing that we need to commence mitigation programmes significantly in 
advance of such tipping points being reached does little to tell us at which point 
we must begin mitigating if we are to avoid catastrophic runaway climate change.  
In reality, this of little significance.   
For many people, the fact that we know that tipping points will one day occur as a 
result of our emission-producing actions might be seen as a good enough reason 
to curb such actions immediately in order to give us the best possible chance of 
avoiding the catastrophic harm that will result from runaway climate change.   
Those individuals (including supporters of rights) who do not feel that protecting 
future persons from harm
19
 is something that is morally required from current 
persons draw the opposite conclusion. 
The important thing to note about tipping points is that implementing the type of 
mitigation programmes necessary to prevent them is something which will only 
benefit future persons.  As a result of the timeframes involved both with emission 
and with implementing an effective programme of mitigation in a rights-friendly 
manner,
20
 if a tipping point is to be reached within the lifetime of current persons, 
                                               
19
 The reasoning behind the inability of supporters of rights to assign rights to future persons is 
explained in Chapter 3.  Chapter 2 demonstrates that the provision of rights is the only way in 
which supporters of rights-based moralities are able to demonstrate that a particular entity is of 
such significant moral value that the rights of others might be restricted in the name of 
protecting said entity. 
20
 A hurried programme of mitigation which, for example, banned the use of fossil fuels before 
alternatives were widely available would doubtlessly cause irreparable harm to the rights of 
many current persons who rely upon carbon-heavy fuel sources to meet their most basic rights 
such as heating their homes and cooking their food.  It is, I suppose, possible that such extreme 
measures might be justified if they were taken in the name of protecting current persons from 
tipping points.  However, given the very small chance that a tipping point will both occur within 
the lifetimes of current persons and not already be inevitable as a result of a combination of past 
emissions and unavoidable current and future emissions (breathing, boiling water, etc.), this does 
not seem a course of action supporters of rights would endorse.  This is particularly true when we 
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it is already too late to stop its occurrence through mitigation.
21
  And if we are 
temporally distant enough from a tipping point to avoid its occurrence then all of 
the people we will protect through this avoidance will be future persons. 
 
The Timeframe of Emissions 
The first thing to note about the emissions we produce today is that, because of 
the inertia of the Earth’s oceans, their negative effects on the climate will not 
begin to be felt for at least several decades.
22
  Once they do begin to take effect 
however, they will continue to do so for extensive periods of time.  CO2 (by far 
the most prevalent of all GHGs in terms of contribution to climate change) 
remains in the atmosphere for 50-200 years, methane (also a significant 
contributor) remains for up to 120 years, and other GHGs which make a more 
minor contribution can continue to do so for millennia.
23
 
With the above in mind, it becomes clear that the primary victims of climate 
change will be future generations.  Indeed, many of the most negative 
consequences of the phenomenon will be felt only by the as yet unborn.
24
  This is 
because the tipping points mentioned above will be caused by the unprecedented 
                                                                                                                                                  
consider that such extreme mitigation might end up causing a similarly catastrophic level of 
damage to that caused by the tipping point its. 
21
 This argument is presented in greater detail in Chapter 6 once the claims inherent within it 
regarding mitigation, future persons and rights-based moralities have been laid out and justified. 
22
 Zickfield, K. and Herrington, T., ‘The Time Lag Between a Carbon Dioxide Emission and 
Maximum Warming Increases With the Size of the Emission’, (2015) Environmental Research 
Letters, 10 031001, p.1. 
23
 Page, E.A., Op.Cit, p.25.  Indeed, some scholars believe that the harm caused by CO2 is also 
more long-lasting than the commonly agreed figure.  Archer and Brovkin, for example, argue that 
20-60% of CO2 remains in the atmosphere for over a thousand years (Archer, D. and Brovkin, V., 
‘The Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of Anthropoenic CO2’, Climatic Change October 2008, 
Volume 9, Issue 3, pp.283-297, p.283). 
24
 Page, E.A., ibid, p.36-7 
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(and still rising) amount of GHGs which are now being pumped into the 
atmosphere as a result of globalisation, immense population growth, and 
widespread industrialisation across the developing world.   
Due to the increase in green technologies, it may well be the case that many 
individuals living in developed countries are producing fewer emissions than their 
parents did, but the number of individuals producing such emissions has risen 
significantly in recent decades and continues to do so.  It took 10,000 generations 
for the world’s population to reach two billion in 1945.25  Today, just 70 years 
later, it stands at over seven billion and is predicted to reach 11 billion by the end 
of the century.
26
  Due to the fact that our emissions remain in the atmosphere for 
centuries, the combined emissions produced by the ever-increasing global 
population today will eventually come to cause the deaths of millions of people.  
However, the vast majority of those individuals who will be affected (and all of 
those individuals who will face the catastrophes caused by reaching ‘tipping 
points’)27 do not currently exist.  By the time they do exist, however, it may be too 
late to reverse the climate change process.  Given this fact, many people might 
feel that the current generation is placed under a duty to take action to combat 
climate change while it is still possible for such action to be effective. 
 
Adaptation and Mitigation 
                                               
25
 Guggenheim, D., Op.Cit 
26
 Carrington, D., ‘World Population to Hit 11bn in 2100 – with 70% Chance of Continuous Rise’, 
The Guardian (18 September 2014).  Available at:  
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/18/world-population-new-study-11bn-
2100 .  Last Accessed:  15 February 2016 
27
 Unless, of course, those tipping points occur within our lifetime.  As already noted though, if 
they do so (which is unlikely), their occurrence will primarily be the result of the emissions of past 
persons combined with the unavoidable emissions of current persons. 
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As Page astutely notes, “(t)here would, perhaps, be little point in considering 
climate change as raising important ethical questions if little could be done to 
offset or reverse the bad effects it threatens for future quality of life”.28  
Fortunately, this is not the case.  As Pacala and Socolow assert, “(h)umanity 
already possesses the fundamental scientific, technical, and industrial know-how 
to solve the carbon and climate problems…”.29  Unfortunately, due to the 
aforementioned facts that there are already a great deal of GHGs affecting our 
atmosphere, that there will be more to come as our recent emissions take time to 
take effect, and that GHGs remain in our atmosphere for so long, it is already too 
late to stop climate change.
30
  Therefore, preventing the negative effects of 
climate change will involve a mixture of policies.  Some of these will aim to 
substantially reduce our current emission levels in order to slow (and eventually 
reverse) the increase in average global surface temperature, while others will aim 
to lessen the negative effects of that climate change which is already unavoidable.  
These policies are known as mitigation techniques and adaptation techniques 
respectively. 
Mitigation techniques are those actions we could take now in order to ensure that 
the average global surface temperature remains below the 2-2.5°C threshold.  
Such techniques would include the banning of non-essential air travel and 
deforestation and the development of alternatives to fossil fuels.  As Humphreys 
notes, effective mitigation will come at a significant cost to current persons: 
                                               
28
 Page, E.A., Op.Cit, p.27 
29
 Pacala, S. and Socolow, R., ‘Stabilization Wedges:  Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 
Years with Current Technologies’, Science, Vol. 305, Issue 5686 (13 August 2004), 968-972, p.968 
30
 Sinnot-Armstrong, W., ‘It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations’ , in 
Gardiner, S., et al. (eds), Climate Change: Essential Readings, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2010), p.332 
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First, it will drastically reduce access to and dependence upon fossil fuels – currently the most 
reliable and cost-effective fuel-source on the planet (measured in terms of energy yield against 
cost of extraction/generation).  Second, it will curtail the development policy options available to 
governments everywhere – an implication that matters especially in those countries that have not 
yet reached a level of economic growth sufficient to guarantee basic needs.  Not only will climate 
change mitigation policies profoundly influence the allocation and use of scarce resources, they 
will do so far into the foreseeable future.  In short, climate change mitigation efforts will reorient 
and fix national development paths over the long term, and these in turn will tend to set limits on 
the capacity of countries to fulfil basic human rights, albeit to different degrees.
31
 
 
Adaptation techniques are those actions taken to combat the irreversible negative 
effects of climate change.  Such techniques might include building sea walls to 
protect coastal areas or vaccinating against diseases like malaria and cholera (the 
spread of which will increase as a result of rising temperatures).
32
  As part of this 
adaptation the UNFCCC requires wealthier states to provide financial assistance 
to poorer states in order to help them to implement such measures.
33
 The World 
Bank estimates that this last element alone is likely to cost between US$4 billion 
and $37 billion per year.
34
 
Adaptation, then, is an expensive process which will severely impact upon the 
lives of current persons.  More importantly, the greater the increase in climate 
change, the more costly and less effective adaptation will become.
35
  Since 
                                               
31
 Humphreys, S., Op.Cit, p.22 
32
 Caney, S., ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, in Gardiner, S., et 
al. (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2010), p.124-5 
33
 UNFCCC, ‘Paris Agreement (as contained in the report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
twenty-first session)’, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2015), Article 4(5). 
34
 Stern, N., The Economics of Climate Change:  The Stern Review (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p.442 
35
 Holden, J.P., Op.Cit, p.3 
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adaptation will only slow the effects of climate change, not the climate change 
itself, it will do nothing to prevent us from reaching ‘tipping points’ at which 
adaptation no longer has a use.  Therefore, any meaningful attempt to combat 
climate change in the long term must consist of a mixture of adaptation and 
mitigation techniques.  This will mean making significant sacrifices.  Due to the 
timeframe of climate change, many of these sacrifices will need to be made by the 
current generation, even though many of the resultant benefits will fall upon 
future persons.
36
   
 
The Response of Ethics 
The nature of climate change and the time delays built into it raise many difficult 
ethical issues with regard to which actions (if any) we should take to reverse the 
process.  This section will highlight these issues so that they may be investigated 
in more detail throughout the thesis. 
 
 The Role of Intention 
Nobody deliberately causes climate change.  None of the actions we take are 
taken with the intention of producing emissions.  Rather, they are innocuous (and 
sometimes essential).  How does this affect our moral reasoning?  Is the fact that 
the consequences of such actions are knowable enough to render them immoral?   
                                               
36
 The costs (both financial and otherwise) of mitigation and adaptation that will be felt by 
current persons are outlined in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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Certainly, according to the doctrine of double effect, this is not automatically the 
case.  According to this doctrine, if our only means of stopping a paramilitary 
radio station from broadcasting information necessary for its troops to carry out a 
genocide is to bomb it from the air, we are entitled to do so even if we know that 
our action will also kill a small number of innocent people (hostages, cleaning 
staff, children playing outside, etc.).  This is (at least primarily) because we do not 
undertake the bombing with the intention of harming these innocents, even though 
we know that they will indeed be harmed.   
It is not immediately clear, however, that the doctrine of double effect can be used 
as a way of justifying the emissions (particularly the non-essential emissions) of 
current persons.  For one thing, ethicists may question the validity of the doctrine 
of double effect under any circumstances.
37
  One might legitimately ask whether it 
really is permissible to cause harm simply because you did not intend to do so.  
This is particularly true when the word intention is used in such a manner as to 
enable us to claim that we did not intend to create a certain consequence that we 
did in fact know we would create. 
Additionally, anthropogenic climate change seems to be a very different scenario 
from those which the doctrine of double effect is usually invoked to defend.  
Ceasing those actions which produce so-called ‘luxury emissions’ (i.e. those 
which are not essential to our existence in the way that breathing or boiling water 
are) would have less of an impact on our own lives than the consequences those 
actions will have upon future persons.  In the scenario above we justified our 
bombing of the radio station and subsequent destruction of innocent life on the 
                                               
37
 See, for example:  Persson, I., From Morality to the End of Reason:  An Essay on Rights, Reasons 
and Responsibility (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2013), p.140-159 
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basis that we intended to save (ideally a larger number of) the innocent lives of 
others.  It was this initial good intention that outweighed the unintended (but, 
crucially, foreseeable) consequences of causing the deaths of innocent people 
through our bombing.  When it comes to climate change however, my intention is 
to drive to the supermarket because carrying my shopping home on foot would be 
a chore.  While there is nothing wrong with such an intention, it does seem 
reasonable to claim that it is outweighed if my drive causes severe harm to a vast 
number of other people (and I am fully aware that this is the case).  It seems, then, 
that even if we believe the principle of double-effect to be valid, it (at least) 
cannot be applied to defend the most banal of day-to-day actions which will cause 
such significant harm to others if those others are appropriate objects of moral 
concern.
38
 
There remain, however, two key issues surrounding the relationship between 
intention and emission which will have a bearing throughout this thesis.   
Firstly, as will be highlighted in Chapter 3, it is not an unquestionable truth that 
future persons are appropriate objects of moral concern.  In fact, this thesis will 
demonstrate that, under a rights-based morality, they are not.  As a result, the 
double-effect scenario is further complicated by the temporal distance between the 
current persons and the victims of the unintended consequences of their actions.  
This issue will be explored in greater detail in parts 3 and 4 of this section. 
Secondly, many of the emission-producing actions of people living today might 
be legitimately labelled ‘subsistence emissions’.  Such emissions would certainly 
include those associated with breathing and boiling water, but might be justly 
                                               
38
 The status of less banal emission-producing actions is considered below and at various points 
throughout this thesis. 
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extended to include a wide range of other activities in the modern world such as 
heating one’s home or driving from an isolated rural area in search of food or 
medical attention.  The fact that we do not intend to harm others through our 
actions appears to be of greater relevance when we cannot easily avoid taking 
such actions.  This is especially true if not taking such actions would cause harm 
to us.  Under a rights-based morality, something is judged harmful when it is 
harmful to the rights of a right-holder.  As Chapter 5 explains, a great many of our 
emission-producing activities are protected by rights, thus making their restriction 
a morally complex issue. 
 
 The Collective Nature of the Problem 
My actions alone are not enough to cause climate change.  The emissions I 
produce only make a difference to the global climate when taken in conjunction 
with the emissions of others.  For some ethicists, such as Sinnott-Armstrong, this 
is enough to call into question the idea that there is anything inherently wrong 
with individuals producing even so-called ‘luxury emissions’. 
He highlights the difficulty with holding individuals accountable for climate 
change as follows: 
There is nothing immoral about greenhouse gases in themselves when they cause no harm.  
Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide and water vapour, which occur naturally and help plants 
grow.  The problem of global warming occurs because of the high quantities of greenhouse gases, 
not because of anything bad about smaller quantities of the same gases.  So it is hard to see why I 
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would have a moral obligation not to expel harmless quantities of greenhouse gases.  And that is 
all I do by myself.
39
 
 
Sinnott-Armstrong acknowledges that, under certain circumstances, it is possible 
for a person to be held accountable for an action even if that action is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the resultant harm to occur.  He uses the example of 
five individuals pushing a car off a cliff with the passenger locked inside.  He 
(correctly) asserts that it would be morally wrong to join in and help push, even 
though had I been the only one pushing no harm would have occurred, and had I 
not pushed, the same harm would have occurred as a result of the actions of the 
other five people.
40
  He argues, though, that this situation is different from that of 
climate change for two reasons:  firstly because I intend to cause harm to the 
passenger and secondly because my action is unusual. 
As noted in the previous section, it is not clear that a lack of intention to cause 
harm should, in all circumstances, be enough to justify actions which nevertheless 
do cause harm, especially if that harm was knowable before the action was taken.  
Similarly, while it is true that my actions alone will only cause climate change if 
everybody else acts in a similar way, since I know fully well that everyone else 
will indeed act in a similar way, it does not seem reasonable that I should not be 
responsible for the negative knowable consequences to which such actions 
contribute. 
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 Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Op.Cit, p.337 
40
 Sinnott-Armstrong, W., ibid, p.334  
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Of more interest is Sinnott-Armstrong’s assertion that the banality of my action 
means that I should not be held accountable for its consequences.  Perhaps a key 
difficulty with our emissions is not that we do not intend to harm others through 
them, but that ceasing such emissions would require drastic changes to the way 
we live our lives which may have serious negative consequences for current 
persons.  While it did not seem unreasonable to prohibit the use of CFCs in 
aerosols in order to repair the hole in the ozone layer, it seems more questionable 
whether we might legitimately ask current persons to stop driving or taking flights 
and pay heavier taxes to meet adaptation burdens in order to protect temporally 
remote persons from harm.
41
  This is particularly true given that the harm that will 
be felt in the coming centuries partially arises as a result of the significant 
emissions of previous generations which remain in our atmosphere. 
The collective nature of climate change, then, raises important issues about who 
(if anyone) ought to bear the burdens associated with mitigation and adaptation.  
The key theories surrounding such a question (the Polluter Pays Principle, the 
Beneficiary Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle) are examined from a 
rights-based perspective in Chapter 6.  The collective nature of the problem, 
though, is not merely of relevance with regard to the costs of preventing climate 
change but also in relation to how we think about climate change in general.  This 
is most apparent in Chapter 4, where the fact that climate change cannot be caused 
by individuals undermines an otherwise valid objection to the non-identity 
problem. 
 
                                               
41
 The effects of such policies on the rights of current persons are examined in Chapter 5. 
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The Nature of the Victims 
The reason that climate change represents such an interesting and morally 
complex subject for ethicists is the fact that those causing harm and those 
suffering from that harm lack contemporaneity.  As McKinnon highlights, 
“…climate change presents problems of justice in global and intergenerational 
arenas that are unprecedented”.42  The vast majority of the victims of climate 
change (and, in all likelihood, all the victims of tipping points) will be future 
persons.   
It was, until relatively recently, simply beyond the purview of ethicists to think 
that the (often innocuous) actions of current persons could have such disastrous 
effects on those individuals populating (sometimes very distant) future 
generations.  As Parfit highlights, this is no longer the case:  “Unless we, or some 
global disaster, destroy the human race, there will be people living later who do 
not now exist. These are future people. Science has given to our generation great 
ability both to affect these people, and to predict these effects.”43 
The important question, then, is that raised by Singer:  “How do we adjust our 
ethics to take account of this new situation?”44 
One answer to this question (provided by people of different moral schools of 
thought for different reasons) is that we should not.  This view - when proposed 
directly, as opposed to arising as the (often unintended) consequence of certain 
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 McKinnon, C., Op.Cit, p.72 
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 Parfit, D., Op.Cit, p.355 
44
 Singer, P., One World (London, Yale University Press, 2002), p.120 
Page 27 of 305 
 
forms of reasoning
45
 – is known as ‘presentism’.  Howarth describes presentism 
as  
…the view that the preferences of the present generation should play a dominant role in the 
formulation and evaluation of public policies.  In this framework, the interests of future 
generations are pertinent only to the extent that the present generation holds an altruistic concern 
for its children, grandchildren, and subsequent descendants.
46
   
 
This view, Page suggests, is born out of a belief that  
…the lack of mutual benefit (or reciprocity) that characterises dealings between members of 
different generations undermines the claims of future persons to resources currently at the disposal 
of existing persons.  This is because, it is claimed, the scope of ethics and justice is determined by 
a principle of reciprocity.
47
 
 
Other scholars, such as Vandeheiden, argue that ‘neither spatial nor temporal 
distance between agents and their victims can excuse acts of intentional or 
predictable harm’.48 
The issue of whether and to what extent the potential nature of future persons 
affects what we can ask current persons to do in order to safeguard them is highly 
complex and will be returned to throughout this thesis.  For now it is enough to 
highlight that the fact that the people who will suffer most from climate change do 
not currently exist will have a significant bearing on our moral decision making.  
                                               
45
 Such as in the case of the ‘non-identity problem’, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
46
 Howarth, R.B., ‘Intergenerational Justice’, in Dryzek, J.S., Norgaard, R.B., and Schlosberg, D., 
Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p.338 
47
 Page, E.A., Op.Cit, p.10  
48
 Vanderheiden, S., ‘Conservation, Foresight and the Future Generations Problem’, Inquiry, Vol. 
49, Issue 4 (01 August 2006), pp.337-352, p.343 
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The nature of the victims of climate change is particularly relevant to supporters 
of rights since (as Chapter 2 highlights) they require individuals to possess rights 
if they are to be considered objects of moral concern and (as Chapter 3 explains) 
future persons fail to meet such criteria. 
When Will the Negative Consequences be Felt? 
Even those individuals who do currently exist and who will be harmed by the 
emissions we produce today are not harmed by them now.  If a baby is born today 
and lives beyond the age of fifty, the negative effects of climate change s/he feels 
will have been caused, in part, by the emission-producing actions that other 
individuals conduct in the present. 
The immense gap between cause and effect which exists in relation to climate-
changing emissions raises the difficult question of when we might judge an action 
to be wrong – when we take the action, or when that action causes harm? 
Additionally, if our only concern is with current persons, it seems likely that – if 
we bear any duty at all before our actions cause harm – that duty might 
legitimately be adhered to through the meeting of an additional financial burden in 
order to adapt to the harms we cause as and when they occur.  This is because, as 
previously noted, in the short-term we will almost certainly be able to protect the 
relatively small number of people who are alive today and will still be alive to feel 
the effects of the emissions we produce now through adaptation measures alone.
49
  
At this point in time, future persons with whom we will lack contemporaneity are 
the only individuals whose welfare necessarily relies upon mitigation. 
                                               
49
 Such an approach is, however, not compatible with all types of rights-based morality.  This 
issue is examined in Chapter 6. 
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Why a Rights-based Approach? 
Given the plethora of existing systems of morality, it is not unreasonable to ask 
why this thesis should focus on rights-based moral systems.  The question seems 
particularly relevant when we consider that the thesis will ultimately argue that 
rights-based moralities are unable to provide appropriate answers to the climate 
change problem.   
The first reason for a focus upon rights-based moral systems is the fact that rights 
will be threatened both by climate change and its potential remedies. 
Climate change represents the greatest single threat to humanity in history.  It is 
already causing enormous damage to rights.  The right to health of millions is 
threatened by an increase in diseases like malaria and cholera.  The right to food 
of millions more is put at risk by an increased number of droughts.  And an 
increase in extreme weather events provides a further threat to rights to shelter and 
life.  If climate change is left unchecked, such problems are only likely to grow in 
the future.  That future will also bring with it entirely new problems which are 
especially relevant to issues of rights.  What, for example, happens to rights 
surrounding nationality, asylum and ‘statelessness’ when one’s state is entirely 
submerged by rising seas? 
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Perhaps more interesting is the moral status of the sacrifices current persons will 
need to make in the near future if the aforementioned damage to rights climate 
change will cause (and is causing) are to be lessened.  Mitigation and adaptation 
techniques will come at a considerable financial cost – money which arguably 
might otherwise have been spent protecting a wider range of rights (as opposed to 
just those endangered by climate change) more effectively.  Of even more concern 
and confusion is the fact that the enforcement of such techniques actually appears 
to come into conflict with the rights of current persons.  These issues are 
examined in Chapter 5. 
The second reason, which strongly informs attitudes of supporters of rights in 
relation to the aforementioned issues, is the moral status they assign to future 
persons.  As Chapter 3 explains, future persons cannot be said to possess rights 
which confer correlative duties upon current persons in the present.  In light of 
this, it is important to explore whether and how combatting climate change can be 
justified solely on the basis of the damage it does to the rights of current persons, 
particularly when we consider that those current persons’ rights are also 
endangered by measures taken to protect against climate change.  This issue is 
considered in Chapter 6. 
Both of these reasons for a focus on rights, one might argue, are derived from the 
particular difficulties which rights-based moralities face when confronted with the 
issue of climate change.  This is undoubtedly true.  I make no apology, however, 
for deliberately targeting rights-based moralities with the specific aim of exposing 
their inadequacies in this area.  Any moral system worth its salt should be able to 
provide its followers with adequate answers to big ethical questions like those 
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posed by climate change.  The fact that rights-based systems seem to struggle with 
climate change is, in itself, a very good reason for an in-depth investigation of the 
relationship between rights-based moral systems and climate change.
50
  It is not, 
however, the only reason for such an investigation. 
The other primary reason for a focus upon rights-based moralities is that they 
seem, in many ways, to be the most obvious and appropriate moral systems for 
considering issues relating to climate change.  As Langlois asserts, “[t]oday…the 
language of human rights has become globally recognised as a response to 
injustice.”51  Climate change, one might argue, represents the globalisation of 
injustice.  The emissions of some will come to have extreme negative effects upon 
others who are geographically, culturally and even temporally remote from them.  
Ideally, then, the rightness and wrongness of these emissions should be judged by 
a moral standard which both polluter and victim endorse.  Rights-based moralities 
would seem to be the strongest candidates for meeting such a standard. 
As Chapter 2 explains, the rights with which rights-based moralities are concerned 
are human rights.  While such systems may not follow the logic or content of 
established human rights law, all are egalitarian in nature and are indiscriminate 
with regard to which (current) individuals ought to possess which rights.  Given 
that climate change is similarly indiscriminate in selecting its victims, this 
egalitarian aspect of rights-based moral systems provides further reason for 
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 Were the relationship between a particular moral system and climate change a simple or 
straightforward thing it would hardly be worth exploring in any great detail. 
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 Langlois, A.J., ‘Normative and Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights’,  in Goodhart, M. (ed.), 
Human Rights:  Politics and Practice (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), p.12 
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thinking them a highly appropriate means of judging the moral status of our 
pollution.
52
 
Moreover, this widespread application of human rights is not merely conceptual in 
nature.  As Morinsk highlights, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 “profoundly changed the international landscape, 
scattering it with human rights protocols, conventions, treaties, and derivative 
declarations of all kinds…. [There is now] not a single nation, culture or people 
that is not in one way or another enmeshed in human rights regimes.”53  With this 
fact in mind, Donnelly draws upon Rawls’ idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ and 
applies it to human rights, claiming that “there is an international overlapping 
consensus on the Universal Declaration model.”54  He argues that: 
Human rights have moral and political authority that goes well beyond their backing by power 
(force).  They dominate contemporary political discussions not only, or even primarily, because of 
the support of materially dominant powers but rather because they respond to some of the most 
important social and political aspirations of individuals, families, and groups in most countries of 
the world.  Human rights have become internationally ‘hegemonic’ in a Gramscian sense of the 
term.
55
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 It should be noted that I consider the rights that are the concern of rights-based moral systems 
to be human rights only in the sense that they are rights held by all humans because they are 
human.  As Chapter 2 explains, different rights-based moralities differ substantially in the content 
of the rights they impose and the duties they feel to be the correlatives of such rights.  
Sometimes, such as in the case of Nozick, these differences will be so great that it is difficult to 
view the rights that are being defended as human rights except in the sense that they are rights 
which are held by all humans as a result of their humanity.  In other words, for the purposes of 
this thesis, human rights are defined by their justification as opposed to their content. 
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I am not absolutely convinced of an overlapping consensus among individuals of 
a UDHR model of human rights.
56
 However, Donnelly’s claim does have a strong 
element of validity in as much as the UDHR has come to represent a moral 
language adopted by all legitimate states in their discussions of right and wrong as 
well as forming a list of principles to which lip-service is near-universally paid 
(regardless of the practical reality of the behaviour of states when it comes to 
protecting and respecting human rights). 
While the UDHR certainly provides a potential starting point for supporters of 
rights-based moral systems, it is far from a necessity for such individuals.  People 
can (and do) consistently disagree with many of the rights listed within the UDHR 
(let alone the interpretation of the duties such rights are said to bestow upon 
others) whilst remaining supporters of rights.  Therefore, even if there is an 
overlapping consensus when it comes to the values and basic qualities held sacred 
by supporters of human rights, it is arguable as to what extent the UDHR 
represents the best way of realising those values and qualities.
57
 
Furthermore, one would have to question the extent to which individuals from all 
societies (especially non-Western societies) have, in fact, reached a consensus on 
the opinion either that all of the qualities rights aim to protect ought to be held to 
be morally sacrosanct, or that, even if they are, rights are the best way of 
protecting such qualities. 
                                               
56
 As I will go on to contend, the idea of an overlapping consensus - at an individual level - in 
favour of some form of universal human rights does seem plausible.  It is only the idea that this 
should surround a UDHR model that I find contentious. 
57
 The work of Nozick, for example, while undoubtedly egalitarian and rights-based, would seem 
difficult to align with a UDHR model.  This issue will be examined in Chapter 2. 
Page 34 of 305 
 
Both of these potential objections, though, are somewhat overcome by the fact 
that Donnelly refers to an overlapping consensus on human rights as a system of 
political morality.  When he speaks of an overlapping consensus, he speaks of a 
consensus among states that they be responsible for the basic rights of their 
citizens and among those citizens that such a role is appropriate for states.  For 
Donnelly, then, human rights are about relations (both moral and legal) between 
states and citizens. 
While this fact does not make Donnelly’s claim of overlapping consensus 
irrefutable, it does help us to see the relevance of his argument in underlining the 
value of a rights-based approach to climate change.  It is governments who will 
need to implement the policies necessary to ensure programmes of adaptation and 
mitigation are large enough and successful enough to have a meaningful effect 
upon climate change.  (And, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, it is governments who 
will risk violating the human rights of their citizens in doing so.)  Regardless of 
what they do in practice, almost every government in the world pays lip service to 
human rights.  As Goodhart puts it, “[w]hile the idea of human rights has 
provoked sometimes sharp controversy, it has nonetheless become the dominant 
normative or moral discourse of global politics and a major standard of 
international legitimacy.”58  It is for this reason that rights-based moralities might 
be considered the most appropriate moral systems by which decisions about 
combatting climate change should be judged.  Human rights are universal (or at 
least universalisable) in a way that Christianity or even utilitarianism never could 
                                               
58
 Goodhart, M., “Introduction:  Human Rights in Politics and Practice,” in Goodhart, M. (ed.), 
Human Rights:  Politics and Practice (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), p.2 
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be.
59
  Regardless of whether they make any real effort to ensure that human rights 
are realised, or of whether they agree on the content of human rights, there exists a 
good deal of agreement between governments that human rights exist and that 
they give us an appropriate language through which to consider the fundamental 
problems facing human beings at a national and international level.  And if 
governments across the globe are to successfully address the problems that will 
affect people living in every state in the world, having a single, agreed-upon 
ethical language through which to frame their concerns would be a good starting 
point. 
Finally, while their number has increased in recent years, academic studies 
considering climate change from a rights-based perspective remain relatively few 
and far between.  Those that do exist predominantly focus upon legal (as opposed 
to moral) rights and the relationship between such rights and the effects of climate 
change.  With this in mind it seems there is room for a thorough investigation of 
the relationship between moral rights, the effects of climate change, and the 
burdens associated with protecting others against those effects.  This thesis aims 
to provide a tentative entry point to such a debate. 
 
 
 
                                               
59
 What I mean by this is, while it is theoretically possible for everyone on Earth to become a 
Christian or a Utilitarian, those who are not already of such a persuasion would need to drop 
their current belief systems in order to do so.  On the other hand, it seems that people of 
particular religious and/or philosophical persuasions might actively endorse human rights in 
some form without abandoning their own primary moral doctrines.  Thus, people with radically 
different moral beliefs might, for different reasons, feel it appropriate for all humans to be 
considered to possess certain rights without needing to agree upon why they should do so. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the nature of the science surrounding climate change 
and the ethical issues which emerge from it.  The problem is perhaps best summed 
up by McKinnon when she states: 
The climate change we are experiencing requires swift, far-ranging, globally coordinated and 
probably very unpopular political action.  Depending on the action taken in the next ten to twenty 
years, the current generation will either stand as the cohort who pulled humanity back from the 
brink of environmental disaster – possibly even from extinction – or as the cohort who missed the 
last big opportunity to do so.  The current generation did not create the climate change problem 
(although many of us are doing much to exacerbate it), and are horribly unlucky in having been 
born at a time in human history when the science that reveals the scale and potential devastation of 
anthropogenically caused climate change is maturing just in time to show how little time we have 
left to do something about it.
60
 
 
Current persons are, then, largely the victims of circumstance.  The primary 
reasons that we have to make such difficult decisions are as follows: 
 The size of the current generation is unprecedented; 
 The technology we use every day (to which viable alternatives are not widely 
available) produces vast amounts of GHGs; 
 This technology is more widely available than ever before; 
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 McKinnon, C., Op.Cit, p.2.  Just how much time we have to ‘do something about’ climate 
change is, in fact, particularly unclear.  This is partly because it is difficult to predict with any great 
accuracy the correlation between our emission levels, the length of time they remain at such a 
level, and the climate-related harm that will occur.  It is undoubtedly true that, should humanity 
continue to pollute at the current rate, we will cause significant damage to present and future 
persons.  It also seems very likely that such behaviour will eventually lead to us crossing a tipping 
point beyond which adaptation ceases to be a possibility.  What is far less predictable is exactly 
when we will reach such a tipping point.  The certainty with which McKinnon asserts that, within 
the next ten to twenty years, pollution will rise to a level where the eventual crossing of a tipping 
point becomes unavoidable seems decidedly questionable. 
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 The atmosphere is already heavily laden with emissions of previous generations 
who had little or no idea of the problem they were causing. 
 
None of these factors are the fault of the current generation, yet, as the first 
generation to be fully aware of both the nature and temporal closeness of the 
problem, many people would feel that current persons are under a duty to make 
the sacrifices necessary to tackle it.  Responses to the question of which sacrifices 
(if any) current persons can be asked to make will vary considerably depending on 
the particular moral systems we adopt and the ways in which such systems view 
future persons.  This thesis will demonstrate that all rights-based moral systems 
struggle (albeit in different ways) to justify a suitable combination of both 
adaptation and mitigation methods as a result of their inability to assign 
significant moral worth to future persons. 
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CHAPTER 2:  RIGHTS-BASED MORALITIES 
 
Introduction 
Rather than analysing the ability of a specific rights-based morality to effectively 
deal with climate change, this thesis takes on the more ambitious task of 
highlighting the problems faced by rights-based moralities in general in this area.  
With this in mind, this chapter seeks to outline those qualities which must apply to 
all rights-based moral systems, while also highlighting some of the key 
differences which might reasonably occur between such systems. 
The chapter begins by identifying the basic qualities which must apply to any 
moral system which might be considered rights-based.  It then outlines the ways 
in which the rights which are to be protected by such systems might be decided 
upon.   
Having highlighted these more generic features, the chapter goes on to examine 
specific rights-based moralities in order to illustrate the finer details of their inner 
workings as well as the significant differences that occur between them.  The 
chapter outlines Interest and Choice Theory as well as Nozick’s libertarian 
proposal for a rights-based morality stemming from natural rights.  Each of these 
theories has been the subject of criticism from both supporters and sceptics of 
rights.
61
  I make no attempt to endorse any of the theories discussed.  Rather, I 
investigate each in order to provide a broad spectrum of what rights-based 
                                               
61
 This is particularly true of the work of Nozick, which has been subject to significant criticism.  
As I will argue, regardless of whether such criticism is justified (and much of it is), Nozick’s theory 
remains the clearest possible example of a rights-based morality and thus merits serious 
consideration in any attempt to provide an overarching assessment of such systems. 
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moralities might entail in order that the problems with such theories when applied 
to climate change can be shown to be problems with rights-based moralities in 
general, as opposed to problems which can be dismissed as faults with one 
specific rights-based morality. 
The chapter concludes by examining under which circumstances (if any) rights-
based moralities might allow rights to be restricted/overridden.   
 
Rights-Based Moralities 
Before embarking upon an investigation into the validity of rights-based 
moralities with regard to climate change, it is crucial to pin down exactly what is 
meant by the term ‘rights-based morality.’  This section aims to elucidate the 
point at which a moral system might be legitimately considered rights-based as 
well as considering the nature and content of the rights in question.  
To say that a moral system is rights-based must be to say something more than it 
is a system which uses rights.  Many moral systems could (and do) use rights as a 
way of achieving their goals.  Utilitarians, for example, might feel rights could be 
used to ensure the greatest good for the greatest number is achieved in practice.  
Yet to label systems which use rights in this way as rights-based moralities would 
render the distinction close to meaningless.  As Nozick puts it, “[u]tilitarianism 
doesn’t, it is said, properly take rights and their nonviolation into account; instead 
it leaves them a derivative status.”62  In order to be considered rights-based, then, 
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 Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), p.28 
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a moral system must consider the non-violation of rights to be the basis of right 
and wrong. 
This distinction, though, is not a simple one to pin down.  Even Nozick, whose 
philosophy is as ardently rights-based as it is possible to imagine, notes that rights 
are to act as side constraints on the achievement of goals which are not, in 
themselves, rights-based.
63
  Yet this is surely a claim which could be made of any 
moral system which uses rights.  The difference with a rights-based morality, 
then, is the strength that is assigned to those side constraints. 
To be considered rights-based, a moral system must hold the securing of 
inviolable individual rights to be the highest possible moral objective.  The 
purpose of rights is to constrain the actions which might be taken in pursuit of a 
particular goal, regardless of how admirable that goal may be, if said actions 
conflict with rights.  Under moral theories which are truly rights-based, rights may 
only be sacrificed, restricted or overridden in the name of other rights.  They must 
be more than simply convenient tools which might happily be abandoned in the 
name of some sort of ‘common good,’ ‘general welfare’ or any other worthy 
higher purpose unless that good/welfare/goal is itself in some important sense 
rights-based (indeed, as shall be noted later in the chapter, for thinkers like Nozick 
even this will not be a good enough reason to justify the sacrifice of rights).  
Exactly which rights may be sacrificed/restricted/overridden and under which 
circumstances is a complicated issue which will be returned to at the end of this 
chapter. 
                                               
63
 Ibid, p.29 
Page 41 of 305 
 
In summary, the first key element which defines a morality as rights-based is the 
strength it assigns to rights.  To put it simply, rights-based moralities use rights to 
determine the most fundamental aspects of right and wrong.  As a result, it would 
be impossible for rights to be usurped by non-rights-based goods since the very 
fact that such goods are not the objects of rights is itself evidence of their lesser 
status.   
It is important, at this point, to emphasise the second sentence of the above 
paragraph.  The second key element of rights-based moralities is the fact that the 
rights therein only determine the key areas of right and wrong.  Rights-based 
moralities are concerned only with what Raz would label ‘narrow morality,’64  
which he describes as follows: 
Morality in the narrow sense is meant to include only all those principles which restrict the 
individual's pursuit of his personal goals and his advancement of his self‐interest. It is not ‘the art 
of life’, i.e. the precepts instructing people how to live and what makes for a successful, 
meaningful, and worthwhile life. It is clear that right‐based moralities can only be moralities in the 
narrow sense.
65
 
 
Rights-based moralities, then, cannot tell us whether it is wrong to have sex 
outside of marriage or to swear in the presence of the elderly.  Instead, they focus 
on those elements of existence which are crucial to all human beings if they are to 
have a minimally good life.  This brings us to the third key element of rights-
based moralities: they are universal.  It is this universality which leads their 
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supporters to feel rights to be a particularly useful way of providing moral 
regulation on relationships between states and citizens. 
Rights-based moralities are derived in the abstract and, therefore, are not, 
according to their authors, based upon life within a particular society.
66
  As will be 
examined further in the next section, the moral systems they propose are founded 
upon the idea that there exist certain core qualities which are highly valued and 
thought to be essential by all humans, universally.   
If a morality is universal, then when that morality is based upon certain core 
rights, those core rights (or at least the majority of them) will apply universally.
67
  
And if the rights at the core of rights-based moralities apply to all humans (and 
only humans) because (and only because) of their humanity, then they must be 
considered to be human rights (as opposed to, say, the specific rights which 
emerge from being a citizen of a particular country or from being party to a 
contractual agreement).  As Gewirth puts it, “[h]uman rights are rights or 
entitlements that belong to every person; thus, they are universal moral rights.  
                                               
66
 While there is a substantial body of work which argues that the concept of human rights is 
western in nature and frequently amounts to an imperialist enforcement of western values upon 
other cultures, this is not a position which is endorsed or accepted by those who found their 
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67
 It is possible that there may be certain rights within a rights-based morality that are unsuitable 
for universalisation, but these will be the exception, not the rule and will emerge from 
justificatory principles which are universal.  They are applied to ensure that the principle which 
rights are designed to protect/enhance - and/or some of the general rights themselves - are 
adequately enjoyed by all people.  For example, individuals from a Romany background may have 
rights pertaining to the availability of adequate caravan sites since living in a caravan is an 
important part of their cultural and/or religious beliefs and way of life.  While this specific right 
would not apply universally to all people, it is derived from the right to partake fully in one’s 
cultural life and maintain one’s cultural practices which is universal as is the principle it is derived 
from (whether that principle be the idea of fundamental interests, a capacity for choice, or pre-
existing natural rights). 
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There may of course be other moral rights as well, but only those that morally 
ought to be universally distributed among all humans are human rights.”68   
A primary task for any rights-based morality, then, is to establish why there are 
certain rights that all human beings should have and which rights these should be. 
 
How Do We Determine Which Rights Are Human Rights? 
Having established that the rights with which rights-based moralities are 
concerned are human rights, the next question to emerge is which rights are 
human rights? 
When it comes to moral (as opposed to legal) rights this is not a question which 
can be answered with a definitive list.  Different moral systems may include 
significant variation in those aspects of morality they feel warrant the special 
status of being protected by a human right while still being legitimately 
considered rights-based moralities. 
Having said this, the rights espoused by legitimate
69
 rights-based moralities 
cannot be derived at random.  There must be some examinable reasoning behind 
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the choices of which aspects of human existence are deemed to be appropriate 
objects of rights.  This reasoning tends to boil down to some form of one of two 
justificatory models:  Choice Theory or Interest Theory.
70
 
Choice Theory places the free exercise of choice at the foundation of the human 
rights doctrine.  Choice theorists feel that “to be a human agent is to possess both 
the condition of liberty and sufficient opportunities for exercising one’s liberty”.71  
As such, they believe that the “purpose of human rights is to secure and promote 
the exercise of free choice”72 for all humans, equally.  For choice theorists, then, 
the appropriate objects of rights are those conditions which are essential to the full 
and free exercise of liberty. 
Individuals who support rights but are opposed to the idea that liberty forms a 
sufficient basis for their justification turn to universal human interests as the 
justification for human rights.  Some form of Interest Theory is put forward in 
various guises by numerous theorists, including Sen, Nussbaum and Finnis.  The 
Interest Theory approach is summarised by Fagan: 
The common basis for the interest theory approach consists of the appeal each theorist makes to 
the existence of fundamental human interests.  Human beings are viewed as physiological and 
social agents who require the sufficient protection and promotion of certain interests in order to be 
human.  These interests pre-exist, so to speak, the institution of human rights and social 
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institutions more generally.  That is to say, human rights are viewed as grounded in our very nature 
and exist in order to promote and protect those interests which constitute us:  human rights are 
viewed as the mechanism through which these interests are best identified and secured.
73
 
 
Rather than focussing upon choice as the essence of what it means to be human, 
then, interest theorists hold that there are numerous crucial basic interests which 
all human beings commonly have merely by virtue of their humanity.  The 
universality and primary nature of these interests is what qualifies them as being 
suitable objects for the protection of rights. 
If asked to compile a conclusive list of human rights, it seems unlikely that 
interest theorists or choice theorists would be able to agree upon exactly which 
rights should be included even among themselves.
74
  The differences between the 
rights listed by one group to those in the other are likely to be all the more 
abundant.  It is for this reason that no attempt is made here to outline exactly 
which rights we are referring to when we speak of rights-based moralities.  Such 
rights might vary substantially between any two theories without undermining the 
claim that either one genuinely meets the criteria of a rights-based morality. 
Having said this, there would appear to be certain rights which one might think 
ought to be common to all rights-based moralities if those moralities are to be 
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thought legitimate (although the form in which such rights appear may still vary).  
Rights to life and freedom from torture would, among others, appear to be 
appropriate candidates for inclusion on such a list.
75
   
In summary, while the exact contents of the rights that any rights-based morality 
holds as central might vary considerably, in order for the rights they espouse to be 
considered legitimate, the objects of those rights must be concerned with those 
aspects of life which are fundamental to a minimally good human existence. 
Having outlined the key characteristics commonly held by all moral systems 
which are truly rights-based, I will now move on to examine two specific 
examples of rights-based moralities – put forward by Nozick and Gewirth 
respectively – in order to better outline some of the implications of placing rights 
at the heart of our moral reasoning, as well as highlighting the vast differences 
which can exist between different types of rights-based morality.  
                                               
75
 Having said this, the manner in which such rights are formed and the principles which justify 
them may vary substantially.  Shue, for example, defends such rights very directly, believing that 
“people have a basic right to physical security – a right that is basic not to be subjected to 
murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault” (Shue, H., Basic Rights (2
nd
 Edition) (Princeton:  
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protected” (Ibid, p.21).  Shue, then, argues (quite plausibly) that those rights I have identified as 
being common to all rights-based moralities possess this commonality because rights-based 
moralities simply cannot function effectively without them.  Such rights are justified, at least in 
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For other theorists, these common rights exist because they are inarguably justified by the 
overarching principles that justify any rights.  Finnis, for example, believes that rights are justified 
by seven key interests which are universally held by all humans.  First among these is a right to 
life which, for Finnis, would encompass a right to be free from torture, since he notes that:  “The 
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shape for self-determination.  Hence life here includes bodily (including cerebral) health, and 
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and Natural Rights (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), p.86). 
 
There is not space here to produce a definitive list of rights-based moralities and their varying 
attitudes to the way in which they seek to defend rights to life and freedom from torture.  
Sufficed to say that I can think of no rights-based theory that would not assign some version of 
such rights. 
Page 47 of 305 
 
Nozick 
Lomasky describes Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia as the twentieth century’s 
“…most ambitious attempt to define the limits of the politically permissible by 
reference to Lockean-type natural rights.”76  The very first sentence of Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia is the very essence of a rights-based morality.  The claim that 
individuals possess moral rights is presented as an indisputable fact.
 
 Indeed, if we 
take the first three sentences of the book, it becomes clear that Nozick believes in 
a right-based morality in its strongest imaginable form: 
“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without 
violating their rights).  So strong and far reaching are these rights that they raise the question of 
what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.  How much room do individual rights leave for 
the state?”77 
 
Essentially, Nozick acknowledges that human beings will realise their natural 
rights more fully within a society than they would within the state of nature, and 
societies require some sort of state.  ‘State’ in this context refers to an overarching 
system of rules designed to regulate the behaviour of ‘citizens’ and a 
governmental body with the authority to enforce those rules.  For Nozick, then, 
the primary purpose of rights is to delineate those areas of life which are so crucial 
to what it is to be human that no other individual, or the state, may interfere with 
them, even if doing so would significantly improve the lives of others.  The 
primary purpose of the state is to ensure that this non-interference is adhered to. 
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The rights (or, rather, the duties associated with those rights) Nozick speaks of, 
then, are negative in nature.  Rights simply prohibit others from taking certain 
actions against us, they do not simultaneously require those others to take 
additional actions to ensure that our rights are fully realised.  So if A is bitten by a 
snake and cannot afford the antidote, and neither A’s being bitten or poverty is the 
fault of B, then B is under no duty to provide A with the antidote, even if he is 
easily able, both practically and financially, to do so.  This remains true whether B 
is an individual or a state.  As Nozick puts it, “…your being forced to contribute 
to another’s welfare violates your rights, whereas someone else’s not providing 
you with things you need greatly, including things essential to the protection of 
your rights, does not itself violate your rights, even though it avoids making it 
more difficult for someone else to violate them.”78   
As a result of this, he feels that taxation represents a violation of rights akin to 
forced labour,
79
 a fact which he fully acknowledges might mean that the end goal 
of a successful, functioning state cannot be reached through any “…morally 
permissible available means.”80   While Nozick acknowledges that some limited 
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aspect of taxation must be permissible in order to fund the functions of a state 
which better protect those rights we possess in the state of nature and thus justify 
the existence of that state, any contribution to the positive realisation of the rights 
of others must be voluntary in nature.
81
 
The reasoning behind Nozick’s conclusions on the nature of a rights-based 
morality stems from his commitment to individualism.
82
  For Nozick, individuals 
are the only legitimate subjects of rights.   
Nozick argues that rights prohibit certain actions on the basis of “the underlying 
Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be 
sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent.  
Individuals are inviolable.”83  It is the fact that this inviolability is protected by 
rights that prevents those rights from being sacrificed in the name of some 
collective good.  Indeed, for Nozick, since individuals are the relevant unit of 
moral concern, the idea of a collective good simply fails to make sense at all.  As 
he puts it: 
…there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.  There are 
only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.  Using one of 
these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others.  Nothing more.  What happens 
is that something is done to him for the sake of others.  Talk of an overall social good covers this 
up.  (Intentionally?)  To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of 
the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.  He does not get some 
overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him – least of all a 
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state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore 
scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.
84
 
 
In summary, Nozick feels that individuals are the ultimate unit of moral concern 
and the state is only justified to the extent that it makes individuals better off than 
they would be in the state of nature.  The purpose of rights is to prevent other 
individuals and the state from taking certain actions against us under any 
circumstances.  Due to this focus upon individuals, the very concept of a 
collective good that could justify the sacrifice of individual rights would be 
incoherent for Nozick.
85
 
 
Criticisms of Nozick 
Nozick can be criticised on two main grounds. 
Firstly, his work is particularly vulnerable to the criticism of naive individualism 
which is often levelled at rights-based moral theories.  Gewirth summarises such 
an objection as follows: 
The emphasis on rights, it is held, entails the view that persons have rights but no duties towards 
others, that they are preoccupied only with claiming their own property and other goods and 
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holding them to be inviolable, so that any attempts to enforce duties for the benefit of other 
persons or the general welfare are deemed morally wrong.
86
 
 
Unlike other supporters of rights, Nozick would largely agree with such a 
statement (although he would hold that the only duties we have are negative duties 
to avoid taking actions which violate rights and such duties would therefore be 
owed to other individuals).  Essentially, Nozick’s work mirrors the Thatcherite 
assertion that there is no such thing as society, and that only individuals can be 
deemed appropriate subjects of morality (in Nozick’s case through the ascription 
of rights).  Many would feel that such an approach failed to recognise the fact that 
human beings are only able to fully realise their rights within a society in which 
others took positive action to assist that realisation and thus also failed to assign 
appropriate moral weight to collective goods, which may be directly and/or 
indirectly antecedent to that realisation.
87
 
The second major criticism of Nozick is that, due to the fact that his theory is 
founded upon the undefended
88
 claim that human beings possess natural rights 
which are so strong that they form the basis of what states and others can and 
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cannot do if they are to act morally, that theory is more akin to dogma than 
reasoned argument. 
But is Nozick’s argument that individuals have rights as dogmatic as it seems? 
All arguments in favour of rights-based moralities begin with some sort of 
assumption.  Gewirth, for example, assumes that an ability to take action and to 
choose which actions to take is central to human functioning.  Interest theorists, 
on the other hand, assume that there are certain fundamental interests which are 
universal to all humans and which are so important as to justify the existence of a 
system of universal rights to protect them. 
Nozick’s assumption (which is shared by others) is that human beings possess 
natural rights.  These rights, which are possessed in the state of nature by all 
humans, form the basis of why and how we might possess rights within a society. 
We can, of course, undermine Nozick’s argument by denying the truth of this 
assumption, but we might equally deny the assumption that fundamental interests 
or a capacity for action are significantly important to warrant the imposition of 
rights.  This is not to deny that interests or a capacity for action exist at all, but 
simply to argue that Interest and Choice theorists both fail to provide a conclusive 
explanation of why such things should automatically require us to adopt a rights-
based morality, given that a) either or both could surely be protected in other 
ways, and b) we may feel that other universal human characteristics are of equal 
or greater importance in terms of justifying our moral thinking.  Indeed, this is 
shown by the very existence of both interest and choice theorists.  Even among 
supporters of rights-based moralities, some do not think human interests (which 
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they surely believe exist) are sufficient to justify rights, whereas others do not 
think a capacity for action has this status. 
The fact that Nozick’s theory is based upon an assumption is not, in itself, enough 
to deny its validity as a rights-based morality.  Having said this, the strength of 
that founding assumption will inevitably affect the strength of the theory as a 
whole and the assumption that individuals have natural rights seems eminently 
more deniable than the assumption that individuals have fundamental interests or 
a capacity for action.  As noted above, for Choice and Interest theorists, the 
question is not whether we have a capacity for action or fundamental interests, but 
whether these things are sufficient to justify the claim that morality is (or should 
be) rights-based.  With regard to Nozick, however, we might question not just 
whether the rights we have in a state of nature warrant the imposition of a 
correlative rights-based morality, but also whether we really have natural rights at 
all. 
In what sense, one might ask, are natural rights, rights?   
Take, for example, liberty.  We undeniably have the quality of liberty in the state 
of nature in that we are, by and large, free to do whatever we are able to do.  It is 
questionable, though, whether this amounts to a right to liberty.  Can we really 
have a right to something in any meaningful sense in the absence of a state which 
(at least theoretically) holds the power to enforce that right and punish those who 
violate it? 
I do not propose to answer such a question here, but rather to highlight that the 
idea of natural rights is far more controversial than the idea of fundamental 
interests or a capacity for action.  As Gewirth, highlights, we do not have rights in 
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the same way we have limbs
89
 and so a theory of rights ought to provide some 
explanation as to why we ought to be said to have rights.  Yet Nozick provides us 
with no explanation as to why he thinks the qualities we possess in the state of 
nature amount to rights to those qualities.  And if such qualities do not bear the 
status of rights, it is less clear that these qualities ought to be used to delineate 
what states can and cannot do. 
As Nagel puts it, “Nozick starts from the unargued premise that individuals have 
certain inviolable rights which may not be intentionally transgressed by other 
individuals or the state for any purpose.” 90  It is from this premise that his theory 
develops.  Nozick feels such rights to bare such a strong status that even taxation 
for the good of protecting the rights of others is prohibited.
91
  Ultimately, Nozick 
feels that the state is permissible, but only to the extent that it better protects the 
very limited but very strongly-held negative rights we have in the state of nature.  
In the state of nature we have rights to qualities such as life and property which, 
morally-speaking, others ought to respect.  However, in reality people will 
sometimes act immorally for their own self-gain and thus may murder others or 
steal their property.  The minimal nightwatchman state is permissible because it 
better protects our natural rights.  Anything more extensive unnecessarily harms 
our natural rights, as opposed to better safeguarding them.  As such, the general 
conception of modern civilised society accepted by most people (especially 
supporters of rights) – free healthcare, a welfare state et cetera – is not simply 
beyond the minimum required by morality, but is actively immoral. 
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The real problem, then, is not simply that Nozick fails to provide any kind of 
argument as to why we should be so certain that humans possess fundamental 
rights (a fact that many would disagree with), but that the nature of the rights-
based morality he derives from such an assumption is also highly controversial.  
Nozick’s ideal state, emerging from his unusually strong conception of rights, is 
equally objectionable to most others both in favour and opposed to rights-based 
moralities.  And if one seeks to avoid the unfortunate conclusions Nozick arrives 
at through a series of detailed and logical arguments, the most obvious way of 
doing so is to deny the truth of the premise upon which such arguments are 
founded. 
The questions and criticisms which arise in relation to both the theory and practice 
of Nozick’s work are numerous.  Nagel, for example, highlights that, in practice 
“…it is doubtful that a government limited to the functions of police, courts, 
prisons, and national defense would be conspicuously benign, or that it would be 
especially protective of individual rights.”92 
In terms of theory, one might question whether the rights one supposedly has in 
the state of nature should automatically be mirrored in a society
93
 and, more 
importantly, why all the rights Nozick defends must possess such equal status in 
terms of their non-derogability and the circumstances under which we might feel 
they are violated.  It would seem that a right to property might be more easily and 
legitimately restricted (through taxation) than a right to be free from torture.
94
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While criticisms such as these are not necessarily insurmountable, in failing to 
provide any justification as to why humans should be said to have natural rights or 
why those rights should amount to the bedrock of morality, Nozick is susceptible 
to the argument that his otherwise coherent and detailed arguments are built on an 
unsecure foundation.  If we disagree with the controversially strong status Nozick 
assigns to those qualities we hold in a state of nature then all of the complex and 
well-reasoned arguments he derives from them are undermined.  Given this fact, 
supporters and detractors of Nozick alike might agree that his failure to provide an 
adequate justification of why he assigns such importance to natural rights 
represents a glaring and unnecessary weakness for his theory as a whole. 
Despite its problems, Nozick’s theory unquestionably represents a rights-based 
morality.  It places rights in a central, foundational position and builds an 
overarching moral theory based around the status of those rights.  Even if we think 
that the many criticisms of Nozick’s work indicate that it is an inadequate (or 
perhaps just an inadequately argued) rights-based morality, none demonstrate that 
it is an illegitimate one.
95
  For this reason, this thesis will consider the Nozickian 
position throughout in order to ensure that any problems identified with rights-
based approaches to climate change genuinely represent problems with rights-
based moralities in general, as opposed to problems which are specific to any 
particular rights-based morality. 
There is also a second reason for considering the Nozickian position. 
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opposed to merely using them as a tool to realise non-rights-based moral goals and overriding 
those rights when upholding them would go against the true values of the morality. 
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Not only is Nozick’s system undoubtedly rights-based, it is also a system which 
might arguably be more readily adopted by individuals who do not already have a 
propensity towards rights-based moralities (and who are perhaps suspicious of the 
notion of any over-arching moral system).  Nozick’s negative approach to rights 
arguably comes closer to Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus than other 
rights-based approaches to morality. 
At the very least, one might argue that the vast number of preventable human 
rights violations which occur across the globe as a result of poverty are indicative 
of a lack of certainty among individuals, states and international bodies alike with 
regard to the identity of the bearers of the positive duties which are supposedly 
correlative to rights.  However, it could well be that the issue is deeper than this.  
Perhaps this unwillingness to fulfil positive duties effectively in fact stems from a 
more deep-seated belief that rights do not place us under a moral duty to take 
positive action to help others.  This is not to claim that we do not think that doing 
so is a morally good thing, but rather that it is a matter of supererogation, not 
duty. 
On the other hand, it would seem a more achievable (though not simple) task to 
gain some level of consensus among individuals who are not inherently drawn to 
the idea of a rights-based morality that human beings ought to refrain from taking 
those actions which directly cause the infringement of the rights of others.  This 
seems particularly true if, like Nozick, we limit those rights to a narrow range of 
qualities which it would be fairly uncontroversial to maintain were fundamental 
and universal in nature.  Theft, murder and torture, for example, are, all things 
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being equal, considered to be wrong by a great many people who espouse no 
clearly distinguished system of moral belief, let alone a rights-based one. 
This greater propensity towards a more Nozickian system of rights is perhaps 
demonstrated by the fact that we venerate those who sacrifice their time and 
money in order to take positive action to improve the rights (especially the 
economic, social and cultural rights) of others by, say, paying for and/or 
administering vaccines against malaria to those who are too poor to otherwise 
protect themselves from the disease.  Notice that we do not place similar plaudits 
upon individuals for managing to refrain from murdering others.  We feel that not 
murdering people is a general minimum requirement of morality which we are 
duty-bound to fulfil, whereas to take positive action to prevent the deaths of others 
is to go beyond the minimum and thus to go beyond the realm of duty.
96
 
Of course, even if we accept that Nozick’s theory might be the most acceptable to 
those who are suspicious of rights, we might nonetheless argue that said theory is 
so lacking in the protection we want any morality – particularly a rights-based 
morality – to offer that we might better achieve the goods most of us think rights 
are there to protect through some other, non-rights-based system.  Kantians, for 
example, could surely prevent much more of the suffering we generally think 
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rights ought to protect us from than Nozickians without the need to refer to rights 
at all.
97
  
However, the purpose of this thesis is not to promote the adoption of rights-based 
moralities over and above other moral systems, but to investigate their pros and 
cons in tackling climate change.  Therefore it is important to consider the broadest 
possible section of rights-based moral theories, particularly those which stand a 
better chance of being adopted in practice in order to address a climate change 
problem which is, unfortunately, not simply a thought experiment but a genuine 
threat to human rights. 
 
Choice Theory / Gewirth 
Despite the fact that Robert Nozick’s work represents a clear and coherent 
example of a rights-based morality, many supporters of rights would (quite 
legitimately) feel aggrieved by the suggestion that any difficulties with such a 
theory should be viewed as evidence of difficulties with all rights-based 
moralities.  The purpose of this chapter is not to advance the merits of any 
particular rights-based morality over another, but to identify commonalities 
between them as well as highlighting different interpretations of how such 
systems might operate.  With this in mind, this section will examine the theory put 
forward by Gewirth, which, while varying considerably from Nozick’s, remains 
undeniably rights-based and represents a good example Choice Theory, which 
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stands alongside Interest Theory and Libertarian approaches like that of Nozick as 
one of the three primary types of rights-based morality. 
As Boylan notes, “Gewirth will be known first for his original and influential 
theory on the origin and justification of human rights.”98  The differences between 
Gewirth’s and Nozick’s work are numerous and significant, but they perhaps all 
stem from a difference in their justifications of rights.  As noted above, Nozick’s 
theory is somewhat lacking when it comes to justifying the ascription of rights to 
human beings, which is based on some vague assertion that individuals are born in 
possession of natural rights.  Gewirth, on the other hand, seeks to provide a 
specific and definite justification of why human beings ought to have rights which 
might then act as solid foundation on which to delineate the limits and contents of 
his rights-based morality. 
Gewirth’s work has been described as the most sophisticated and detailed account 
of Choice Theory available.
99
   More specifically, he feels that the ability to take 
purposive action lies at the heart of what it is to be human and thus the purpose of 
rights is to protect such qualities as are needed by all humans if they are to take 
such action.  Gewirth begins with the premise that freedom and well-being are the 
essential qualities or ‘basic goods’ required by all human beings in order to afford 
them the capacity for action that separates them from non-human animals.  This 
fact, Gewirth believes, necessitates the existence of human rights
100
 and ultimately 
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justifies the implementation of ‘social rules and institutions’ which serve to better 
protect such rights.
101
 
It is, then, human beings’ capacity for action – and, importantly, the universality 
of the capacity for action and the freedom to choose which actions to take – that 
underlines Gewirth’s belief in human rights as a rational necessity.  He 
summarises this step in logic as follows: 
…human rights are of supreme importance, and are central to all other moral considerations, 
because they are rights of every human being to the necessary conditions of human action, i.e., 
those conditions that must be fulfilled if human action is to be possible either at all or with general 
chances of success in achieving the purposes for which humans act.  Because they are such rights, 
they must be respected by every human being, and the primary justification of governments is that 
they serve to secure these rights.  Thus the Subjects as well as the Respondents of human rights are 
all human beings; the Objects of the rights are the aforesaid necessary conditions of human action 
and of successful action in general; and the Justifying Basis of the rights is the moral principle 
which establishes that all humans are equally entitled to have these necessary conditions, to fulfil 
the general needs of human agency.
102
 
 
For Gewirth the idea that all human beings possess rights which all other human 
beings hold correlative duties in relation to is not simply a dogmatic claim but a 
reasoned conclusion made on what he believes are a series of irrefutable steps in 
logic.   
Gewirth argues that what he labels ‘the exceptional manditoriness’ of human 
rights is derived from the fact that the moral principle which forms the justifying 
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basis of these rights amounts to a ‘rational necessity.’103  That moral principle is 
labelled by Gewirth as the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which he 
outlines as follows:  “Addressed to every actual or prospective agent, it says:  Act 
in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.  (The 
generic rights are rights to the generic features of action – freedom and well-being 
– which constitute its necessary conditions.)”104 
Gewirth lays out four reasons for thinking that human rights should be grounded 
in ‘the necessary conditions of human action,’ which he argues justify the PGC. 
Firstly, he argues that the undeniable ‘supreme importance’ of human rights – or, 
rather, the universality of that supreme importance – demonstrates that “every 
actual or prospective agent must be concerned with human rights, and… also why 
these rights must take precedence over all other practical criteria or requirements, 
including those that bear on objects or conditions of action that are of lesser 
stringency.”105  Since the objects of rights are a) of supreme importance, and b) 
are of supreme importance to everyone, they are better candidates as the basis of 
morality than objects which are of less importance for everyone or which are of 
supreme importance to only some people.  As a result, the objects of rights might 
legitimately be assumed to supersede other less important and/or less universal 
objects of morality. 
Secondly, Gewirth argues that “to tie human rights to the necessary conditions of 
action is to connect the rights directly with morality, since action is the common 
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subject matter of all moralities.”106  In this way he seeks to make his theory appeal 
to something like an ‘overlapping consensus.’  If we accept Gewirth’s claim that 
an ability to take action and to choose which actions to take represents the 
common subject matter of all moralities, then any objection which is made to the 
notion of human rights must be instrumental in nature.  The only argument that 
remains to those objecting to Gewirth’s theory is to claim that there are better 
ways of ensuring this capacity for action is protected than the ascription of 
universal rights.  If we accept this to be the case, Gewirth’s theory will be 
substantially strengthened since the key justificatory reason behind rights will be 
universally accepted and all that will remain is to convince others that rights are 
the best tool to achieve this uncontroversial goal in practice.  In this way, this 
element of the PGC represents both a strength and a weakness for Gewirth, since 
critics might undermine his whole theory through the very plausible argument that 
action simply is not the common subject matter of all moralities (utilitarianism 
would appear to be an example of a moral system where a capacity for action does 
not obviously act as the founding moral justification, as indeed would Interest-
based theories of rights).
107
 
Thirdly, Gewirth maintains that “the necessary conditions of action have more 
specific and less disputable contents than may be attributed to concepts like 
‘dignity’ and ‘flourishing.’”108  He presumably thinks that this fact makes the 
qualities required for the taking of action more appropriate objects of rights than 
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those required for the more ambiguous concepts of maintaining human dignity or 
living a flourishing human life.  While there is some merit in this argument, one 
might question why the fact that the necessary conditions for action are more 
specific and less disputable than other possible justificatory reasons for human 
rights should automatically make the capacity for action a better justification.  
Certainly such criteria might make it easier to decide what human rights ought to 
be rights to, but this does not mean that action is automatically a more appropriate 
justificatory foundation for rights than concepts like dignity or flourishing.   
Moreover, outside of rights-based moral thinking, the value of the more specific 
and less disputable contents of the necessary conditions for action seems lessened.  
Indeed, a lack of such a definite structure upon which morality is founded is what 
allows non-rights-based moral systems to impart moral guidance on a much wider 
range of issues, as opposed to being forced to limit their attention to so-called 
‘narrow morality.’ 
None of this should be seen to undermine Gewirth’s work as a whole.  In deriving 
rights from the necessary conditions for action his theory has the advantage of 
enabling its supporters to coherently demonstrate which rights we should have 
and why.  This fact, though, provides no reason as to why we should be logically 
bound to accept human rights or the idea that such rights are justified on the basis 
that they enhance our capacity for action. 
Gewirth’s fourth and final reason for basing human rights on the necessary 
conditions for action lies in the fact that: 
…this serves to emphasize that the ultimate purpose of the rights is to secure for each person a 
certain fundamental moral status.  All the human rights, those of well-being as well as of freedom, 
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have as their aim that each person have rational autonomy in the sense of being a self-controlling, 
self-developing agent who can relate to other persons on the basis of mutual respect and 
cooperation, in contrast to being a dependent, passive recipient of the agency of others.
109
 
 
This final element is perhaps the most important aspect of the PGC.  In basing 
rights on the central importance of autonomy to human well-being, Gewirth 
grounds his theory upon its ability to protect a quality that many people would 
agree represents a universal and crucially important aspect of human nature which 
is fundamental to what it is to be a human and live a minimally good life.  Such a 
fact is highlighted by Beyleveld, who states that: 
Gewirth’s attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral principle and the 
concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognising that the Principle of 
Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to accept that Gewirth’s 
Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.
110
 
 
For Beyleveld, “…Gewirthians are Kantian in aiming to establish a categorically 
binding impartial principle as being connected entirely a priori with the concept of 
an agent as such.”111  Providing we accept Beyleveld’s position, it becomes clear 
that neither Gewirth’s insistence that autonomy is central to morality nor his claim 
that a binding moral principle can be derived from this fact are particularly 
controversial ideas.
112
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In summary, Gewirth’s theory claims that I “may and must accept a maxim if (and 
only if) my failure to accept it entails that I fail to understand what it is for me to 
be an agent.”113  The duties I owe to others emerge as a result of the possession of 
agency in both mine and their persons.
114
 
According to Gewirth, the ability to take purposive action is something which all 
humans ought to possess if they are to live minimally good lives.  In order to be 
able to take purposive action, certain conditions need to be met; we need others to 
refrain from taking certain actions against us and, where possible, to take certain 
actions in order to better our own ability to take action.  Such conditions are 
safeguarded by the provision of rights.  Since all humans require their own rights 
to be respected in order to be able to take action, rationally speaking they must 
also respect the rights of other human beings. 
Gewirth’s theory, then, affords us a reasoned account of why certain elements of 
morality must be given a higher status than others and are, therefore, the objects 
of rights.  It also explains why such rights might legitimately be considered 
universal, thus providing some justification for the use of a morality based upon 
such rights to judge the actions of all persons, including those who may be 
culturally opposed to it.  This is perhaps the most significant challenge faced by 
the supporter of rights in the real world. 
Gewirth’s theory is undeniably rights-based, and one which makes a highly 
credible attempt to demand that all must make the decision to follow it based on 
reason rather than dogma.  This strengthens its credibility when compared to 
Nozick’s work.  Having said this, Gewirth’s attempt to derive a theory which 
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presents rights, not simply as a plausible way of enforcing morality, but as a 
rational necessity is highly ambitious and invites criticism. 
 
Criticisms of Gewirth 
Unsurprisingly for such an all-encompassing moral theory, there have been 
significant criticisms of Gewirth’s work.  Many, though, are criticisms of rights-
based moralities more generally and are thus of little relevance here.  If we 
dismiss the validity of rights-based moralities altogether then there is little sense 
in determining whether their difficulties in adequately addressing the problem of 
climate change represent a dangerous exception to the otherwise positive idea of 
their general implementation.  The criticisms I wish to consider here, then, are 
criticisms of Gewirth’s theory in particular, which tend to be made by people who 
are sympathetic to the general idea of moral rights.  They are concerned with the 
universality (or lack of) set out by Gewirth’s theory and with his appeal to 
rationality as a justification for his work. 
The first problem with Gewirth’s work is that, while it purports to be a theory of 
universal human rights, it does not actually apply equally and universally to all 
humans.  Gewirth’s theory is justified by the notion that we should have rights 
because we are capable of action and we should respect the rights of others 
because we are rational beings.  As, De Roose highlights, however, this reasoning 
denotes a flaw in theories like that put forward by Gewirth: 
Some beings, including children, animals and the mentally handicapped, seem to deserve moral 
consideration, despite the fact that they are not rational or moral agents.  These so-called marginal 
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cases create a problem for theories that heavily stress the role of moral and/or rational agency in 
ethics:  the latter seem unable to account for the former’s moral status.115 
 
In other words, to claim that human rights are the rights of individuals with the 
capacity for purposive action is, paradoxically, also to claim that certain 
individuals do not possess human rights.  Most obviously, children might be 
considered questionable subjects of rights, since their capacity for action is 
distinctly underdeveloped.  However, in as much as children have the potential to 
become fully-functioning purposive agents, and considering that that capacity for 
action will increase in stages (rendering less clear cut the claim that children are 
not purposive agents at all) it would not seem unreasonable to claim that 
Gewirth’s theory might allow children rights.  More difficult cases are individuals 
in a permanent vegetative state, or those with severe learning disabilities.  In such 
cases, even the potential for action is lost. 
None of this is conclusive evidence of any fundamental problem with Gewirth’s 
theory.  Perhaps it is possible to treat these marginal cases in a compassionate and 
ethical way without the assignment of rights.  However, given that Gewirth seeks 
to use rights as the foundations of morality, it becomes difficult to see exactly 
how his system could properly ensure the welfare of such people.  Certainly the 
idea that showing adequate respect to such persons ought to be a matter of 
supererogation - that mistreating them would be wrong in the same way that 
mistreating a dog would be wrong - seems callous in the extreme.  Those 
supporting Gewirth, then, are under pressure to find a good reason as to how and 
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why a morality founded upon the capacity for action should protect those 
individuals who lack such a capacity.  If they do not, then the logic behind their 
theory will be weakened through its failure to justify a system of rights which is 
truly universal.  The alternative is that Gewirthians simply agree that so-called 
‘marginal cases’ should not receive the full protection of a moral system, but this 
position would obviously be met with a great deal of hostility. 
The issue of to whom rights ought to apply is a difficulty which is far from unique 
to Gewirth in the field of rights theorists.  It is an issue which will come to the 
fore in more detail in Chapter 5, which will investigate the moral status of future 
persons under rights-based moral systems. 
The second major problem with Gewirth’s theory stems from his attempt to justify 
his ideas through an appeal to rationality.  As Gewirth puts it, “[i]n sum, then, my 
argument for the existence of human rights is that every agent logically must hold 
or accept that he and all other agents have these rights because their Objects are 
the necessary conditions of human action.”116 The use of the term ‘logically must’ 
is distinctly problematic in a world where the meeting – and even the 
acknowledgement – of rights is far from universal.  As Fagan argues, “…despite 
his appeals to the authority of logic, Gewirth’s account of the rationality of human 
rights is inadequate to the modern world in which human rights must secure their 
existence.  If it is a failure of rationality to accept and respect the rights of all 
other moral agents, then countless millions of human agents must be condemned 
as irrational.”117 
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Of course, the fact that people do not act in accordance with Gewirth’s morality is 
not evidence that they should not do so.  Rather, it is simply evidence that the 
world does not currently act in accordance with a rights-based morality – a fact 
which comes as no surprise.  The problem Fagan seeks to highlight, however, is 
Gewirth’s insistence that his theory stems from the rational necessity of the PGC.   
Gewirth purports to arrive at the conclusion that human beings possess 
fundamental rights - a conclusion he determines must be accepted by all 
rationally-minded people - through a series of steps of logic which, he claims, 
must also be accepted by all rationally-minded people.  Therefore, if a) it is 
legitimate to call into question his conclusion that the acceptance of universal 
human rights is a rational necessity (and it would seem that it is),
118
 and b) if that 
conclusion is derived from a series of logical steps, then it seems equally 
legitimate to question the truth both of those logical steps and of the idea that 
human beings have (or ought to have) fundamental rights. 
If a sociological study into human behaviour resulted in a conclusion that was 
manifestly false, one would have to discount the legitimacy of that study 
regardless of the apparent quality of the methodology and thoroughness of the 
research.  Indeed, it seems there would inevitably be some significant error with 
regard to either the work or the conclusions derived from it.  In attempting to 
strengthen his theory by claiming it to be an undeniable, logical necessity, then, 
Gewirth actually serves to weaken his argument because his conclusion (that 
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human beings have rights and that these rights ought to be respected by all 
rationally-minded people) is, in fact, at least eminently deniable and arguably 
logically flawed.  
Despite these difficulties, Gewirth must be commended for making a detailed 
attempt to respond to failings he perceived in the work of other rights theorists to 
develop “a consecutive line of argument from first principles to practical 
applications” and resolve “certain basic problems about human rights, especially 
problems of justification.”119  The fact that, in doing so, he has left his theory open 
to well-reasoned criticism should perhaps not be seen as evidence that that theory 
is invalid, but rather as evidence that justifying universal moral theories in general 
is never an easy task.  Indeed, his key failure does not arise in his ability to present 
a coherent and consecutive line of argument, but simply in his overzealous 
insistence that that it is an argument which must be accepted by all who deem 
themselves rational.  Despite this insistence, there seems nothing within Gewirth’s 
theory that prevents us from arguing that it is a theory which rationally-minded 
people might accept as a good way of implementing moral principles in practice 
without requiring us to insist that rationally-minded people must accept such a 
theory. 
Moreover, evidence of flaws with Gewirth’s reasoning are not evidence of flaws 
with rights-based moral theories in general and a theory something like Gewirth’s 
(with certain adaptations) is what is envisioned by a significant number of 
supporters of rights. 
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The Limits of Rights 
Having established which kinds of qualities might be considered the basis of a 
rights-based morality and why, it is important to consider the status of human 
rights in relation both to other rights and to non-rights-based moral concerns. 
In order to be considered rights-based, a moral system must give a particularly 
high level of importance to rights.  Human rights must necessarily trump non-
rights-based moral concerns.  Gewirth attempts to express this necessity in his 
explanation of why the capacity for purposive action should be considered to 
justify a moral system based on rights: 
…the correlative ‘oughts’ of human rights are practical-prescriptive ‘musts’ addressed to other 
persons or groups, and these ‘musts’ can be logically derived only from antecedents that 
themselves are similarly necessary.  The necessary goods of human action fulfil this condition; 
other proposed Objects and Justifying Bases of human rights either do not do so at all or do so less 
directly and explicitly. 
This normative necessity is a distinctive feature of human rights that gives them a more stringent 
modality than other moral or valuational concepts.  Goods are worth having; virtues are good to 
have and indeed admirable; what is right is at least permissible and may also be justified by some 
relevant rule.  Human rights, however, are normative relations to Objects which one must have in 
order to be an agent.  It is for this reason that human rights are uniquely and centrally important 
among moral concepts:  they are the necessary basis and focal point of all morality, since no 
morality, together with the goods, virtues and rules emphasized in diverse moralities, is possible 
without the necessary goods of action which are the Objects of human rights.
120
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Regardless of whether we agree with Gewirth’s reasoning as to the underlying 
justification for the imposition of a particular rights-based morality, his comments 
regarding the necessary features of a rights-based morality hold true.  The duties 
which are the correlatives of human rights hold immense moral weight.  As 
Gewirth puts it, the ‘oughts’ associated with most moral concerns become ‘musts’ 
when they relate to human rights.  I ought not to spend all my wages on beer 
instead of buying my young daughter a birthday present.  Rights-based moralities 
seek to differentiate such lesser moral considerations from the bigger issues about 
how human beings should live their lives. 
As earlier highlighted, rights-based moralities are narrow moralities, focussing on 
the ethics of the public/political sphere and the relationships between states and 
their citizens.
121
  In order to achieve a moral system which is truly universal while 
remaining meaningful, rights-based moralities seek to protect only the most 
fundamental areas of existence, but to do so in a manner which is far more 
obligatory than everyday morality.  Essentially, rights-based moralities seek to 
expand our freedom by limiting it.  Rights outline those actions it is impermissible 
to take (or, with regard to positive duties, to refrain from taking).  They tell us that 
certain things are always wrong and that our doing them may be legitimately 
prevented/punished by others with the relevant authority.  Since all of the most 
fundamental aspects of morality are covered by human rights, human rights must 
always outweigh any other, non-rights-based moral concerns. 
So what does this mean in terms of the ‘absoluteness’ of rights? 
                                               
121
 This is not to say that individuals do not hold duties to others under a rights-based system, 
but, rather, that these duties are more effectively realised when they are conferred to states 
through the payment of taxes by individual duty-bearers. 
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While lawyers are able to determine a hierarchy of rights by insisting that some 
are ‘non-derogable’ while others may be subject to ‘progressive realisation,’ the 
issue of why, when and in which ways rights may be overridden is a much more 
difficult task for advocates of rights-based moralities.  While it may be possible to 
claim that it is not permissible to override rights in the name of non-rights-based 
goods,
122
 claiming that rights and/or the extensive list of duties which are their 
correlatives are absolute in relation even to each other will prove a difficult (and 
perhaps an impossible) task.  This is because of the simple fact that rights will 
sometimes clash.  When such clashes occur, one right must be sacrificed in the 
name of another.  Any legitimate and effective rights-based morality ought to 
provide some way of deciding which right ought to be the one to give way.   
Gewirth affords a clear measure by which such decisions should be made.  He 
states that “…if two moral rights are so related that each can be fulfilled only by 
infringing the other, that right takes precedence whose fulfilment is more 
necessary for action.”123  Gewirth, however, distinguishes such a process from 
violations of rights, stating that: 
A right is violated when it is unjustifiably infringed, i.e., when the required action is unjustifiably 
not performed or the prohibited action is unjustifiably performed.  And a right is overridden when 
it is justifiably infringed, so that there is sufficient justification for not carrying out the correlative 
duty, and the required action is justifiably not performed or the prohibited action is justifiably 
prohibited.
124
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 And even this is a controversial area which is likely to involve making difficult distinctions with 
regard to what amounts to a non-rights-based good and the difference between violating rights 
and restricting them. 
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It is important to note that Gewirth’s interpretation of when rights might be said to 
clash is broader than might be allowed by other critics and supporters of rights 
alike.  While he maintains that rights are held by individuals, he does not assert 
that those rights need to clash with the rights of others in a direct manner before 
their restriction becomes permissible.  Rather, he believes that a concern for the 
rights of individuals requires a concern for the common good to the extent that 
that common good protects the rights of other individuals.  He explains his 
position as follows: 
…social rules and institutions are justified when they are instrumental to securing person’s rights 
to freedom and well-being.  The duties of each person to respect the rights of others are extended 
to various aspects of political obligation.  When a state is justified by the PGC as securing the 
rights of all its inhabitants, each person living in such a state has the duty to support it.  This duty 
ranges from obeying its laws to contributing, by taxes, advocacy, and other relevant means, to the 
state’s carrying out its justified functions.  More generally, the PGC, in requiring respect for the 
generic rights of each person, requires also support of the whole system of mutually sustaining 
rights and duties.  In this way, the emphasis on individual rights is not only compatible with, but 
requires a conscientious concern for, the common good.
125
 
 
Gewirth claims that this concern for the common good is so strong that even the 
right to life of an innocent person might be legitimately overridden were the 
consequences of respecting that right sufficiently dire.
126
  He does not mean to 
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 Ibid, p.19 
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 Ibid, p.218.  Gewirth does not provide specific reason as to why he believes this to be the case, 
seemingly believing such a notion to be self-evident.  The examples he provides might each be 
justified through a utilitarian view of rights under which, in cases where the same rights of 
different individuals come into conflict, those of the few are sacrificed in the name of those of 
the many.  However, the supporter of rights who does not also accept the validity of even a 
rights-based utilitarianism would argue that all four examples might just as easily be justified 
through reference to the doctrine of double-effect.  Gewirth does go on to argue that certain 
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suggest, however, that rights ought not to be given primacy.  Rather, he simply 
argues that the rights of any individual may be justifiably restricted in order to 
better protect the rights of others even if the exercise of the rights of that 
individual does not, in and of itself, amount to a violation of the rights of those 
others. 
For example, if the exercise of freedom of opinion by A on a particular date is 
highly likely to cause B to murder C, D and E, it would not automatically amount 
to a violation of the rights of A if the state took reasonable measures to prevent 
the airing of such an opinion, even though A’s exercise of her right does not 
directly clash with the rights of anybody else.  For Gewirth, the general harm to 
the common good is enough to warrant the lesser right to be overridden.  It is 
important to note, though, that this common good remains rights-based, and 
reference to it is only justified because of the harm to rights which will otherwise 
indirectly occur.  Were the resultant harm not a harm to rights (for example, if - 
unlike the human A and B - C, D and E were giant pandas) or were it a harm to 
the lesser rights of the greater number (if, instead of killing C, D and E, B simply 
                                                                                                                                                  
rights can be absolute, but he does so by taking extremely specific scenarios and treating them as 
individual rights in and of themselves rather than examples of particular violations of more 
general rights.   
 
So, for example, he asserts that mothers have an absolute (and in some sense distinct) right not 
to be tortured to death by their own sons, whereas most supporters of rights would feel that 
such a scenario was merely an example of one of the many ways a general right to be tortured 
might be violated.  A supporter of rights who agreed with Gewirth’s assertion that mothers ought 
never to be tortured to death by their own sons but did not agree that this constituted a separate 
right might instead argue that the general right not to be tortured is absolute, but that this does 
not mean that every individual duty associated with that right is also absolute.  This position is 
examined in greater detail below. 
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planned to steal £1 from each of them), reference to the common good would not 
be justified.
127
 
Some version of Gewirth’s notion that human rights may be legitimately 
overridden when they clash with the (more important) rights of others (either 
directly or indirectly) is arguably the most popular interpretation of the limits of 
rights among their supporters.  It is, however, not the only possible interpretation 
left open to those who propose that morality is rights-based. 
Nozick presents an alternative view of the way in which rights work in practice.  
As noted earlier, for Nozick rights are as individualist as it is possible to imagine.  
There is no such thing as a collective with a common good.  Limiting the rights of 
one person harms that one person for the benefit of others.  The type of harm 
which occurs is exactly the type of harm rights are designed to protect us from and 
thus cannot be justified under a Nozickian morality. 
For Nozick, rights “…are agent-relative, in the sense that each agent is taken to be 
concerned only with his own observance of the constraints.”128  As Waldron 
highlights, this, in combination with their status as side constraints, has the effect 
of preventing the existence of any circumstances under which rights might be 
legitimately overridden, since it casts doubt over the very concept of a clash of 
rights: 
Since a constraint presents itself to him simply as a limit on his conduct, he is not required by a 
concern for rights to try to limit the conduct of others to see that rights are respected by them, and 
so the question of whether he should violate some rights himself in order to prevent graver 
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 Such a fact will be of great relevance when we come to consider the moral position of future 
persons. 
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 Waldron, J., ‘Rights in Conflict’ in his Liberal Rights:  Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.204 
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violations by others does not arise.  On this conception, rights are more or less incapable of 
conflicting with one another.
129
 
 
Such a position is, of course, only possible due to Nozick’s view of human rights 
as entirely negative in nature.  Rights do not require me to do anything for others, 
but only to refrain from doing things to others.  So, if A has a right to free speech, 
then it would always be wrong to restrict this right.  If, as a result of A’s exercise 
of her right to free speech, B kills C, D and E, then B has violated the rights of C, 
D and E, and thus acted wrongly.  It may therefore be legitimate for the state to 
take action to prevent B from committing the violations, and/or to punish him for 
having done so.  None of this, though, has anything to do with A.  A’s exercise of 
her right to free speech violates the rights of nobody. 
Similarly, for Nozick, if X has a right to health but no money, and Y has lots of 
money, Y is under no duty to provide X with the funds to prevent his death 
through the purchase of readily available but relatively expensive medicine.  X’s 
rights are negative in nature and wholly separate from those of Y.  The only way 
Y can violate the right to health of X is by poisoning him or forcibly preventing 
him from purchasing the medical treatment he can himself afford.  But since Y 
has no right to poison X or prevent him from purchasing medical treatment, there 
is again no possibility of a clash of rights.  For Nozick, then, rights are both 
absolute and strictly negative in nature.
130
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 In response, one might point out that this explanation of rights presupposes direct relations 
between individuals.  As a result, it might be argued that the conclusions Nozick draws about 
positive duties lack relevance to the issue of climate change, since it will only be state action (if 
anything) that is sufficient to quell emission levels.  However, such an objection ignores the fact 
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One way of strengthening the status of rights (and probably the only way of 
insisting that all rights bear such a strong status as to be considered absolute), 
then, is to adopt Nozick’s position and insist that rights are purely negative in 
nature.  To do so, however, would be to limit the duties we owe others and the 
permissible actions of a state to a level that the majority of scholars of morality 
(whether supporters of rights or not) would find unacceptable.  The obvious 
alternative for supporters of rights is to insist that rights bear positive correlative 
duties and to accept that such an insistence somewhat weakens the status of said 
rights by acknowledging that they might be legitimately overridden under the 
right circumstances (i.e. when they clash with other rights). Waldron, however, 
suggests the possibility of a third way of looking at things. 
Rights are commonly viewed as ‘trumps’ designed to protect against the potential 
ills of wholly unrestricted utilitarianism.
131
  There is a concern, though, that 
supporters of rights take things too far the other way by placing too many 
restrictions on what might be done for the good of the many.  As Waldron asserts, 
“[w]e surely think that some attention is due to considerations of ordinary utility, 
and while it is reasonable to postpone that until the most striking of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
that Nozick sees relations between individuals and their state as commensurate with relations 
between individuals since, as he puts it, “…the legitimate powers of a protective association are 
merely the sum of the individual rights that its members or clients transfer to the association.  No 
new rights and powers arise; each right of the association is decomposable without residue into 
those individual rights held by distinct individuals acting alone in a state of nature.”  (Nozick, R., 
Op.Cit, p.89) 
131
 This idea is perhaps most famously and eloquently put forward by Ronald Dworkin.  See Dworkin, R., 
‘Rights as Trumps,’ in Waldron, J., Theories of Rights (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 153-
167. 
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requirements generated by rights have been satisfied, it is not reasonable to 
postpone it forever while we satisfy duty after duty associated with rights.”132 
What Waldron argues is that it is not rights that clash, but the duties associated 
with those rights and it is these duties which might, on occasion, be sacrificed 
either in the name of other rights or some ostensibly rights-based ‘common good.’  
As he puts it, “…talking about conflicts of rights is a way of talking about the 
incompatibility of the duties that rights involve.  What we refer to as a trade-off of 
one right against another, then, need not involve the sacrifice of one of the rights; 
rather, it involves a decision not to do what is required by a particular duty 
associated with the right.”133  The idea that Waldron attempts to convey is that, 
while rights themselves are absolute and may not be removed from right-holders, 
the duties which are the correlatives of those rights may be extremely extensive in 
number and thus might, under the appropriate circumstances, go unmet without 
this necessarily amounting to a violation of the associated right. 
In order to better elucidate his point, Waldron uses the example of the distinctly 
uncontroversial human right to be free from torture, asking:  “[i]f the interest in 
not being tortured is the basis of the moral importance of the duty, and if at least 
one of the duties generated has priority over some other moral consideration, does 
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 Waldron, J., Op.Cit, p.216.  Waldron’s argument, which is examined in more detail in the 
following pages, emerges in reaction to Dworkin’s idea of ‘rights as trumps’.  Dworkin considers 
that, if left entirely unrestricted, utilitarianism could end up going against its own egalitarian 
values by unduly harming members of the minority.  Dworkin argues that rights are necessary to 
overcome these potential unwanted and unintended consequences and make utilitarianism 
viable.  Taking Dworkin’s stance as his starting point, Waldron makes a similar argument 
regarding the dangers of the trump status of rights.  He contends that, if we assign too much 
strength to this trump status, we risk not simply restricting the utilitarian basis of our political 
system, but almost sacrificing it, thereby undermining the social good we were attempting to 
achieve through our introduction of rights into our utilitarian system. 
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that mean that all the duties generated by concern for that interest have the same 
priority?  And if not, why not?”134 
Such a question is not an attempt by Waldron to separate the positive and negative 
duties associated with rights with the idea of only endorsing the latter.  It is 
perfectly reasonable to assert that, if we genuinely believe people have a right to 
be free from torture, we may well want to extend the duties associated with such a 
right beyond the minimal Nozickian duty not to directly torture people 
ourselves.
135
  Supporters of rights might feel that the state is also placed under 
some additional positive correlative duty to protect others from being tortured by 
others and that individuals are under a similar positive duty to pay the taxes that 
are required to fund that protection. 
Waldron’s concern, then, is not with whether a particular duty could be 
considered positive or negative, but with how essential that duty is for the 
successful maintenance of the right which is its correlative.  As he puts it, “[t]he 
existence of successive waves of duty associated with a given right is likely to 
play havoc with any tidy sense of the priority that the right has over other moral 
considerations.”136 
With this in mind Waldron questions whether there is no limit on what he terms 
the ‘social convenience’ that might be sacrificed in order to meet even the more 
remote duties that could be associated with a prohibition on torture.  He gives the 
example of the establishment of an expensive but effective Commission of 
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 While, legally speaking, only states and state officials are capable of committing the offence of 
torture, there seems no reason for those endorsing a system of moral rights to adopt such a 
position. 
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Enquiry designed to bring torturers to justice and ensure torture is made 
marginally less likely in the future.
137
 
In light of this, supporters of rights might claim that clashes of rights are far less 
frequent than we might first have supposed.  It might be suggested that it is the 
duties associated with rights that clash and are thus sacrificed, not the rights 
themselves.  So while a right to health might be seen as being, in general, more 
important (or, in Gewirth’s terms, more necessary for action) than a right to 
education, this is not to suggest that the former should always supersede the latter.  
If the maximum plausible level of taxation yields a limited, finite budget for 
public spending, it would seem unreasonable to fund expensive research into rare 
diseases which have non-fatal negative effects on a small number of victims each 
year before funding a single primary school place for those who cannot otherwise 
afford education. 
In summary, there exist significant differences between rights-based moral 
theories with regard to when (if ever) rights may be legitimately sacrificed.  Of 
greater importance, though, are the commonalities between all rights-based 
moralities in this area.  Most central of these is the assertion that human rights (or, 
if one prefers, the duties associated with them) may only be sacrificed (if ever) in 
order to protect other, more important, human rights.  This remains true even for 
those supporters of rights who feel that the ‘common good’ can represent a 
legitimate reason for rights/duties to be overridden.  This is because a rights-based 
conception of the common good is ultimately a concern for the rights of others 
and is only employed in order to avoid the unfortunate consequences which might 
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result from a strictly individualist view of the nature of rights and, in particular, 
the nature of clashes of rights. 
 
Defining rights-based moralities through reference to non-rights-based 
moralities 
The key feature linking each of the different types of rights-based morality 
highlighted throughout this thesis is that rights sit at their core in a manner which 
is in some sense ‘natural’ and inescapable.  For a morality to be truly right-based 
in the sense that I define it, it must espouse the existence of rights as a logical 
necessity. 
This criterion is most obvious among those who develop theories based upon 
‘natural rights’, of whom I use Nozick as an example throughout this thesis.  For 
Nozick and others like him, the idea that human beings have rights is simply a 
self-evident fact.  It therefore requires no justification.  To ask why humans have 
rights would be akin to asking why they have an ability to think.  Human beings 
have rights and thus our moral thinking must take careful account of these rights 
and work in a manner which respects them if it is to be considered just.  Questions 
surrounding whether or why we have rights simply fail to emerge for natural 
rights theorists. 
Supporters of Choice and Interest theories take a slightly less direct approach.  
Nonetheless, they still end up defining the existence of rights as a hard fact which 
must form the basis of morality, rather than as a matter of opinion or a tool 
through which the goal of a moral system might be achieved.   
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For Choice theorists, the ability of humans to make choices is the crucial factor 
which separates them from other animals.  In order to freely exercise that ability, 
humans need certain scenarios to endure; one’s ability to make choices is severely 
impaired if they are being tortured or dying of hunger.  It is therefore a logical 
necessity that a moral system must assign rights to human beings which protect 
those aspects of existence most crucial to their ability to freely make choices.
138
 
The situation is similar for Interest theorists.  All human beings ‘naturally’ have 
certain interests (in food, water, being free from torture, et cetera) which they 
hold regardless of circumstance, simply as a result of their being human.  Once we 
accept this fact, we must also accept that a just moral system must assign rights to 
protect these interests. 
For Interest and Choice theorists, then, rights are not ‘natural’ facts in the same 
way as natural rights theorists like Nozick believe them to be.  Instead, rights 
quickly emerge as a logical and necessary next step as a result of the undeniable 
essential universal human qualities they are needed to protect (i.e. the ability of 
humans to make choices / the fundamental interests all humans have).  Despite 
this difference, all three types of theory unquestionably remain rights-based.  This 
is because all place rights at the core of how they make decisions about right and 
wrong and none hold the possibility of remaining coherent if we remove the rights 
element from them and replace it with something else. 
In order to better highlight my explanation of what constitutes a rights-based 
morality, it will be helpful to briefly examine the moral system put forth by John 
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Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, which affords rights a role as central as it is 
possible to imagine without becoming rights-based in the sense that I use the term. 
 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice 
Rawls’ theory undoubtedly bares a great deal of similarity to the rights-based 
moral systems examined by this thesis.  This can be seen from his own summary 
of the basic premise of his work: 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a 
whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made 
right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are 
outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the 
liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to 
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. The only thing that permits us to 
acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable 
only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human activities, 
truth and justice are uncompromising.
139
 
 
Such a view shares many similarities with the rights-based moral systems I 
explore throughout this thesis.  The idea of the inviolability of individuals as 
something which cannot be overruled by utilitarian concerns is something which 
lies at the heart of rights-based moralities. 
Rawls puts forward two basic principles of justice: 
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First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.  
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.140 
 
As he goes on to note,  
[t]hese principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the second. 
This ordering means that infringements of the basic equal liberties protected by the first principle 
cannot be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages. These liberties 
have a central range of application within which they can be limited and compromised only when 
they conflict with other basic liberties.
141
 
 
Rawls develops these ideas on the basis that they are what any rational person 
would select when place behind what he terms ‘the veil of ignorance’ (Rawls’ 
version of the original position).  Behind such a veil, persons lack knowledge as to 
their class, social status, intelligence, strength, conception of the good, et cetera.  
As a result, Rawls argues, his two aforementioned principles of justice emerge as 
those which all rational beings would choose and agree upon as being fairest for 
all in the absence of knowledge as to any particular advantages/disadvantages they 
might have upon entering society.
142
 
Were we to accept Rawls’ theory as being rights-based, this concept of a veil of 
ignorance might prove useful in enabling proponents to better defend the welfare 
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of future persons.  As Rawls highlights, people in the original position would not 
know at which time they would be born and thus would need to select principles 
of justice which were fairest for people living in future generations.
143
  As a result, 
the Rawlsian would be duty-bound to consider the welfare of future persons when 
deciding upon the proper constituent elements of a theory of justice. 
Exactly what difference this would make in practice is not entirely clear.  While I 
would have to consider the welfare of future persons while deciding which rights 
everyone ought to have, it is not clear what difference this would make to the 
manner in which I exercised my rights upon my coming into existence or upon the 
duties I then owed to future persons who did not exist.  Since I will not be 
focussing upon Rawls’ work throughout this thesis, I will not consider such 
matters in any depth here.  Rather, I would seek to note that the very reason I am 
not going to consider Rawls’ work (i.e. it is not rights-based) is, in part, 
highlighted by this difficulty.  While espousing the ascription of rights and 
duties,
144
 the manner in which such things are held and realised is not central to 
Rawls’ work in the way that it is in that of Choice theorists, Interest theorists or 
followers of natural rights / libertarianism – an issue I shall return to shortly. 
There are, additionally, several other reasons for thinking that Rawls’ theory falls 
outside of what I deem to be a rights-based morality, the understanding of which 
will help to elucidate exactly what the qualities of a true rights-based morality are. 
As Rawls himself notes, his original position of the veil of ignorance is “a purely 
hypothetical situation.”145  It is simply a thought experiment used to demonstrate 
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the value and logic of his theory.  This is very much the opposite of a Nozickian 
position where human beings do, in actual fact, possess natural rights, these being 
the same rights that all human beings possessed before societies existed.  Thus, 
Rawls statement that “[i]n justice as fairness the original position of equality 
corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social 
contract,”146  might be considered somewhat misleading.  While Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance is certainly the equivalent of Nozick’s state of nature, it is by no means 
the same thing.  For Nozick, rights come first due to their natural existence 
whereas society and morality emerge out of the state of nature and must therefore 
take account of the rights that pre-exist them.  For Rawls, the starting position is 
purely hypothetical and does not necessitate rights in the same way. 
It is clear that Rawls, despite being a social contract theorist, cannot be seen as 
producing a rights-based moral system in the same way that Nozick does.  It is, 
however, worth considering whether he might instead be considered an Interest or 
Choice theorist.   
Rawls seeks to afford all humans certain ‘basic equal liberties’ which are 
protected by rights.  One might argue that these liberties are either those things all 
human beings have interests in or the constituent minimum elements needed to 
protect free choice.  Should one adopt this position, much of Rawls’ theory would 
be subject to the analysis of Choice and Interest theories put forth throughout this 
thesis. 
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However, there seem several good reasons for thinking Rawls not to be an Interest 
or Choice theorist which serve to highlight key differences between his theory and 
systems of morality which I have defined as rights-based. 
As earlier noted, Rawls’ veil of ignorance would seem to afford some level of 
extra protection to future persons, but the very fact that it does so turns out to be 
indicative of the fact that his theory cannot be considered rights-based. 
The veil of ignorance does not exist.  I do.  When I come into existence I will 
have rights and duties of the highest level allowed by equality.  Not just equality 
between existing persons, but also future persons.  This suggests that I owe some 
(necessarily non-correlative) duty toward future persons upon coming into 
existence that remains even before those future persons (and therefore their rights) 
come to be.  While such an idea is not illogical, it is not one that is compatible 
with a morality which is fundamentally rights-based either.  Rather, it speaks of a 
moral system which uses rights as a tool through which to achieve morality rather 
than being the basis and purpose of that morality in and of themselves. 
Furthermore, while Rawls’ ‘basic equal liberties’ might be seen as akin to the 
rights a Choice or Interest theorist would arrive at, the manner in which such 
things are derived by Rawls and rights-based theorists is far from similar.  
Consider again Rawls’ first principle of justice, which states that “each person is 
to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”147  For the supporter of 
Interest or Choice theory, this way of framing things would seem odd.  Interest 
and Choice theorists believe we have rights because those rights protect our 
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interests / our ability to make choices.  Rawls, however, seems to derive his rights 
not from any basic and essential factor of our humanity, but from the concept of 
equality.  This is made clear when he says  
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to give a complete specification of these liberties 
independently from the particular circumstances—social, economic, and technological—of a given 
society.
148
 
 
For the Interest / Choice theorist, such an assertion would simply fail to make 
sense.  Human beings have certain basic interests (including an ability to make 
choices) whether in or outside of a society.  They therefore have rights aimed at 
protecting such interests under all circumstances – even if those rights cannot 
easily be fulfilled in every different society.  It is the rights that are the basis of the 
morality.  For Rawls, however, it seems that it is equality that is the foundation of 
morality.  Rights are simply a tool through which equality and justice (the 
fundamental goods) can be achieved.  For a true supporter of rights-based 
moralities, rights must be the fundamental goods in and of themselves. 
The purpose of this section has not been to offer any meaningful critique of the 
work of John Rawls, but simply to briefly examine why Rawls’ theory cannot be 
considered a rights-based morality in order to better elucidate those factors which 
are crucial to rights-based moral systems (factors which Rawls’ theory lacks).  
Rights-based moral systems must insist upon a strict and immediate correlation 
between individual rights and duties or else, like Rawls, they risk allowing rights 
to be overcome by non-rights-based concerns under certain circumstances.  More 
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importantly, rights-based moralities must take rights as their basis.  Some rights 
theorists, like Nozick, do this by taking the existence of rights as a factual starting 
point and building a morality from there.  Others, like Choice and Interest 
theorists, argue that rights are a logical necessity for any moral system as they 
constitute the only reasonable form of protection for the key elements of what it is 
to be human.  Rawls, by contrast, adopts neither such position – instead using 
rights as a convenient tool through which to achieve the equal justice which is his 
goal.  For this reason, his theory cannot be considered rights-based. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that rights-based moralities are concerned with 
those objects which are so fundamental to the realisation of a minimally good 
human life that they must be protected by rights which are ascribed to all humans 
equally.  These rights are so strong that they can only be overcome through 
reference to other rights. 
Ordinarily, far from being a weakness of rights-based moralities, the vigour with 
which rights are defended by such systems would be seen as a strength.  By using 
inviolable rights to protect those areas of human existence which are truly 
essential and universal, rights-based moralities provide us with systems for 
distinguishing between different types of moral concern and guide us as to which 
areas of morality ought to prevail in cases of disagreement.  They seek to provide 
moral guidelines which might more easily be accepted by people of different 
religions and cultures as well as providing a reasoned justification for the demand 
for such acceptance. 
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Unfortunately, as this thesis will demonstrate, climate change represents a truly 
extraordinary problem.  As will be explained in subsequent chapters, the fact that 
the majority of the victims of climate change will not possess rights until the 
damage to those rights can no longer be reversed creates significant problems for 
supporters of rights.  This is because, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the measures 
that states will necessarily need to take in order to protect future persons from the 
worst ills of climate change are at best unjustified by rights-based moralities and 
at worst prohibited by them. 
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CHAPTER 3:  FUTURE PERSONS AND RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 2, rights-based moralities must, all other things being 
equal, judge the action of an individual to be wrong if that action violates the right 
of another right-holder.  Indeed, these are the only circumstances under which a 
right-based morality may hold an action to be wrong.
149
  The only reason a state 
may restrict rights, then, is when their exercise threatens the rights of others.  
When it comes to the issue of climate change, then, in order to claim that those of 
my pollutant actions which amount to an exercise of my rights
150
 might be justly 
limited, it would appear that supporters of rights-based moralities would need to 
demonstrate that future persons are able to possess rights before they come into 
existence (at which point they would cease to be future persons).  As this chapter 
will demonstrate, this does not seem to be the case. 
The chapter will begin by defining what we mean when we talk about future 
persons.  It will go on to explain the complex philosophical conundrum known as 
the non-identity problem.  It will then explain why each of the rights-based moral 
systems considered throughout this thesis (Choice Theory, Interest Theory and 
Libertarianism) are incapable of asserting that future persons should possess 
rights.  Finally, it will outline why, even if such difficulties could be overcome, 
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the non-identity problem necessarily precludes future persons from possessing 
rights regardless of which type of rights-based morality one adheres to. 
 
Defining ‘Future Persons’ 
Before embarking upon an academic investigation of any topic, it is of crucial 
importance that one clearly defines one’s terms.  In the case of this study, perhaps 
the most important term used is ‘future persons’.  It will quickly become apparent 
that, due to the nature of climate change (i.e. the fact that the ill effects of the 
emission-producing actions we take today will not begin to be felt for at least 
twenty-five years), the way in which we define future persons may have a 
significant impact upon which actions we define as morally acceptable.  This 
seems especially true for rights-based moralities, particularly if it transpires that 
future persons are incapable of holding rights. 
Despite the theoretical importance of defining the term ‘future persons’ (not to 
mention the responsibilities of good academic practice), surprisingly few scholars 
writing on the subject of intergenerational justice have done so.  One admirable 
exception to this is Page, who defines future generations as “…those that will 
come into existence after all those now living have ceased to exist”.151 
The problem with this definition is that it refers to future generations and there 
seems no good reason as to why generations ought to be considered our 
appropriate unit of moral concern.  This seems particularly true if we follow a 
rights-based morality, which, to varying degrees, tend to focus first and foremost 
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upon protecting the well-being of individuals with the idea that this will, in turn, 
end up protecting humans as a collective. 
And if it is individual future persons that are our concern, there seems no reason 
either logically or ethically, that our obligations to persons who will exist in the 
distant future ought to be analysed separately from those obligations we bear to 
persons who do not currently exist but who will come to exist within the lifetime 
of people who are alive today (Page makes no reference to this latter group at all).  
Page fails to highlight any important ethical difference between persons who do 
not yet exist and will not do so for 100 years and those who do not yet exist and 
will not do so for thirty years which might warrant us to treat the latter more 
favourably than the former.  We might assume, then, that his definition is 
pragmatic in nature and is simply aimed at limiting the scope of his subject area.   
In many circumstances, such an approach would be justified.  It is not possible for 
a single academic work to cover every possible scenario, therefore boundaries are 
often drawn around the parameters of the subject area, thus making one’s analysis 
more focused and complete.  The problem is that, in this case, our moral position 
on the standing of more immediate future persons is likely to play a key role in 
shaping the extent to which distant future persons are affected by climate change.  
Howarth hints at the difficulties that surround a focus on future generations as 
opposed to future persons when he highlights some of the criticisms which have 
been made of Parfit’s similar understanding of the former: 
…Gosseries (2008) notes that Parfit’s argument abstracts away from a key fact of human 
demographics:  At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children 
and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined.  If one accepts the plausible 
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premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh-and-blood progeny, a “chain 
of obligation” is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of 
more distant generations.
152
 
 
The point noted above, while seemingly ignored by the majority of scholars in the 
area, may prove to be of crucial importance in our moral reasoning on the issue of 
climate change and future persons.  As Caney notes, “…a theory of justice that is 
to apply to global climate change must address the question of how the 
intergenerational dimensions of the issue make a morally relevant difference.”153   
As noted in Chapter 1, the emissions we produce today will only begin to have 
negative effects on people living thirty years from now.  Those same emissions 
will also contribute to the negative effects of climate change felt by different 
persons living 130 years from now.  As such, if it can be demonstrated that we do 
owe duties to persons in the nearer future which warrant us bearing significant 
climate burdens today, it seems likely that we may incidentally protect those 
individuals which Page defines as future generations from harm in the process.  
Such a fact may, eventually, prove to be of key importance in rescuing rights-
based moralities from the challenges posed by climate change.
154
 
In light of the above, I will focus my analysis upon future persons as opposed to 
future generations.  I will define future persons as any persons who are more than 
one month from being conceived.  Such a definition allows for the widest possible 
range of what might constitute a future person without straying into unnecessary 
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controversy.  Many people feel that human life begins at some varying point 
during the gestation period.  Others feel that it begins at conception.  Others still, 
believe that it is before even this.  By borrowing the reasoning of Derek Parfit
155
 
we can confidently claim that nobody believes that people exist before the egg 
which will one day become them has been produced.  As such, my definition is as 
broad as it is possible to be without entering into unnecessarily morally and 
scientifically complex areas which will, ultimately, have no bearing upon the 
results of my study.  This broadness is crucial, for it is at the boundaries of 
contemporaneity where the ethical stances of both supporters of rights and 
polluters will come under the greatest scrutiny.  Before addressing the complex 
ethical questions which arise in this area in subsequent chapters, it will be prudent 
to first determine whether future persons (as I have defined them) are capable of 
possessing rights. 
 
The Non-Identity Problem 
Before examining the attitude supporters of rights must take toward future persons 
it is important to examine a more general ethical difficulty with ascertaining the 
moral status of such beings which will have a significant impact upon rights-based 
approaches to the issue. 
Outside the realm of rights, it is common to assert that a particular action is wrong 
if that action causes harm to others which could have been averted.
156
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to be deemed wrong. 
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Unsurprisingly then, those ethicists writing on climate change tend to maintain 
such a principle in relation to future persons.  For example, O’Neill writes that 
“by burning fossil fuels prodigally we accelerate the greenhouse effect and may 
dramatically harm successors, who can do nothing to us”.157   
Perhaps one of the key difficulties in the field of climate ethics is that, as Parfit 
and other theorists highlight, O’Neill’s statement is not obviously and 
unequivocally true.  This is because of what has come to be known as ‘the non-
identity problem’.  Page summarises the non-identity problem as follows:  “Put 
simply, the puzzle is that actions or social policies that will lower future quality of 
life will harm few, if any, members of future generations because they are also 
necessary conditions of these people coming into existence.”158 
It is not immediately clear that the manner in which Page’s assertion is framed is 
correct.  It seems at least possible that an action can both cause a person’s 
existence and harm that same person.  Perhaps the issue, then, is not whether or 
not our actions harm future persons, but rather, whether the fact that we are 
accountable for such harms is sufficient reason to blame us for causing them.  
This is because the same actions which caused the harm were necessary 
conditions of their victims’ existence.  Therefore, we might feel that future 
persons are, on balance, better
159
 off as a result of our pollutant acts even though 
they are also harmed by them. 
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other option – their complete lack of existence – is an entirely different scenario, rather than a 
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If I push a child from the path of a speeding car, it would seem unjustified to hold 
me accountable for the resultant bruising to its arms.  We would ordinarily say 
that my selfless act in saving its life (or, to draw a neater parallel, my enabling the 
continuance of its existence) absolved me of any guilt regarding any injuries 
caused to the child in the process.  The question then becomes whether there is an 
important moral difference between deliberately protecting someone’s current 
existence and accidentally creating some of the conditions for someone’s 
existence in the future.  This issue, as I will explain in more detail below, is at the 
crux of the non-identity problem. 
The primary problem in assigning moral value to future persons is not that such 
persons do not yet exist.  Rather, it is the fact that they do not exist in a very 
specific way; they are not yet individuated.  We do not yet know who such 
persons will be.
160
  More importantly, we do not yet know if they will be. 
Some theorists do not think this should be an issue.  They maintain that, because 
we can be relatively sure that some future persons will one day exist, we have a 
duty not to take actions which will cause them harm at the point at which they 
come into existence.
161
  As theorists such as Parfit highlight however, the problem 
is more complex than this.  This is because, in many cases, those actions which 
cause climate change are the very same actions which cause the future persons 
who are affected by it to come into existence. 
                                                                                                                                                  
of being ‘worse off’.  Nonetheless, there does not seem to exist a better way of terming the 
problem. 
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In order to explain such a fact, we must begin with Parfit’s ‘Time-Dependence 
Claim’, which goes as follows: “If any particular person had not been conceived 
when he was in fact conceived, it is in fact true that he would never have 
existed.”162  Of course, there is no way to unequivocally prove the truth of such a 
claim, for there is no way of knowing absolutely whether, had the same two 
parents had sexual intercourse three years later than they did, the exact same child 
would have emerged.  However, as Parfit notes, while not inarguably true, the 
Time-Dependence Claim in uncontroversial and easy to believe.
163
 
In order to make his claim even less controversial, Parfit reformulates it to read:  
“If any particular person had not been conceived within a month of the time when 
he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed.”164  In doing so, he 
ensures that both egg and sperm would be different in the latter case, thus 
ensuring that the fetus conceived one month later would be biologically different 
to that which could have been (but was not) conceived one month earlier.
165
 
De-Shalit highlights the relevance of this logic.  As he asserts, not only can a 
particular policy of current persons (e.g. drastically cutting emissions or allowing 
them to go on unrestrained) affect the standard of living of future persons,
166
 it can 
(and will) “affect people’s very existence, i.e. it may determine whether they are 
going to exist or not, and, more generally, our acts may affect the number of 
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future generations, the size of each generation, and the identities of future 
people”.167 
As a result, Parfit notes that our moral thinking about issues which affect future 
persons needs to be divided into three types of choice: 
1) Different Number Choices – those choices of current persons which will affect 
both the number of future persons who are born and the identity of such persons. 
2) Same Number Choices – those choices of current persons which will affect which 
future persons are born, but which will have no bearing on how many future 
persons are born. 
3) Same People Choices – the choices we make which will have no bearing on the 
number or identity of future persons.
168
 
As Parfit asserts, most of our moral reasoning tends to come in the form of Same 
People Choices.
169
  However, it is often the case that we miscategorise Different 
Number Choices and Same Number Choices as Same People Choices, and it is 
this error which confuses our reasoning processes.  Our concerns with regard to 
future persons tend to assume that the same future persons will be worse off if we 
pollute more and better off if we pollute less.  However, on closer inspection this 
is not obviously the case. 
Both the number of individuals born in the future and the identities of such 
individuals are at least partially a result of circumstance.  The process of 
industrialisation (the primary cause of climate change), by, for example, causing 
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more people to live in cities and enabling travel on a global scale, has had a 
dramatic effect on which individuals have been born.
170
 As Parfit puts it, “…how 
many of us could truly claim, ‘Even if railways and motor cars had never been 
invented, I would still have been born’?”171  In other words, those individuals who 
make up the future generations who will suffer as a result of climate change will 
be different individuals than those that would have existed had we not polluted.  
Thus, our pollution (which they will one day suffer the negative effects of) is a 
necessary condition of their existence. 
In light of this, Parfit feels that we are faced with two questions: 
“1) If we cause someone to exist, who will have a life worth living, do we thereby benefit this 
person? 
2) Do we also benefit this person if some act of ours is a remote but necessary part of the cause of 
his existence?”172 
 
Parfit argues that, if our answer to the first question is yes, it must be the same for 
the second question.
173
  Many people, though, would answer both questions in the 
negative.  They would argue that, in order to benefit somebody, it must be the 
case that they would have been worse off were it not for our action.  Since, 
however, if we had not performed our action, the individual who was created as a 
result of it would not have existed, they are not actually worse off as a result of it.  
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They cannot be, since they never will have existed.  Therefore, because they 
would not have been worse off had we not performed our action (indeed, they will 
not be anything), they are not better off because we did perform it.  Our action 
does not actually benefit such a person.  Thus, such an argument would go, future 
persons have a legitimate moral claim against current persons who cause them 
harm through pollution, even though without said pollution said future persons 
would not have existed.
174
   
Somehow, despite the fact that such an argument is logic-based and arrives at a 
conclusion many of us would agree with, the thinking involved in reaching that 
conclusion seems counter-intuitive.  Is it really the case that never existing does 
not make one worse off than those persons who exist?  Obviously, in terms of 
logic, the argument is sound.  I cannot be worse off if I never exist, because I 
cannot be anything.  Intuitively speaking though, it seems equally true that most 
of us would rather exist than never have existed.  As such, it does seem in some 
way callous to place too much blame upon actions which were a necessary 
condition of existence. Nonetheless, the argument raised is an important one and 
will come to the fore again in an adapted manner in the later section on rights-
based solutions to the non-identity problem. 
Parfit highlights the problems noted above using the example of ‘the 14-year-old 
girl’: 
This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. 
Though this will have bad effects throughout this child's life, his life will, predictably, be worth 
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living. If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she 
would have given a better start in life.
175
 
 
He notes that, even if we do not believe that causing someone to exist benefits that 
person, we must acknowledge that having a life worth living is better for this 
person than if they had not existed.
176177
  Thus, even if we believe the girl’s 
decision was wrong, we cannot say that her child is worse off as a result of it.  
Analogously, we cannot say that the victims of climate change are worse off as a 
result of our pollution if the actions which created that pollution were a necessary 
factor in their existence. 
As Parfit notes, “[w]e can deserve to be blamed for harming others, even when 
this is not worse for them”.178  If my careless driving causes you to lose a leg, and 
then, a year-later, war breaks out, and your missing leg causes you to avoid certain 
death in the trenches, it is still reasonable to hold me accountable for your 
disability.
179
  The problem is that climate change presents a very different 
scenario.  While we know that our current pollution will harm future persons, we 
also know that those persons it harms would not have existed without it because 
that pollution is the by-product of our way of life, and it is that way of life which 
makes us have children when we do.  We know that, as a result, the people 
harmed would not regret our act if they knew about it, and that our act will not be 
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worse for such people than anything else we could have done.
180
  As a result, 
Parfit believes that, in the case of the non-identity problem, “…we should revise 
the ordinary use of the word ‘harm’. If what we are doing will not be worse for 
some other person, or will even be better for this person, we are not, in a morally 
relevant sense, harming this person”.181   
In summary, it seems that, regardless of whether we feel causing someone to exist 
benefits that person, the non-identity problem means we commit no wrong against 
future persons through our pollution, despite the fact that they will be harmed by 
it.  This is because, should we cease our emissions, we will cause different people 
to exist than otherwise would have.  Thus, those people who will be affected by 
our emissions cannot be viewed to have been harmed by them. 
Faced with such logic, environmentalists must demonstrate other reasons as to 
why current persons ought to reduce their emissions.   
One obvious path to take would be to claim that non-human species and/or the 
planet itself possess an intrinsic moral value which is separate from its value to 
human beings.  This would mean we have a duty to cut our emissions in order to 
protect those species climate change will irreparably damage, most of which 
would not be different individual creatures to those which would have existed had 
we not polluted, and whose numbers will be greatly affected by our choices.  
However, this is not an objection which could be easily upheld by supporters of 
right-based moralities. 
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Before giving up on humanity as a relevant measure of morality, however, there is 
another way of viewing things we might consider. 
We might claim that, even though no specific individual humans are made worse 
off by climate change, climate change still causes suffering.  If, under Scenario A 
(not polluting) there will be a lower net amount of human suffering than under 
Scenario B (polluting), then it seems that many moral systems – most obviously 
utilitarianism – might seek to claim that, all things being equal, there is something 
morally wrong with causing climate change.  The fact that the identity of those 
harmed and those not harmed will differ is of no great moral significance, one 
might argue, since our desire to avoid harming them is based upon their status as 
humans in general, not on the basis that they are specific humans.   
In summary, the non-identity problem only creates a difficulty in our moral 
reasoning if we apply a particularly individualist take on morality.  Rights-based 
moralities tend to be individualist in nature
182
 and, as the next sections will show, 
it is with regard to such moral systems that the non-identity problem becomes 
particularly relevant. 
 
The Non-Identity Problem and Rights 
At first glance, an appeal to rights appears a particularly effective way of 
overcoming the non-identity problem. 
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The non-identity problem primarily arises as a result of the fact that the emission-
producing actions which cause harm to future persons are necessary factors of 
their existence (that is, of the existence of those specific future persons, not of the 
existence of any future persons at all).  As such, many ethicists (including Parfit) 
struggle to find any good moral reason for acting to combat climate change at all.  
This is because, they believe, nobody is made worse off by climate change
183
 (and, 
indeed, many people – current and past persons producing emissions they do not 
feel the effects of – are made better off by it).  Thus, even though many future 
persons will suffer horribly from the effects of climate change, because they 
remain better off than if they had never existed, they have no moral claim against 
current persons for the emission-producing actions which caused both their 
existence and their suffering. 
Supporters of rights are unhindered by such a problem.  This is because, under 
rights-based moralities, one does not need to be made worse off by something in 
order to have been wronged.  Individuals have rights, and other individuals (or 
bodies of individuals such as states) have duties to ensure those rights are met.  
Under such a system there is no logical reason as to why future persons could not 
claim that their right to health had been violated by other individuals who had 
caused them to contract malaria through their emissions.  Importantly, under a 
rights-based morality, this remains the case even if the victim would never have 
existed without those same emissions.  This is because, under rights-based 
moralities, all individuals are entitled to equal rights by virtue of the fact that they 
are human.  So, while there is no right to exist, once an individual does exist they 
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possess the same rights as everybody else regardless of the circumstances of their 
existence. 
It seems, then, that an adherence to rights-based moralities has some advantages 
with regard to climate change since it appears, at first glance, able to comfortably 
and coherently subvert the non-identity problem.  However, as Callahan correctly 
highlights, there is a downside to this approach: 
Imagine that all the inhabitants of our planet decide together that they no longer wish to reproduce, 
no woman conceives, and there are no future generations….the rights theorist is silent about this 
outcome: since none of the rights of future people are being violated by such a decision - their 
existence being a prerequisite for their having rights - the proponents of the rights theory cannot 
condemn the earth’s inhabitants for this unfortunate decision.184 
 
Callahan’s objection seems well-founded.  Indeed, if anything, it is perhaps not 
strong enough.  Rights theorists are not ‘silent’ on the issue of all human beings 
deliberately and voluntarily ceasing reproduction – rather, they must, logically-
speaking, describe such an act as being morally-neutral.  Since there is no right to 
be born, there is no correlative duty to conceive.  Certainly, many of us might find 
such a conclusion morally (though not logically) objectionable.
185
  However, 
given that, in practice, there seems no reason to think that the entire human race 
would deliberately and voluntarily stop producing offspring, it would perhaps be 
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permissible to forgive the failure of rights-based moralities to condemn such 
actions. Unfortunately, however, while the non-identity problem need not prevent 
individuals from possessing rights upon coming into existence, it does serve to 
demonstrate that they cannot do so prior to such a point. 
 
The ‘Non-Right-Holder Problem’ 
As earlier noted, the moral issues surrounding future persons are further 
complicated by the unwillingness of scholars to define their subject matter.  The 
same might be said of the unwillingness of scholars to define which types of 
entity are capable of possessing rights and why.  As highlighted above, an 
adherence to a rights-based version of morality would appear to resolve the non-
identity problem when taken in isolation.  Though he does not acknowledge such 
a fact, this is perhaps one of the reasons behind Howarth’s claim that “…rights-
based ethics provides the most convincing approach to issues of sustainability and 
intergenerational justice…”.186  The problem, however, with both Howarth’s 
assertion and any attempt to resolve the non-identity problem through an appeal to 
rights is that both rely solely upon the structure of  how rights distribution works 
between right-holders, whilst off-handedly presupposing that future persons can 
be counted as right-holders.  On closer examination, the issue is far more 
complicated than this.  As Caney correctly highlights,  
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…the effects of global climate change will be felt by future people, so that an adequate theory of 
global environmental justice must provide guidance on what duties to future generations those 
living at present have.  It must consider whether future people have rights…187 
 
Perhaps the most logical starting point in answering such a question would be to 
return to our three types of rights-based morality (Choice Theory, Interest Theory 
and Libertarianism) in order to ascertain which characteristics any individual must 
display in order to be capable of possessing rights and whether future persons 
meet such criteria. 
Griffin maintains that it is an individual’s personhood which entitles them to 
rights: 
A normal fully developed human being is of considerable moral weight, perhaps for several 
reasons, but one of them is simply that the human being is a person.  What sort of being are we 
persons essentially?  We are embodied minds – that is, something with the capacity to support 
consciousness.  So when did I, a being of this sort, begin to exist?  It must be that I began to exist 
when my brain first acquired the capacity to support consciousness.
188
 
 
Clearly, if we accept Griffin’s account, future persons are simply not human 
beings and so are not capable of possessing rights regardless of the non-identity 
problem, a fact which would certainly appear to invalidate the arguments of those, 
like Howarth, who feel that rights-based moralities are the best way forward in 
our ethical thinking about climate change.   
                                               
187
 Caney, S., Op.Cit, p.123 
188
 Griffin, J., On Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.86 
Page 111 of 305 
 
It seems likely that this personhood approach is something akin to the position 
which Nozickians would take on the matter.  As was highlighted in Chapter 2, 
Nozick fails to go into great detail with regard to exactly what it is about people 
that make them appropriate candidates for rights.  People have rights because they 
are human beings and human beings are born in possession of rights in the state of 
nature.  Since future persons have not yet been born (and, indeed, will never be 
born, since at such a point they would become current persons), they are prior to 
the state of nature and are not yet human in the way that Nozick imagines when he 
speaks of right-holders.  Furthermore, given Nozick’s focus on negative rights and 
the extensive limitations these place upon states, claiming that those states must 
consider even the rights of as yet non-existent persons in their decision-making 
would render Nozick’s theory even more contentious.189 
Griffin goes on to strengthen his earlier statement, concluding:  ‘…only normative 
agents bear human rights – no exceptions: not infants, not the seriously mentally 
disabled, not those in a permanent vegetative state, and so on.’190 
Such a definition plainly rules out the possibility of future persons possessing 
rights; if even certain types of living human beings are not eligible for rights, 
those that do not yet exist must clearly be excluded.  Future persons are a long 
way from being normative agents – even if they will one day come to be so.  
However, it seems likely that most supporters of right-based moralities would be 
unwilling to accept Griffin’s definition. 
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Much like supporters of any moral system, supporters of right-based moralities 
will want to say that it is morally wrong to torture a child.  As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the only manner in which right-based moralities can assert that 
an action is wrong is to demonstrate that said action violates a right possessed by 
the victim of said wrong.  Therefore, for the supporter of a right-based morality, if 
it is wrong to torture a child this must mean that that child has a right not to be 
tortured.
191
  Such a fact would be incompatible with Griffin’s definition. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in line (to some extent) with Griffin’s 
reasoning, Choice theorists base their justification of human rights upon the 
notion of the capacity for action.  Let us then return to Gewirth’s justification for 
the existence of rights: “…rights and rights-claims arise logically and 
fundamentally out of the concern of all human beings, as prospective purposive 
agents, that the proximate necessary conditions of their action and generally 
successful action be protected.”192   
Perhaps the key difference for our purposes between Gewirth and Griffin’s 
explanations of who should hold rights is the former’s inclusion of the word 
prospective.  For Gewirth, the potential for action is enough to justify an 
individual’s possession of rights.  Clearly, such a fact is enough to rescue at least 
Choice Theory from Griffin’s uncomfortable conclusion that children cannot 
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possess rights.  The question then becomes, is the potentiality for action held by 
children of the same order as that held by future persons? 
As a fellow Choice theorist, Steiner argues that “…it is precisely because future 
persons are necessarily incapable of choice, that they cannot be said to have rights 
against present persons”.193  Surely, though, as Griffin highlights, the same thing 
could be said of infants?  Gewirth, as we have seen, seeks to avoid this problem 
because he feels that the fact that we know that infants will come to make those 
choices means it is reasonable to assign them rights before they are capable of 
doing so in order to safeguard their existence for long enough for them to develop 
into choice-making beings.  Could not the exact same thing be said of future 
persons? 
In order to highlight the difference between infants and future persons it is 
necessary to return to the non-identity problem.  The key difference between 
infants and future persons is that infants currently exist.
194
  They are individuated.  
We are able to point to specific infants and claim that they, as specific individuals, 
will one day possess the capacity for reasoned action.  The same cannot be said of 
future persons.  We are unable to point to any specific individual who will be born 
years from now which we are defining as our ‘prospective purposive agent’. 
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The fact that I am unable to identify, even in thought, the future person who I am 
claiming will be able to make choices seems problematic.  Future persons are 
wholly incapable of choice and are unable to exercise or claim any rights we 
assign them.  While we might argue that current persons could claim on their 
behalf, such claims would seem somewhat disingenuous if am incapable of 
pointing to whom I am claiming on behalf of.   
Imagine I make the claim that you should not take a certain action which you have 
a right to take on the grounds that your doing so will one day harm someone I 
cannot name and who does not currently exist.  I think you might reasonably 
argue that if your rights can be restricted under such circumstances they lose much 
of their meaning, since it becomes too easy to claim that such restrictions are 
rights-based.   
When it comes to children, things are different.  Firstly, we might question 
whether they really are incapable of making choices in the same way as future 
persons.  A baby’s choice of whether to shake the rattle or pet the teddy may not 
be a fully autonomous and valuable choice, but it is a choice nonetheless.  Being 
able to make such simple choices seems fundamentally different from the inability 
of future persons to do anything at all. 
Secondly, it seems eminently reasonable that I might make a rights claim on 
behalf of a child who will later benefit from such a claim.  This is because I can 
point to the child who holds the right and demonstrate that his/her right in 
particular is being violated by your action.  This seems an important difference 
from future persons.  If you are restricting my rights in the name of some other, it 
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seems only reasonable that you are able to tell me who that other is, or at the very 
least that that other is. 
Ultimately, future persons cannot currently make choices and so it is difficult to 
see how they might currently possess rights.  If Choice theorists really do struggle 
with the moral status of infants, this struggle seems better viewed either as a 
problem with Choice Theory or as evidence that children really should not have 
rights.  It cannot be seen as evidence that non-existent people possess a capacity to 
make choices.  It seems, then, that both a Nozickian personhood theory and 
Choice Theory are ultimately unable to provide any good reason as to why future 
persons could or should be said to possess rights before they are conceived.  It is 
perhaps for this reason that Page seeks to base his assertion that future persons 
might legitimately be considered right-holders on Interest Theory. 
Page claims that, if one subscribes to Interest Theory, future persons can be 
considered capable of possessing rights because, as he puts it,  
[i]t can be assumed that there will be people who exist in the future that these people will possess 
interests that will be vulnerable to harm, and that the actions of existing persons – particularly 
those affecting the integrity of the natural environment – will have profound effects on these 
interests.
195
   
 
Of course it is fairly safe to assume that, at some point in the future, persons will 
exist who do not exist today and that those persons will have interests which may 
well be significantly negatively affected by the actions of current persons.  But 
surely the same defence could be made of Choice Theory?  Surely the choices of 
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such persons will, in many cases, also be severely limited by the actions of current 
persons?  The choices of who to marry or which religion to adopt or even where 
to shop will be severely limited for those future persons laying in hospital beds 
dying of malaria as a result of the pollution of current persons.  In short, one 
obvious fault with Page’s claim is that, if the fact that future persons will have 
interests is enough to justify their possession of rights under Interest Theory, then 
the fact that such persons will have choices must equally justify their possession 
of rights under Choice Theory. 
A second (and more concerning) problem with Page’s statement is that it misses 
the key issue.  Nobody doubts that, upon coming into existence, future persons 
will hold the exact same rights as their predecessors are entitled to today.  
However, what Page appears to infer is that the fact that future persons will one 
day possess interests is enough to confer duties towards them upon current 
persons.  This cannot be correct. 
It seems that perhaps Page means to say that, because future persons will one day 
possess interests, they currently possess rights (thus meaning that current persons 
currently possess correlative duties not to take actions which might, in future, 
violate such rights).  However, Page provides us with no reason as to why this 
should be the case.
196
 
The above position is also alluded to by Feinberg, who states that: 
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The rights that future generations certainly have against us are contingent rights:  the interests they 
are sure to have when they come into being (assuming of course that they will come into being) 
cry out for protection from invasions that can take place now.  Yet there are no actual interests, 
presently existent, that future generations, presently non-existent, have now.
197
 
 
Feinberg, then, at least attempts to address the problem surrounding the fact that, 
while future persons will one day have interests, they do not yet do so.  He feels 
that this fact is not sufficient to prevent current persons from bearing duties which 
are effectively correlative to the (not yet existent) rights which stem from the (not 
yet existent) interests of (not yet existent) future persons.  He justifies such a 
position using the following analogy: 
We can tell, sometimes, that shadowy forms in the spatial distance belong to human beings, 
though we know not who or how many they are; and this imposes a duty on us not to throw 
bombs, for example, in their direction.  In like manner, the vagueness of the human future does not 
weaken its claim on us in light of the nearly certain knowledge that it will, after all, be human.
198
   
 
The problem is that the two examples used by Feinberg are far from analogous.  I 
have a general duty not to throw bombs because they might harm current persons 
(this is particularly true if I am throwing them at current persons).  Those current 
persons remain right-holders regardless of whether I can see them.  The fact that I, 
at this present moment, am unable to discern their identity is not demonstrative of 
the fact that their identity is indeterminable.  Plainly, they currently exist, are 
human, and thus possess rights.  Just as plainly (as Feinberg himself 
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acknowledges), future persons do not yet exist, and thus, it would seem, do not yet 
possess interests or the rights which derive from them.  Again, this is particularly 
true in light of the fact that the identity of those individuals who will one day 
possess interests will change in light of the adaptions we make to our behaviour as 
a result of the rights we have decided to assign them (something I will return to 
shortly).
199
   
De-Shalit appears equally confused by the difference between individuals who 
have interests and individuals who will have interests.  He states that, “it is 
difficult to deny that there are some interests, at present existing, that future 
generations, at present non-existent, now have”.200  Even without reference to the 
non-identity problem, such a statement seems eminently deniable.  What is strange 
is that De-Shalit himself provides a quote from De George which perfectly sums 
up the problem: 
Future generations by definition do not now exist. They cannot now, therefore, be the present 
bearer or subject of anything, including rights. Hence they cannot be said to have rights in the 
same sense that presently existing entities can be said to have them. This follows from the briefest 
analysis of the present tense form of the verb ‘to have’.201  
 
De-Shalit responds to such an argument as follows: 
…this argument is not strong enough to disprove the idea that future people, if and when they 
exist, will have rights. What matters in this case is not that future people do not exist now, but 
rather that if and when they exist, future people will have rights. If so we should conserve the rain 
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forests, clean up the beaches, reduce the use of gases which cause the greenhouse effect and so on, 
in order not to violate these eventual rights.
202
  
 
De-Shalit’s objection seems to misunderstand the problem.  De-George is quite 
plainly not trying to ‘disprove the idea that future people, if and when they exist, 
will have rights’.203  Rather, he simply states that future persons do not currently 
possess such rights and is concerned with the effects of this upon the duties of 
existing persons. 
While De-Shalit raises some interesting issues,
204
neither he, Feinberg nor Page is 
able to demonstrate that future persons possess interests before their conception 
(at which point they become current persons).   
Nor do they address another key difficulty with the idea.  If future persons could 
be said to have interests in the present, they would surely have an interest in 
coming into existence.  Yet there clearly cannot be a right to come into existence 
since we would be constantly in violation of such a right with almost every action 
we took since, as the non-identity problem shows us, each of those actions could 
serve to prevent certain future persons from existing and cause certain others to 
exist in their place. 
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Thus, if there is a reason to think that future persons are capable of possessing 
rights before their conception, that reason does not lie in the fact that such rights 
are derived from interests.   
In summary, it seems clear that none of the key justifications of rights provides us 
with any reason to think that rights should be afforded to future persons before 
their conception.  Future persons are not currently capable of reasoned action.  
They do not currently have interests and are not currently capable of making 
choices.  They are not currently human.  They are not currently anything.  The 
first reason for thinking that future persons do not possess rights, then, is their 
non-existence.  There is, however, a second, related but separate reason for 
thinking future persons cannot hold rights, which is highlighted by a return to the 
non-identity problem. 
The importance of the non-identity problem for this thesis is that it demonstrates 
that future persons must be precluded from possessing rights.
205
  This can be seen 
when we consider the reality of the scenario in which future persons are said to 
possess rights in the present: 
Living Lifestyle X causes me to violate the rights of Future Person A.  Therefore I 
am placed under a duty to instead adopt Lifestyle Y.  This causes us to be faced 
with a paradox.  In respecting A’s right by choosing Lifestyle Y, I fail to produce 
the pollution which was a necessary factor of A’s existence.  It may be that B or C 
or even B and C will exist instead, but A will not.  And if A not only does not 
exist, but will never exist, then A certainly cannot have any rights which place me 
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under a duty not to pollute.  And since I am under no duty to choose Lifestyle Y, I 
may quite legitimately choose Lifestyle X (which is preferable to me and allows 
my rights to be met more fully).  However, in doing so, I cause Person A to exist, 
and am thus placed under a duty to respect his/her rights…and the whole problem 
goes on and on in an everlasting circle. 
As a result of the non-identity problem then, even if we feel that the potential to 
make choices / have interests is reason enough to assign rights to an individual, 
we remain unable to assign future persons rights.  This is because future persons 
do not yet exist.  Or, more precisely, it is because of the interrelation between that 
existence and the so-called rights of that individual.  While an objection to the 
rights of future persons based solely upon their non-existence is valid in and of 
itself, it is greatly strengthened when combined with the paradox created by the 
non-identity problem. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, there seems no way in which any form of rights-based morality is 
capable of producing a convincing, coherent argument to say that future persons 
possess rights.  Future persons are incapable of making choices (and, unlike 
infants, always will be since once they are in a position to make choices they will 
be current persons) and therefore cannot justifiably be said to possess rights 
according to Choice Theory.   
They are similarly incapable of having interests.  If they were not, they would 
surely have an interest in being brought into existence, which would amount to a 
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right to such a thing, which we would all be in constant violation of since so many 
of our actions (especially our pollutant actions) cause certain people to exist at the 
expense of others.  Interest theorists are therefore equally unable to hold that 
future persons might possess rights.   
Finally, Nozickians, while being less obviously hamstrung than Interest and 
Choice theorists on the issue, nonetheless struggle to assert why a future person 
amounts to a person at all and therefore would surely maintain that future persons 
do not possess rights in the present.  This is particularly true given the 
exceptionally strong, exceptionally individualist status they assign to rights.  
Nozickian rights are so extensive in terms of the range of activities they cover and 
so powerful in how strongly they are demanded that to insist that they were 
possessed equally by as yet non-existent persons would likely limit the actions a 
state might take to such an extent as to render a Nozickian morality unworkable. 
In addition to these specific theoretical objections surrounding non-existence in 
and of itself, the non-identity problem provides a universal, practical obstacle to 
the notion that future persons might possess rights.  In acting in accordance with 
the rights of a particular future individual, we might cause that individual’s non-
existence, thus meaning that we need no longer act in a way which respects 
his/her rights.  This paradox demonstrates that future persons cannot be deemed to 
have rights and current persons cannot be deemed to be placed under correlative 
duties towards them. 
Future persons’ lack of rights means that rights-based moralities struggle to assign 
them a moral status which most of us would deem appropriate.  While some 
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amount supererogation aimed at protecting future persons would be permitted,
206
 
any action which, in affording such protection, required damaging the rights of 
current persons could not be considered permissible.  Unfortunately, as Chapter 5 
will demonstrate, a great many of the paths open to states which might make a 
positive impact in reducing climate change will mean that the rights of current 
persons are negatively impacted. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF 
FUTURE PERSONS 
 
Introduction 
The next chapters will demonstrate that supporters of rights are left questioning 
the validity of their moral doctrine when faced with its apparent inability to 
provide good ethical reasons for reducing emissions.  This difficulty 
predominantly emerges from the inability of future persons to possess rights – a 
fact which itself emerges largely as a result of the non-identity problem, which 
precludes them from doing so.  This chapter will re-examine the nature of rights, 
duties and the non-identity problem in order to analyse some possible rights-
friendly alternatives to the position put forward in Chapter 5. 
Numerous experts in the field of climate ethics raise the spectre of the non-
identity problem before dismissing it as being ultimately incapable of giving us 
good reason not to show moral concern for future persons.  McKinnon, for 
example, argues: 
It is true that what we do now will affect the identity of members of F, that is, will affect who it is 
that actually comes to be.  But what matters is that, whoever comes to be, what we do now delivers 
justice to them.  And the reason for this is…that the point in time at which a person – any person – 
is born is as morally irrelevant to her status as a recipient of justice as is her sex, colour, religion, 
etc.
207
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She goes on to add that “[t]he morally relevant interests of future people – 
whoever they are – are the same as present people’s…”.208  One legitimate 
response to such a claim is to contend that it is not the case that the morally 
relevant interests of future people are the same as those of current persons, but 
that they will be the same when those future people come into being (the non-
existence problem).  On a related (but separate) note, while the time at which a 
person is born is indeed irrelevant to his/her status as a recipient of justice, the fact 
that our actions will effect who comes to be seems very relevant to the issue of 
whether the justice s/he will come to be owed upon being born requires current 
persons to take action before his/her birth. 
McKinnon, and many others like her, dismiss the non-identity problem too readily 
in their desire to assert the moral value of preventing climate change.  While I do 
not agree with such an approach, it will nonetheless often be the case that the non-
identity problem would not have proved an unassailable obstacle in the quest of 
such writers to avail the virtues of not polluting.  For most experts in the field the 
objection to the non-identity problem will sound something like this:  ‘causing 
unnecessary suffering to future persons is wrong and ought to be avoided even if 
avoiding such suffering changes the identity of those future persons’.  I will call 
this ‘The Avoidance of Suffering Goal’. 
As this thesis has shown, such an objection does not hold true for supporters of 
rights.  The non-identity problem precludes future persons from possessing rights.  
This is because, if Future Person A has a right which creates a duty upon current 
persons to not pollute, in meeting this duty current people will change the 
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circumstances necessary for the Future Person A to exist, thus resulting in his/her 
replacement with Future Person B.
209210
  Given this fact, it would be paradoxical 
for us to maintain that Future Person A possesses rights in the present since, as a 
result of the duties such rights would demand of current persons, Future Person A 
will never come to exist and will thus never possess rights. 
With the above in mind, a far more interesting rejection of the non-identity 
problem is put forward by Caney, who attacks the validity of the notion from a 
rights-based perspective.
211
   
Caney essentially seeks to put forward a rights-friendly version of The Avoidance 
of Suffering Goal.  In doing so, he highlights two good responses which 
supporters of rights might offer to the claim that, as a result of the non-identity 
problem, rights-based moralities are incapable of assigning future people 
appropriate moral weight.   
Firstly, he claims that the non-identity problem only serves to undermine what 
Parfit would label ‘person-affecting’ views.212  Of course, rights, as understood 
both in Chapter 2 and by the majority of rights theorists, are most certainly 
person-affecting.  Caney, however, contends that if we adopt Sen’s concept of a 
‘goal-rights system’, rights cease to be person-affecting and thus cease to fall 
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victim to the non-identity problem.  Sen’s position essentially states that the 
successful fulfilment of rights should be included among the goals that any 
morality sets itself.  And if overall levels of rights fulfilment are a moral system’s 
primary aim (or one of them) then the specific identity of those individuals whose 
rights fulfilled becomes irrelevant. 
Secondly, Caney feels that, in line with the thinking of Elliot, one might 
conceivably argue that the fact that there will one day exist some future people 
who will possess rights is enough to confer duties on current people in the present 
without the need to make the controversial claim that future people currently 
possess such rights before they exist.
213
 
In addition to the responses highlighted by Caney, supporters of rights-based 
moralities might also seek to circumvent the issues associated with the non-
identity problem by claiming that future persons are capable of possessing rights 
as a group.  If this could be established then, unlike in the individual cases, the 
meeting of duties associated with such rights would no longer affect the identity 
of the right-holding entity.  The existence of future persons as a group would 
remain unchanged provided that existence is considered to be in some sense 
separate from that of its individual members since, regardless of our emission-
causing activities, some future persons will continue to ‘exist’ to the extent that 
future persons can be said to have existence.
214
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This chapter examines such positions and explains why they turn out to be unable 
to rescue rights-based moralities from the charge that they are incapable of 
assigning appropriate moral weight to future persons. 
Before any of this though, I wish to begin by exploring a well-placed argument 
which is put forward by Carter and might be deemed to undermine the non-
identity problem and therefore the subsequent difficulties it causes for rights-
based thinking.  As I will demonstrate, while Carter’s reasoning provides 
supporters of rights with a plausible argument against the non-identity problem, 
its adoption would actually serve to cause more problems (both practical and 
conceptual) than it would solve for the doctrine. 
 
Carter and the Non-identity Problem 
The difficulties rights-based moralities have in finding suitable motivation for 
resolving the problem of climate change primarily stem from the inability of 
future persons to hold rights before their existence.  In turn, as explained in 
Chapter 3, a primary reason for this inability is that the non-identity problem 
would appear to preclude future persons from having rights.  If the identity of 
future persons is as of yet undecided, and if ‘protecting’ their ‘rights’ will change 
the identities of those future persons, it would seem paradoxical to claim that they 
are the types of being who might be suitable candidates for rights. 
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With this in mind, it is worth briefly revisiting the non-identity problem through 
the work of Carter,
215
 who raises an interesting objection which may be relevant 
to supporters of rights. 
Carter’s argument is made in response to Schwartz’s claims that, since our 
pollution causes different people to exist in the future than would have existed had 
we adopted climate-friendly policies, those future persons who will come to exist 
as a result of our pollution are not made worse off, and hence are not harmed, by 
it.  As a result, he concludes that current persons are not placed under any ethical 
duty to reduce pollution.
216
 
In response, Carter makes several well-placed objections.  For example, he 
questions the legitimacy of defining ‘harm’ as ‘being made worse off’ and asks 
whether it is truly reasonable to claim that a policy which creates great suffering 
might be considered preferable to a policy which creates less suffering provided 
the first policy makes fewer people worse off.
217
 
Like many of Carter’s arguments, the above point, while interesting, is of no great 
use to supporters of rights.  As previously noted, such individuals are troubled by 
a much narrower argument than Schwartz’s, i.e. that the non-identity problem 
precludes future persons from holding rights.  Carter, however, comes up with one 
argument which promises to be more fruitful to supporters of rights, since it 
attacks the reasoning of the non-identity problem itself, as opposed to simply 
questioning the ethical conclusions others draw from it. 
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Carter feels that the non-identity problem emerges as a result of our mistaken 
assumption that both ‘current persons’ and ‘future persons’ should be treated as 
collectivities.  He argues that 
although it appears that we (construed as a collectivity comprising all presently existing persons) 
are responsible, because of our destructive actions, for the existence of all distant future people, 
and consequently, that we (construed as such a collectivity) might, perhaps, be thought to be 
incapable of harming them, there can be no doubt that we, individually, are not responsible 
through every one of our destructive actions for every future person’s existence, and it therefore 
seems to be the case that we can harm even the most distant of future generations.
218
 
 
This important but complex argument is clarified by Carter as follows: 
The mistaken Schwartzian view that Andrea, Ben and Clara cannot possibly harm Xerksis, 
Yolanda and Zak depends upon regarding Andrea, Ben and Clara as, in effect, a collective entity.  
When they are viewed in such a manner, then it appears that they cannot harm Xerksis, Yolanda 
and Zak.  But when they are considered individually, it is clear that they can harm them. 
Certainly, a person would be unable to harm any future person if every future person’s existence 
was dependent upon every one of his or her otherwise harmful actions.  But it is absurd to think 
that anyone has the power through every one of his or her environmentally destructive activities to 
determine the coming into existence of every future person.  Moreover, a person would only be 
unable to harm future persons if, for every otherwise harmful action which he or she might 
perform, the existence of every person who would otherwise have been harmed by the action in 
question was dependent upon that particular action.  As it is highly implausible that every one of 
an individual’s environmentally damaging actions which will result in, or contribute towards, 
future suffering are of that sort, then each of us can harm (and indeed is harming) future people by 
our present environmentally damaging activities. 
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Why do I insist that every one of an agent’s otherwise harmful actions and every one of his or her 
environmentally destructive activities must determine every future person’s existence if 
Schwartz’s claim that we cannot harm distant future persons is to succeed?  Because even if I were 
able to affect the identity of every person in the distant future, it would not follow that I could not 
harm any of them.  I could still harm a future person whose identity I determined as long as one of 
my actions made him or her worse off than he or she would otherwise have been – in other words, 
as long as that action was not the one that determined his or her identity.
219
 
 
In summary, then, Carter objects that, viewed on an individual level, the non-
identity problem ceases to be a problem.  Since it is distinctly possible that any 
one of my individual actions could contribute to the harm future persons will face 
without being significant enough to change the identity of those being harmed, it 
is perfectly reasonable to claim that the actions of current persons might harm 
future persons.  Indeed, he goes on to suggest that viewing the problem at an 
individual level is the only valid means of assessment: 
…one cannot simply conclude that if the collectivity which all presently existing humans 
constitute is able to harm any distant future person, then it must be impossible for any of those 
who comprise it to do so, for one cannot straightforwardly transfer the properties of a collectivity 
to the individuals who constitute it….In other words, we cannot abdicate our individual 
responsibilities simply by viewing ourselves as a collectivity – no matter how convenient that 
might be.  Furthermore, in the view of many today, the collectivity which all presently existing 
humans belong to is not, plausibly, a moral agent.  And if it is not, then its inability to harm distant 
future generations is morally irrelevant; whereas those who are, without question, moral agents – 
individual humans – and who are able to harm future people, surely have the moral obligation to 
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alter their behaviour, and that of the communities they live within or alongside, so as to avoid 
bringing about the harm they can individually cause future persons.
220
 
 
At first glance, such an approach appears attractive to supporters of rights.  Not 
only does Carter’s objection appear to overcome the non-identity problem, it does 
so in an apparently rights-friendly manner.  Rights, in the sense that this thesis has 
discussed them, are predominantly considered to be held by individuals.
221
  The 
problems for supporters of rights have thus far stemmed from the harm climate 
burdens would do to the rights of current individuals.  It would seem quite natural, 
therefore, to disaggregate both future and current persons into specific (although, 
in the case of future persons, not specifiable) individuals. 
Upon further examination, though, it becomes clear that accepting Carter’s logic 
would cause supporters of rights more problems than it would solve.  Its primary 
difficulty is highlighted by Sinnot-Armstrong, who states 
There is nothing immoral about greenhouse gases in themselves when they cause no harm.  
Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide and water vapour, which occur naturally and help plants 
grow.  The problem of global warming occurs because of the high quantities of greenhouse gases, 
not because of anything bad about smaller quantities of the same gases.  So it is hard to see why I 
would have a moral obligation not to expel harmless quantities of greenhouse gases.  And that is 
all I do by myself.
222
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While Sinnot-Armstrong’s view is not one which I endorse overall, his claim 
becomes perfectly reasonable if, as Carter insists, we ignore the inherently 
collective nature of the causes of climate change.  Carter’s problem, then, is that, 
by compelling us to view things from an individualist perspective rather than a 
collectivist one in order to subvert the non-identity problem, he has inadvertently 
afforded current persons a different (and more compelling) reason for continuing 
to pollute.  Unless we view climate change as a collective problem, it is difficult 
to see how we can view it as a problem at all.  Contrary to Carter’s claim, my 
emissions alone will neither change the identity of future people nor harm them.  
It is only when taken with the emissions of others that my emissions are able to 
cause harm, and when taken with the emissions of others they will also affect the 
identities of future persons. 
In anticipation of criticism of his focus upon individuals, Carter puts forward two 
possible counter-objections.  Unfortunately for supporters of rights, neither seems 
capable of overcoming Sinnot-Armstrong’s argument. 
Carter’s first response to the objection that it is collectivities, and not individuals, 
that cause harm to future persons is simply to claim that it is not true.  Instead, 
Carter asserts that, since each individual performs actions which contribute to the 
harm caused by the collective, each individual can be said to have in some way 
caused that harm.  He uses the following example to illustrate his point: 
Suppose that every weekday I walk over your lawn on my way to work.  The harm that I do is, 
apparently, insignificant.  However, suppose that one thousand other people also decide to use 
your lawn as a short cut.  Collectively, we cause a great deal of damage to your lawn.  It is wholly 
implausible to think that none of us causes any damage, but there is some collective entity which 
causes it.  Rather, when we all act as we do, each of us causes a small amount of damage which 
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adds up to a great deal of damage to your lawn.  And were each of us to think ‘my contribution is 
insignificant, therefore I won’t alter my route to work’, then the damage which each adds would 
persist.  Hence, each of us is morally obliged to stop contributing to it.
223
 
 
The problem is that climate change is not like my lawn.  With regard to my lawn, 
‘each of us causes a small amount of damage which adds up to a great deal of 
damage’.  As such, if there is something morally wrong with damaging my lawn 
by walking across it, then it is morally wrong for you to walk across it regardless 
of whether anybody else also does so because your walk alone does some 
damage.
224
 
This situation is not analogous to climate change because, as Sinnot-Armstrong 
highlights, each individual emission-causing action is neither harmful nor 
immoral in itself.
225
 
Firstly, it clearly cannot be the case that every emission-causing action is immoral 
regardless of whether said action contributes to a level of climate change which 
harms future persons.  Heating one’s home and breathing produce emissions.226  
Such things are activities which individuals cannot be held accountable for, 
regardless of the consequences.  Therefore, unlike your walking on my lawn, it is 
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not inherently wrong to produce emissions, even if those emissions might be 
deemed to cause harm. 
Secondly, and more importantly, there is nothing inherently harmful about the 
emissions we produce as individuals.  As Sinnot-Armstrong explains,  
…the harms of global warming result from the massive quantities of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere.  Greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide and water vapor) are perfectly fine in 
small quantities.  They help plants grow.  The problem emerges only when there is too much of 
them. 
227
 
He goes on to add that “…global warming will not occur unless lots of other 
people also expel greenhouse gases.  So my individual act is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for global warming.”228  As a result, unlike the damage to my lawn, the 
emissions of any current individual only do any damage at all when taken in 
conjunction with an extremely large number of other emissions created by 
millions of other individuals, past and present.  In other words, climate change - 
which itself is harmful to future persons - only occurs as a result of many millions 
of actions which, taken individually, are not harmful at all.  It is purely a 
collective problem.  Therefore, Carter’s move to avoid the non-identity problem 
through a focus on individuals rather than collectivities inadvertently affords us an 
altogether different reason for thinking that there is nothing immoral about climate 
change. 
While Carter does not address the criticism of his reversion to an individualist 
perspective in quite the detail given above, he does acknowledge that the 
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objection that climate change is purely a collectivist problem is likely to emerge.  
As a result, he makes the following statement: 
…were it in fact the case that only collectivities cause significant damage, my response to 
Schwartz could be developed in the following way:  If only a collectivity exceeding a certain size 
causes harm to individuals in the distant future, each of us is, whether we like it or not, a member 
of such a collectivity.  And each of us bears some responsibility for what that collectivity does – 
for example, by not campaigning to alter how the collectivity behaves.
229
 
 
The obvious response to this is to question whether, given such an adaption, we 
can still claim that it is possible for current persons, as a collectivity, to take 
actions which will harm certain future persons without changing their identity.  
Similarly, it seems pertinent to ask whether it is legitimate to separate certain 
pollutant actions from others if the sum total of the pollutant actions will still 
cause the identity of these particular future persons to change.  Carter appears to 
feel that such problems might be overcome if we consider a collective smaller 
than ‘current persons’, but big enough to impact upon the identity of future 
persons, such as a nation-state.
230
 
Even if we accept the legitimacy of Carter’s claim with regard to collectivities, it 
is still not enough to rescue supporters of rights from the consequences of the non-
identity problem.  While Carter’s point may cause some difficulty for Schwartz’s 
dramatic, generalised claim that we owe no moral duty to future persons as a 
result of the non-identity problem, it does not hold similar strength against the 
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much narrower claim that the non-identity problem provides a strong reason for 
thinking that future persons are not the type of beings who can possess rights. 
For supporters of rights, the importance of the non-identity problem is not related 
to whether it is possible for an action to ‘harm’ future persons if that same action 
was also a necessary factor of their existence.  All individuals have rights 
regardless of how they came into existence.  Therefore, while there is no right to 
be born, once an individual is born the rights they automatically possess as an 
existing human are in no way affected by the nature in which their existence 
emerged.   
What the non-identity problem demonstrates, however, is the fact that, since a 
great many of the actions of current persons will impact upon the identity of 
future persons, it would be paradoxical to claim those future persons bear rights 
now.  If they did, current persons would be required to adjust their behaviour 
accordingly, thus changing the identity of those who supposedly held the right.
231
 
Carter attempts to claim that, since certain of our actions (as part of a collective) 
might negatively affect a future person without changing their identity, the claim 
that we owe no moral duties to future persons is incorrect.  However, such an 
argument does not seem sufficient to warrant granting rights to future people in 
the present.  Even Carter acknowledges that the identities of some (perhaps a 
majority) of the future persons who will come to exist will have been changed as a 
result of our current actions.  His argument is simply that, because this is not the 
case with all future persons, it is possible for us to harm certain future persons 
through our actions without having first benefitted them by causing them to exist.   
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This is not sufficient to dispel the claim that the non-identity problem precludes 
future persons from holding rights.  Rights are universal.  We cannot assign them 
to certain future persons (those whose identities have not been changed by the 
pollutant activities they will come to suffer from) but not others (those whose 
identities have been changed by the pollutant activities they will come to suffer 
from).  Moreover, it would be impossible to determine, in practice, which future 
persons came under which category.   
In short, it may be the case that Carter provides a good reason for followers of a 
great many ethical schools of thought to think that the non-identity problem is not 
a sufficient reason to disregard the moral status of future persons.  Unfortunately, 
rights-based moralities do not benefit in such a way.  This is because, while Carter 
gives us reason to think it possible for current persons to harm future persons, he 
does not overcome the well-founded objection that the non-identity problem 
precludes future persons from holding rights in the present. 
 
Future Rights, Current Duties? 
Clearly, the non-identity problem remains a significant difficulty for those 
supporters of rights who seek to use the wellbeing of future persons to justify 
large-scale action to reduce climate change in the present.  It is, however, not the 
only problem which would need to be overcome for such a goal to be achieved. 
A second, perhaps more straightforward and more fundamental difficulty, is put 
forward by Beckerman and Pasek, who contend that “…the general proposition 
that future generations cannot have anything, including rights, follows from the 
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meaning of the present tense of the verb ‘to have’.  Unborn people simply 
cannot have anything.”232  They further clarify this argument as follows: 
The crux of our argument that future generations cannot have rights to anything is that properties, 
such as being green or wealthy or having rights, can be predicated only of some subject that exists. 
Outside the realm of mythical or fictional creatures or hypothetical discourse, if there is no subject, 
then there is nothing to which any property can be ascribed.
233
 
 
Caney feels that supporters of rights can overcome at least this second objection 
by adopting what Elliot describes as ‘the Concessional View’ with regard to 
future people and rights. 
While Elliot himself does not believe it unreasonable to assign rights to future 
persons, he asserts that one need not do so in order to provide future persons with 
enough moral weight to demand that we constrain our pollutant actions in the 
present.  As he puts it,  
The point is that future people will come into existence and will have interests which are then real.  
In the future these people will satisfy the interest principle and so will be the kinds of beings who 
can possess rights.  The implication is that the reality of these interests in the future is of normative 
significance for us now.
234
 
 
Essentially, the Concessional View argues that supporters of rights need not claim 
that either future people or their rights exist in the present in order for current 
people to possess duties in the present which are correlative to the rights future 
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people will have upon coming into existence.  Instead, it argues that the fact that a 
particular action of ours is likely to violate the as yet non-existent right of an as 
yet non-existent person at some point in the future is enough to prohibit us from 
taking said action. 
Elliot explains such a position as follows: 
…what we presumably wish to avoid are violations of rights flowing from our actions and 
policies.  Clearly present actions and policies will affect the interests of people who exist in the 
future.  And the rights people have in the future will be determined by the interests which they 
have then.  So, it would seem that if we can adversely affect their interests, which we can, we can 
violate their rights.  The manifestations of such violations might not occur in the present but the 
actions or policies which cause them do….All that we need to accept to make this point is that 
some future event can render a present event a violation of a future right.  This seems 
unproblematic.  We do not have to accept that the violation occurs before the right exists, only that 
an action of ours in the present causes the violation in the future.  And if we have a commitment to 
avoiding and minimising violations of rights we should refrain from performing the action.
235
 
 
Elliot’s move is a smart one and seems to offer some hope of avoiding some the 
criticisms of the idea that future people have rights without abandoning the moral 
worth of future people altogether.  By specifically not claiming that future people 
possess rights in the present, Elliot avoids Beckerman and Pasek’s objection that 
future people cannot ‘have’ anything, without succumbing to the conclusion that 
current persons are not required to care about their welfare under a rights-based 
morality.  Instead, our duty not to cause harm apparently remains intact regardless 
of the present absence of any correlative right. 
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Unfortunately, there are other problems which Elliot’s position is not so easily 
able to overcome.   
By insisting that future people do not have rights in the present, he immediately 
causes us to question why the supporter of rights should take their welfare into 
account.  Essentially, since (as future chapters will demonstrate) reducing climate-
related harm to future persons would involve restricting/violating the rights of 
current persons, such policies would need to demonstrate that these 
restrictions/violations were being carried out as a result of a clash of rights.  If 
future persons do not have rights, this is impossible. 
In attempting to address such an issue, Elliot refers to what effectively amounts to 
an appeal to the general welfare.  As noted above, he states that “an action of ours 
in the present causes [a] violation in the future.  And if we have a commitment to 
avoiding and minimising violations of rights we should refrain from performing 
the action.”236  He later adds: 
We are not striving to ensure that the rights of a specific set of people are not violated, rather we 
are striving to ensure that rights violations do not occur.  Whoever comes into existence will have 
rights and it is the violation of the rights of individuals which we wish to avoid.
237
 
 
Sacrificing the rights of specific current individuals in the name of minimising 
overall levels of rights violations might, at first glance, appear to be a rights-based 
argument. However, on closer inspection it becomes clear that this is not the case.  
As Nozick notes, 
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…there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.  There are 
only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.  Using one of 
these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others.  Nothing more.  What happens 
is that something is done to him for the sake of others.
238
 
 
The primary way in which supporters of rights might overcome Nozick’s 
complaint is through recourse to the general welfare.
239
  Yet, ironically, greater 
overall levels of rights recognition among as yet non-existent persons cannot be 
considered a legitimate exercise of the ‘general welfare’ for two reasons.   
Firstly, under a rights-based morality, even references to the general welfare must, 
in a certain sense, be rights-based.  As explained in Chapter 2, the purpose of 
references to the general welfare under rights-based moralities is to allow that 
certain rights-protected actions may, under certain circumstances, be restricted 
(solely) in order to better safeguard the rights of others.  These circumstances are 
those where the unrestricted exercise of those rights would lead to significant 
harm to the rights of others but where this resultant harm would only be indirectly 
related to the actions taken and thus would not amount to a clash of rights in the 
traditional sense. 
With the above in mind, the first reason that greater overall levels of enjoyment of 
rights in the future cannot be considered a legitimate goal of the general welfare is 
that, since future people do not have rights, it cannot be claimed that the sacrifices 
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of certain rights of certain current persons are even indirectly taken in the name of 
protecting rights.  At best, they are taken in the name of potential, eventual rights.  
Thus, the general welfare in this case would refer to the welfare of people who do 
not yet exist and do not yet possess rights.  Any reference to the general welfare 
based on their well-being would amount to sacrificing rights in the name of a non-
rights-based goal.  As noted in my response to Sen’s ‘goal rights’ argument, 
below, a moral system which allows such a thing can no longer consider itself 
rights-based. 
The second difficulty with Elliot’s argument is that it remains vulnerable to the 
non-identity problem.  The future people who enjoy greater levels of rights 
recognition will be different future people to those who otherwise would have 
existed.  Therefore they cannot be said to have benefitted from our policy.  While 
current people are made significantly worse off, nobody is made better off.  In 
light of this, coupled with the inability of future persons to hold rights, it would 
seem that Elliot’s general welfare claim that minimising violations of rights is a 
good thing would actually be better served by current persons not mitigating 
climate change. 
Overall, while Elliot’s argument that future persons are able to merit significant 
moral weight without possessing rights overcomes some of the problems rights-
based moralities have in this area, it is ultimately incapable of resolving such 
issues satisfactorily.  As such, I will now examine the work of Sen, Caney’s other 
primary reference point in addressing such perceived deficiencies. 
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‘Goal Rights’ and Future Persons 
Caney feels the non-identity problem is only a problem for what Parfit would term 
‘person-affecting’ views.  Such views would deem an action to be wrong if (and 
only if) that action made a person worse-off.  As we have seen, the non-identity 
problem means that the pollutant actions of current persons cannot be categorised 
in such a manner, since they do not make future persons worse off.  Caney argues, 
however, that if we accept Sen’s concept of a ‘goal rights system’, the claim that 
future people have rights ceases to be a ‘person-affecting’ claim.240 
Caney states that, if we follow Sen’s view of rights 
…a commitment to rights requires that we bring about states of affairs in which people are able to 
exercise their fundamental rights. The key point is that this is not a ‘person-affecting’ approach but 
what Parfit terms an ‘impersonal’ one. As such, it is not undermined by Parfit’s non-identity 
problem. 
If we use Sen’s approach it follows that a rights-centered analysis does not claim, and is not 
committed to claiming, that an action committed now violates a particular (future) person’s right in 
the sense that it prevents a person from enjoying a right that he or she would otherwise be able to 
enjoy. Rather, what it entails is that persons should not act in such a way that those who are born 
in the future are unable to enjoy certain rights.
241 
 
Sen himself does not attempt to apply his account of rights to the issue of future 
persons.  Rather, his ‘goal rights’ system is developed in response to deficiencies 
he perceives with both the welfarist instrumental approach and the deontological 
constraint-based approach (some version of the latter being that which I have 
                                               
240
 Caney, S., Op.Cit, p.237 
241
 Ibid, p.237 
Page 145 of 305 
 
earlier presented as being what I understand to be at the core of rights-based 
moralities).
242
 
Sen defines a ‘goal-rights’ system as “[a] moral system in which fulfilment and 
nonrealization of rights are included among the goals, incorporated in the 
evaluation of states of affairs, and then applied to the choice of actions through 
consequential links”.243  This focus on consequences is important.  It is the 
primary difference between Sen’s approach and the constraint-based approach 
which I have previously deemed to epitomise rights-based systems.  This is 
because, in allowing the consequences of an action to influence our decision as to 
its rightness or wrongness, Sen avoids the position that rights are unassailable 
constraints upon action.  As he puts it,  
…although rights are included within the evaluation of states of affairs, there could be other things 
to which the evaluation of states of affairs is sensitive in a goal rights system. The crucial issue is 
the inclusion of fulfilment and nonfulfilment of rights-rather than the exclusion of nonright 
considerations-in the evaluation of states of affairs.
244
 
 
As Caney notes, it is not that Sen would allow us to assign rights to future 
persons.  Under Sen’s system, rights would still be held by individuals, and those 
individuals would still need to exist in order to possess them.  Claiming that future 
individuals held rights which bore correlative duties upon present persons would 
remain absurd as a result of the non-identity problem. 
                                               
242
 Sen, A., ‘Rights and Agency’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11 (1982), 3–39, p.5 
243
 Ibid, p.15 
244
 Ibid, p.15 
Page 146 of 305 
 
The only advantage of Sen’s system, then, would be that, because it denies the 
absolute nature of rights, it would allow us to restrict/violate the rights of current 
persons in order to protect future persons.  This advantage emerges not from any 
claim that future persons possess rights, but from the idea that the rights of current 
persons may be legitimately overridden by non-rights-based concerns if such 
concerns are of sufficient importance.
245
  The only thing which is different about 
Sen’s claim is that the overall effect of an action upon the successful realisation of 
the rights of future persons might have some bearing upon whether we deem a 
particular concern to be worthy of overriding the rights of current persons, without 
requiring that we deem the former to be in possession of rights in the present.  In 
other words, Sen’s approach allows its supporters to assert that improving the 
ability of future persons to have their rights fulfilled upon coming into existence is 
a goal of such moral significance that we do not require those persons to be 
current right-holders in order to warrant our restricting/violating the rights of 
current persons to protect them.  And by claiming there is some sort of intrinsic 
good in reducing overall levels of suffering and increasing levels of rights 
recognition among future persons in general, supporters of Sen’s approach are not 
plagued by the fact that those future persons will be different future persons to 
those who would otherwise have existed, and thus cannot be said to have 
benefitted from these increased levels of rights recognition. 
There are several key difficulties with such an approach. 
Firstly, as argued in Chapter 2, I am deeply unconvinced of the coherence of a 
rights-based moral system which is so concerned with moral goals which are not 
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rights-based that it is willing to allow rights to be restricted/violated in pursuit of 
them.  If we truly believe that a rights-based morality is so incapable of averting 
certain moral catastrophes that we have to rely upon a get out clause which 
enables us to sacrifice rights in the name of non-rights-based goods, then why do 
we endorse a rights-based system at all?  If, when things get difficult, our rights-
based system must be pushed aside in favour of some other moral system which is 
capable of arriving at a more desirable outcome, why would we not simply forgo 
rights altogether and wholeheartedly adopt this new moral system instead? 
In response, one might argue that, because rights-based moralities work well 
under non-emergency circumstances they are of great worth, even if they can be 
legitimately abandoned when following them will lead to catastrophe.  However, I 
would contend that in accepting such a position we inherently endorse a morality 
which cannot truly be considered rights-based in the sense discussed in Chapter 2.  
In allowing that rights may, under certain circumstances, be overridden in the 
name of non-rights-based goals we endorse a system which uses rights as a 
convenient tool to reach its goals, not one which uses rights as its founding 
principle. 
As noted above, if our moral system is to remain rights-based then references to 
the general welfare must be references to those cases where the outcome of 
normal rights-based reasoning would result in a situation which is worse for right-
holders than if we temporarily restricted certain rights.  This is not the case here as 
future persons are not right-holders. 
Secondly, why should it be the case that increasing the welfare levels of those 
future persons who will one day exist is considered so important that it remains 
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our key moral priority even if none of these future persons will actually benefit 
from these increased welfare levels?  Due to the non-identity problem, the future 
people who come to exist in a world with less climate change will not be better off 
than they would have been if we had polluted, since if we had polluted they would 
have been entirely different people.  Therefore, current people will be made worse 
off by a mitigation regime which causes no future people to be better off.  Such a 
position seems difficult to maintain for a great many moral theories, but for those 
claiming to be rights-based it is clearly untenable.  
Why should we think that increasing future levels of welfare is ‘sufficiently 
strong’ to warrant both directly violating and unduly restricting the rights of 
current persons?  Moreover, since Sen’s theory maintains that individuals have 
duties to help, wherever possible, to alleviate rights violations of others when we 
can do so at little cost to ourselves,
246
 why should we think we should forgo such 
duties in favour of a highly costly policy of mitigation which will increase the 
welfare of (but not benefit) people who are not currently right-holders living in the 
distant future, but which will, in the process, greatly lower levels of rights 
realisation for both the present generation and those which immediately follow 
it?
247
   
In short, while I accept Caney’s argument that Sen’s theory could, theoretically, 
be put forward as a rights-based answer to the non-identity problem, I would 
contend that no genuine supporter of rights would seek to do so.  In order to avoid 
the non-identity problem, supporters of Sen’s theory would have to place such 
importance upon a non-rights-based goal - and, in the process, directly damage 
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and/or severely impair the development of the rights of millions - that it would 
become difficult to justify calling their theory rights-based at all. 
Group Rights
248
 and Future Persons 
One further key criticism which could be made of my rejection of the idea future 
persons are capable of possessing human rights is the claim that my arguments 
thus far are only evidence that future persons are incapable of possessing rights as 
individuals.  None of these arguments, it might be claimed, categorically prohibits 
future persons from possessing rights as a collective. 
Up until this point this thesis has rejected the idea that future persons might be 
appropriate subjects of rights on two main grounds: 
Firstly, I have argued that it difficult to see how future persons can have rights 
because it is difficult to see how future persons can have anything.  Future 
persons, by definition, do not yet exist.  Moreover, they do not exist in a very 
specific way; they are not yet individuated.  It is therefore hard to imagine how a 
future person might possess a right in the here and now (even if we accept that 
they will one day come to do so).  And it is doubly difficult to see how either they 
or an agent acting on their behalf might go about claiming such a right given that 
there exists no individual future person who can be identified even in thought on 
behalf of whom we might make such a claim. 
Secondly (and more damningly), I have argued that, as a result of the non-identity 
problem, the idea of individual future persons possessing rights which bear duties 
upon current persons is paradoxical.  This is because in respecting the rights of 
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Future Person A (who would have existed had we polluted), we cause Future 
Person B to come into existence instead.  This means that, a) there is no longer a 
Future Person A whose rights we would violate by polluting, and b) it is hard to 
see how we are doing the individual who is (or will be) Future Person A any 
favours by causing his/her non-existence.  If they had the choice, it seems likely 
that Future Person A would waive any right of theirs at the point where its 
successful realisation would cause their non-existence. 
It might be argued that both of these grounds for the rejection of future persons’ 
rights are only successful if we speak of future persons as individuals.  If, 
however, we were able to assign rights to future persons as a collective it seems 
that such problems would hold the possibility of being overcome.  Future persons, 
as a group, are far more identifiable in thought and thus easier to claim rights on 
behalf of.
249
  More importantly, concerns over inadvertently changing the identity 
of individual group members (and thus their ability to possess rights) through 
actions taken to combat climate change would appear to be assuaged to some 
extent if we treat future persons as a whole as the relevant right-bearing entity.  If 
we are placed under a duty to cease our pollution by the correlative right of future 
persons as a single, right-bearing entity, no paradox emerges through us meeting 
that duty.  Those future persons who end up coming into existence will certainly 
be better off if they are less exposed to the negative effects of climate change than 
those (different) future persons who would have existed had we polluted.  
Certainly, there would still seem to be some ethical difficulty emerging from the 
non-identity problem, but it would no longer be one which automatically 
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precluded the possession of rights since the right-holding entity (future persons as 
a collective) would continue to exist regardless of the behaviour of current 
persons. 
While, historically speaking, the concept of group rights has often been viewed 
with suspicion, recently things have begun to change.  As Jovanovic notes, 
“…collective rights talk has recently gained currency both in the scholarly 
literature and in international and domestic legal instruments.”250 
This is not to say that the legitimacy of group rights is by any means universally 
accepted even among supporters of rights.  However, it does seem fair to claim 
that those scholars who do make serious, well-reasoned arguments in favour of 
group rights are now considered a legitimate part of the discussion both by 
supporters of more individualistic conceptions of rights and those who reject the 
idea of moral rights altogether.  It is, therefore, at least academically legitimate for 
supporters of rights to endorse group rights, and thus the relationship between 
group rights and future persons merits careful consideration.  Indeed, a move 
towards a more group-rights-friendly outlook has some strong potential benefits. 
Firstly, as Donnelly correctly asserts, “[a] standard complaint about human rights, 
and about liberal visions of human rights in particular, is that they are excessively 
individualistic.”251  The serious consideration of group rights is one way of 
lessening this perceived over-focus on individuals as the appropriate objects of 
moral concern (something which has, in part, led critics to claim that, far from 
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being universal, human rights are a western concept unable to properly represent 
the values of many non-western cultures). 
Secondly, traditional, individualistic conceptions of rights struggle to show why 
the well-being of future persons ought to feature significantly in our moral 
reasoning.  Many people who would otherwise be sympathetic to rights-based 
moral systems may find such a conclusion so disquieting as to render such 
systems unacceptable.  In light of this, if those rights-based moralities which 
openly endorse group rights are able to overcome this issue by assigning 
appropriate moral weight to future persons, this may, in itself, be seen as a good 
reason for endorsing the concept of group rights. 
As this section will demonstrate, however, the concept of group rights cannot 
easily or effectively be applied to future persons. 
The section will begin by examining the many varying conceptions of what the 
term ‘group rights’ actually means.  In doing so, it will argue that only if one 
adopts a ‘Value Collectivist’ position do group rights hold any possibility of being 
applied to future persons. 
The section will then go on to explain that, even if we accept the position of Value 
Collectivists, two questions remain:  Are the type of rights which groups can have 
the type of rights which would protect future persons from climate change?  And, 
even if they are, are future persons the appropriate type of group to be capable of 
possessing group rights?  I will demonstrate that the answer to the first question is 
at best unclear, and the answer to the second seems to be negative.  The section 
will therefore conclude that future persons are no more capable of possessing 
rights as a group than they are as individuals. 
Page 153 of 305 
 
What do we mean by group rights? 
It is important to begin by defining what we mean when we refer to ‘group rights’.  
When it comes to this particular term, definition is complicated as different people 
not only consider the term group rights to mean different things, they also 
consider their own version of how and why group rights work to be mutually 
exclusive from other versions.  Before moving on to discuss these different 
conceptions of group rights, though, it is important to first clarify what is 
definitely not meant by the term in this context. 
References to group/collective rights which commonly appear often turn out to be 
references to collective litigation and/or jointly exercised legal or moral rights 
which are ultimately the rights of individuals.
252
  So if my banker defrauded me 
and a number of other clients in the same ponzi scheme, it would make sense to 
say that s/he wronged us all and for us to make a joint legal and/or moral claim 
against her/him.  However, we might just as reasonably each make separate 
individual claims without this having any effect on the outcome.  In other words, 
there is nothing about either the right or its holders that renders it a group right.  
Rather, it is simply a number of separate claims to the rights of a number of 
separate people being claimed collectively for reasons of expediency.  Plainly, if 
taken in this sense, group rights (if such a term is even appropriate here) would 
suffer from the exact same shortcomings as individual rights when it came to their 
inability to be possessed by future persons.  In order for group rights to hold any 
hope of affording future persons appropriate status under a rights-based morality, 
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they would need to represent something more than a convenient way of pursuing 
the rights claims of multiple individuals. 
The definition of the term ‘group rights’ in the sense we are speaking of here is 
inextricably linked to the justification of such a position.  The manner in which 
group rights exist in practice is necessarily determined by the moral reasons we 
provide for why they should exist.  As Jovanovic puts it, the justification of group 
rights “is not only theoretical, but also moral, in so far as, in the case of collective 
rights, it requires taking the normative-moral point of view with respect to the 
issues of moral standing of groups and the value they have, particularly for 
individual members of the group.”253 
Those who pay serious credence to the notion of group rights, then, tend to fall 
into one of two camps: Value Individualists or Value Collectivists. 
 
Value Individualism 
Value Individualism is perhaps the more common way of justifying group rights 
among supporters of rights.  It is linked to – but should not be confused with – 
Individualism and Ontological Individualism. 
As Biddle explains,  
Individualism is the idea that the individual’s life belongs to him and that he has an inalienable 
right to live it as he sees fit, to act on his own judgment, to keep and use the product of his effort, 
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and to pursue the values of his choosing. It’s the idea that the individual is sovereign, an end in 
himself, and the fundamental unit of moral concern.
254
 
 
Taking this as their base, Ontological Individualists arrive at a theory of group 
rights which “argues that, in phenomenological terms, all groups are in the end 
reducible to their individual members.”255  As Sheehy explains, this position 
“…holds groups to be identical to sets (or mereological sums of individuals or 
person stages), mere fictions or reductively analyzed out of social scientific 
discourse.  The truths about groups are held to be expressible, without loss, as 
truths about individuals”.256 
This way of considering group/collective rights is one which returns us to our 
initial question of why such things should be of any value other than as 
convenient tools for making multiple rights claims simultaneously.  As a result, 
most scholars who both support group rights and feel that such rights ultimately 
emerge from the supreme moral status of individuals place themselves in the 
school of Value Individualism. 
Value Individualists deny neither the existence of collective entities, nor the 
importance of such entities to the lives of individuals, nor even the capacity of 
collective entities to possess rights.  They do, however, claim that “the lives of 
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individual human beings have ultimate value, and collective entities derive their 
value from their contribution to the lives of individual human beings.”257 
This is not the place to go into a detailed argument for the acceptance or rejection 
of such a position.  Suffice it to say that it certainly does not seem an unreasonable 
way of understanding group rights and, indeed, is more widely favoured than the 
alternative of Value Collectivism.
258
 
If supporters of rights wish to claim that group rights might be assigned to future 
persons, however, the idea of Value Individualism is plainly not something which 
can be acceptable to them.  The collective entity of future persons cannot derive 
its value (or its rights) from the individuals which make it up because, as we have 
already seen, future persons are  a) not yet individuated and, b) because of the 
non-identity problem, cannot be individuated - even in thought - before their 
conception.  It therefore does not make sense to claim they have rights or even 
value as individuals and thus any rights/value they have as a collective (if they 
have such rights/value at all) must come from some source outside of the 
individuals that make up the group. 
 
Value Collectivism 
Value Collectivism “is the view that collective entities can have inherent value, 
which is independent of its contribution to the well-being of individual 
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members.”259  The advantages of such a position are best showcased by 
considering the disadvantages of its opposite. 
Firstly, Jovanovic (who whole-heartedly endorses Value Collectivism) argues that 
the only alternative for those who seek to provide any meaningful endorsement of 
group rights (Value Individualism) is unable “to provide coherent grounding of 
certain forms of collective rights, especially those vested in groups that are not 
organized around liberal values of individual autonomy and tolerance (e.g. 
indigenous peoples).”260  In other words, there are certain group rights (Jones 
gives the example of the right to a seat at the UN),
261
 the existence of which 
cannot be adequately or coherently disaggregated into the rights or interests of the 
individuals who make up the collective entity which possesses the right.
262
  Such a 
realisation points to Value Collectivism as a more plausible explanation for group 
rights than Value Individualism. 
Secondly, Value Collectivists feel that, regardless of practical considerations like 
that raised above, the idea that collective entities derive their rights and their value 
only from the individuals which make them up seems to, at least in certain cases, 
miss a fundamentally important factor about collectives as collectives and 
collective rights as collective rights. 
Again, it is in the opposition to this idea that we best see its value.  Boshammer 
argues that “…to hold the standpoint of value collectivism necessarily implies the 
unjustifiable assumption of the distinctive ontological existence of collective 
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entity.”263  Since she believes this outcome is undesirable, she feels that said 
outcome demonstrates the indefensibility of Value Collectivism.  She illustrates 
her point with the example of the genocide of the Inca people by the Spanish 
Conquistadores in the 16
th
 Century, asking “[h]ave the Spaniards, therefore, 
except the Incas [sic] destroyed additionally, so to speak, the Inca community?”264   
Boshammer assumes a negative answer to this question, but Value Collectivists 
would argue that she is wrong to do so.  This objection of the Value Collectivists 
would not seem unjustified.  Lemkin, the author of the term ‘genocide’, states that 
“…genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions 
involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as 
members of the national group.”265  As a result, Jovanovic argues that  
the criminalized ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part’ relevant groups can in principle be 
established even if the killing involved only a single member of the group.  This is precisely what 
distinguishes the crime of genocide from the ‘simple’ crime of murder.  The underlying idea of 
genocide is, therefore, that the group physical existence can be detached from the existence of its 
individual members, not necessarily in empirical terms, but in terms of a conceptually distinctive 
good that is worthy of criminal law protection.
266
 
 
Value Collecitivists, then, plausibly argue that collective entities possess some 
element of value which cannot be wholly derived from the value of the individuals 
that make them up and that they may hold certain rights which can be held only as 
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a collective, the possession of which is not dependent upon the individual 
possession of such rights by the individual members of the collective.  If a 
supporter of rights wishes to assign collective rights to future persons, they would 
need to adopt a Value Collectivist position. 
This is not to say that Value Collectivism will automatically justify the possession 
of group rights by future persons.  In order for that to be the case, there are other 
difficult questions surrounding the importance of existence which would need to 
be answered. 
As earlier noted, Boshammer criticises Value Collectivism on the grounds that it 
implies that the right-holding collective entity possesses distinctive ontological 
existence.  Even if we accept that the collective is capable of such a quality, we 
must ask what effect results if both the individuals which make up the collective 
and the collective itself, while remaining distinct from one another, lack 
existence?  Can what Jovanovic refers to as ‘the group physical existence’ be 
detached from the existence of its individual members if neither possesses 
corporeal existence? 
The answer to these questions is not immediately clear.   
On the one hand, existence would seem a highly important quality to claiming any 
right, whether as a collective or as an individual.  Without it the right-holding 
group known as future persons faces the non-existence problem in the same way 
as individual future persons, i.e. in what sense can a non-existent entity have 
anything, including rights? 
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On the other hand, if we are to accept that groups are capable of possessing 
distinctive ontological existence, then we are already stepping into a realm where 
possessing a physical body would seem not to be a crucial factor in the possession 
of rights.  If it is truly possible for groups to exist as right-holding entities entirely 
separately from their individual members then it is possible to assign rights to 
entities whose existence is wholly conceptual.  In line with such reasoning, it 
seems that the present non-existence of future persons is not automatically 
enough, on its own, to prevent them from being considered a right-holding group 
at this stage.
267
 
Clearly, then, in order to maintain the position that future persons might possess 
collective rights, one must be a Value Collectivist of the highest order.  Even if 
supporters of rights accept such a position, though (and there are a significant 
number who would not), two key questions remain before our problem of the 
inability of future persons to possess rights is solved: 
1. Are the type of rights which would ground duties upon current persons to reduce 
their pollution levels (rights to a healthy environment, or even to health and life) 
the type of rights which it is possible for groups to hold? 
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2. Are future persons the type of group capable of possessing group rights? 
Which rights are group rights? 
At this point it seems that the supporter of rights might plausibly argue that, from 
a Value Collectivist perspective, it is possible to contend that groups can hold 
rights as groups without any need to rely upon the moral status of individual 
group members in order to justify such a claim.  This, they might argue, means 
that it is possible for future persons to hold group rights. 
This alone, however, is not enough for rights-based moralities to insist upon 
climate-protecting measures in the name of future persons.  In order for that to 
happen, the type of rights groups may hold (and thus the type of rights future 
persons may hold qua group) must include the type of rights that might possibly 
warrant the imposition of correlative duties upon current persons to lower their 
emission levels.  Such rights would most obviously include rights to life, health 
and a healthy environment.  It is not clear that such rights are of the type that may 
be attributed to group. 
Nickel touches on this problem, describing group rights as the  
rights of peoples rather than of persons.  Because of this they do not have a good fit with the 
general idea of human rights, which concern rights that people have independently of group or 
national membership….Group Rights are not human rights in the standard sense because they are 
not rights that people simply have as humans rather than as members of some state or group.
268
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In Nickel’s view, then, group rights and those rights we would ordinarily consider 
to be human rights should not automatically be considered synonymous.  This 
opinion appears to have some merit.  Since, as Value Collectivists argue, the 
rights of the group are not derived from the rights of its individual members, there 
is no reason to assume that the rights of the group should be the same rights as its 
members possess individually. 
In line with this argument, authors such as Reaume feel that the only rights which 
can be held collectively are rights to so-called ‘participatory goods’.  She argues 
that, in deciding whether something qualifies as a group right we must decide 
“…whether the interest in the enjoyment of a good is one that an individual can 
have as an individual.”269  If so, then, by her reasoning, such a right should not be 
considered a group right.  A similar position is put forward by Raz, who claims 
that the rights of groups stem from the interests of their individual members in a 
‘public good’ and are, therefore, rights to that public good.270 
It is worth noting, however, that neither Reaume nor Raz are Value Collectivists.  
Jovanovic (who is) questions the logic of their position, stating that “[c]ontra 
Reaume…groups can also hold rights to goods, which apparently do not satisfy 
her criteria of ‘participatory goods’; and…individuals may also be plausible 
holders of rights which are grounded in interests in certain ‘participatory 
goods’.”271  He goes on to note that  
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…it is possible neither to draw some sharp red line and single out a certain type of goods, which 
only by virtue of its external and formal features would qualify as the sole candidate for generating 
collective interests, nor to neglect that even the prime examples of Reaume’s ‘participatory goods’ 
do have some aspects, which make them individualizable…272 
 
For example, the right of a minority culture to education in the language of the 
group is something which only emerges due to the mutually agreed upon value of 
that language within the group.  It might therefore be considered a participatory 
good in the strictest sense, since the preservation of that language may be key to 
the preservation of the group and its culture.  Yet it is equally easy to see how 
each individual group member might also hold a right to education in the language 
of their culture as individuals, since such education may be crucial to their 
continued participation within their own culture.  Even on an individual level, 
though, this right still stems from the moral value of the group as well as its value 
to the individual since it cannot be claimed that there is a universal right to be 
educated in, for example, Kurdish.  Clearly such a right would only be 
legitimately possessed by Kurds.  Of course, critics might claim this is only 
evidence of an individual right to the preservation of one’s culture, but in 
recognising the importance of that cultural group to the extent that we grant it, as 
a group, rights to participatory goods, we blur the lines between what is the right 
of a group to a participatory good and what is the right of an individual member of 
a group to that same participatory good. 
Ultimately, then, it seems that if, as Value Collectivists do, we accept groups can 
possess rights and that this possession does not stem from the interests or rights of 
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their individual members, it does not seem, in principle, unreasonable to claim 
group rights to things which would ordinarily be seen as individualised goods and 
vice versa.  If a group, as a whole, would benefit from the preservation of its 
language then it may well be that there exists a group right or rights to education 
in that language.  This, it seems, is difficult to separate from the very plausible 
idea that individual members of that group might also have rights as individuals to 
education in the language of their own culture. 
On this thinking, while we may still struggle to assign future persons a group right 
to life or health, the closely linked rights to clean air or a healthy environment 
which would traditionally be viewed as the rights of individuals might plausibly 
also be assigned to groups.  This is because neither the benefits of such rights nor 
the duties they impose can readily be reduced to a purely individual level (though 
both might also be claimed as individual rights).  Clean air and a healthy 
environment will undoubtedly benefit future persons as a group and therefore, 
supporters of rights-based moralities might argue, rights to such things might be 
considered to be group rights. 
While not without merit, such an argument is far from conclusive.  Opponents 
might still contend that such rights are not group rights in the sense we imagine.  
Rather, they are the rights of individuals claimed as a group out of convenience 
rather than out of any particular unique quality of that group.  They are not, it 
might be said, rights which are essential to the survival of the group qua group, in 
the way that a shared culture may be.  This is certainly a problem but, as I will 
now seek to demonstrate, it is a problem which stems more from the nature of 
future persons as a group than the nature of the rights groups may hold.  While 
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both the argument that group rights must only be rights to participatory goods and 
the definition of a participatory good appear at least questionable, the idea that 
future persons might be the type of entity capable of possessing group rights 
remains difficult to defend. 
 
Which type of groups can possess rights? 
Up until this point I have predominantly focused upon the ‘rights’ element of 
‘group rights’.  While this has already thrown up certain obstacles to the 
possession of group rights by future persons, the supporter of rights-based 
moralities might have argued that none are insurmountable.  Far more damning 
practical and conceptual difficulties emerge, however, when we move from 
examining the nature of group rights to the nature of the groups who might 
legitimately be said to possess them. 
The common opinion among scholars in the field of group rights is that such 
rights, in the sense in which I have been discussing them, cannot simply be held 
by any random collection of individuals.  Rather, in order to exist as a separate 
entity capable of possessing rights, groups must possess certain qualities which 
clearly define them, not only as a group, but as a group worthy of protection qua 
group.  In other words, groups must be of certain ‘value’ in order to warrant the 
ascription of group rights.  Hartney argues that the idea that a group might be said 
to possess rights pertains to “the value of the existence of certain groups and the 
importance of protecting these groups against forces which might weaken or 
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destroy them, perhaps even to the extent of outweighing certain rights of 
individuals (either within the group or outside it).”273 
This ‘value’ relates to the value of the group’s existence to its members; the extent 
to which their lives will be enriched by the group’s continued existence.  This 
instantly creates a problem for the notion that future persons might be considered 
a group, since it is hard to see how the existence of future persons as a group 
might benefit a membership which does not yet exist.  Margalit and Raz argue that 
group identification (among qualifying groups) provides individual group 
members with “a culture which shapes to a large degree their tastes and 
opportunities, and which provides an anchor for their self-identification and the 
safety of effortless secure belonging.”274  Such a view (or something like it) is 
widely accepted by scholars working in this field.
275
  It is one which, if adopted, 
proves damning for the notion that future persons might possess rights since they 
plainly lack any kind of common culture, let alone one which might ‘anchor their 
self-identification’, as they presently lack both a self and an identity, (and, indeed, 
tastes and opportunities). 
One alternative to this view is put forward by Jones, who argues that the manner 
in which Raz justifies group rights undermines the latter’s claim that for groups to 
qualify for possession of group rights they must possess specific characteristics, 
such as a shared culture.    He contends that, under Raz’s conception of group 
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rights, “any set of individuals who possess a joint interest in a good can have 
group rights relating to that good provided that their joint interest is sufficiently 
significant to create duties for others.”276  As a result, he finds it unclear “why we 
should hold that a set of individuals can have a collective right only if they are 
antecedently identifiable as members of a group.”277 
If adopted, such a position, despite widening the scope of which types of group 
might possess rights qua group, does nothing to help anyone seeking to claim 
group rights for future persons.  As noted earlier in this section, basing the rights 
of groups on the interests of their members plainly rules out future persons from 
the possession of group rights for the simple reason that there are, at present, no 
individual future persons to possess these interests. 
Ultimately, regardless of their conclusions over which types of group qualify for 
group rights, scholars’ justifications for such conclusions stem from the value 
such rights have for the individual members of the group.  Thus, without being 
able to identify, even in thought, the individual members of the group on whose 
behalf we are claiming rights, those who seek to assign group rights to future 
persons are left with the same problem they had when trying to assign individual 
rights to future persons. 
In the end, the issue comes down to existence (or a lack of it); a fact inadvertently 
highlighted by Jovanovic when he provides his own particularly inclusive 
definition of which groups might legitimately possess rights, stating that “groups 
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‘objectively’ exist, prior to official recognition by the state, whereas in the case of 
students, for example, the ‘group’ label is actually the designation of a particular 
legal status of a person in question.”278  While future persons meet the criteria of 
objectivity (in that they are not a group which has artificially been attributed 
group status by the state), they fail to meet the criteria of existence.   
The purpose of assigning future persons group rights qua group was the avoidance 
of the non-identity problem.  Unfortunately, in avoiding this particular unpalatable 
conceptual hurdle we simply replace it with another. 
In treating future persons as individuals, were it not for the non-identity problem, 
it would be relatively easy to understand why they ought to be considered to have 
rights and why these rights ought to impose duties on current people not to 
pollute.  If Future Person A’s rights to health, life etc. will be negatively affected 
by climate change upon his/her coming into existence, then (again, were it not for 
the non-identity problem) it is feasible that current persons might be required to 
refrain from taking certain actions in order to avoid causing such violations. 
The case is not obviously the same if we treat future persons as a single entity 
which possesses rights qua group.  Indeed, if we view future persons in such a 
way, it is difficult to see why they ought to have any kind of moral status at all.  
Not only is it the case that future persons, as a group, do not currently exist, it is 
also the case that, in a certain sense, they will never exist.  The individuals who 
make up the group will not be harmed by climate change until the point at which 
they come into existence.  However, at the point at which they come into 
existence, they become current persons and thus lose the group membership 
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which supposedly gave them the right which placed duties on others in advance of 
their birth.  By definition, future persons (as a group) do not and will never exist 
and it is therefore very hard to see how they could possess rights (as a group) and 
very easy to see why current persons might be legitimately aggrieved at being 
forced to make sacrifices on their behalf. 
 
Concluding Remarks on Group Rights and Future Persons 
This section has demonstrated that group rights are ultimately derived from the 
moral worth of the individuals that make up the group in question.  Even if we 
adopt the position of Value Collectivism (and it is by no means clear that we 
must) and also conclude that group rights might be held in relation to the types of 
goods required to protect against climate change (a claim which is again 
controversial), we are still reliant on the existence of the individual members of 
the group for the justification of our claim to group rights.  This is not to say that 
group rights must necessarily be reducible to the rights of the individual members, 
but they must be of value to those individual members.  Since future persons as a 
group lack (and will always lack) identifiable individual members capable of 
benefitting from any group rights that are proposed, the possession of such rights 
cannot be justified.  Any ensuing benefits would only be felt by a group member 
upon their coming into existence at which point they would be a current person 
and thus not entitled to membership of the group labelled ‘future persons’ and so 
be unentitled to any of the rights that group might be said to possess.  Much like 
individual future persons, future persons as a group cannot be said to benefit from 
the ascription of rights and it is not reasonable, under a rights-based morality, to 
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ask that current persons be placed under duties which restrict/violate their own 
rights without benefitting anybody else. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that supporters of rights are unable to successfully 
subvert the problems raised in Chapter 3 in order to provide a coherent reason as 
to why the welfare of future persons is of sufficient importance to warrant 
significant restrictions, and even violations, of the rights of current persons.  Any 
attempt to do so ultimately rests upon a non-rights-based claim that rights might 
be legitimately curtailed within a rights-based morality whenever following such a 
morality would lead to an apparently undesirable conclusion.  As I have asserted 
above, such arguments amount to a misuse of the general welfare principle which 
cannot be justified under a rights-based morality.   
In Chapter 6 I will seek to demonstrate that, through the adoption of a tweaked 
version of some of the reasoning used by Elliot, rights-based moralities might not 
be as totally incapable of providing good reasons for current persons to combat 
climate change as has until now seemed to be the case.  As earlier noted, Elliot 
argues that, because future persons, upon coming into existence, will in future 
have rights which will in future be violated by the climate change caused by the 
emissions of current persons, those current persons ought to be placed under a 
duty not to pollute.  I have already outlined the reasons for thinking this argument 
to be flawed (i.e. the non-identity problem and the inability of future persons to 
have anything, including rights).  However, as Chapter 6 will show, if, using 
Elliot’s logic, we take current (rather than future) persons to be the object of our 
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moral concern, the situation changes.  Current persons possess rights at present 
which will in future be violated by climate change.  This fact appears to provide a 
more credible reason as to why supporters of rights might wish to demand that 
people act in advance of the harm their actions will cause in order to stop that 
harm from occurring.  As I will explain, however, it is questionable whether such 
reasoning enables rights-based moralities to deal with the climate change problem 
as extensively as many of us might like. 
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CHAPTER 5:  ADAPTATION, MITIGATION AND RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
The findings of the preceding chapters might be summarised as follows: 
1. Under a rights-based morality, the rights of individuals must take priority over 
non-rights-based moral concerns. 
2. It is impermissible to violate or restrict any of the rights of individuals unless such 
a violation/restriction arises as a consequence of protecting the rights of other 
individuals. 
3. Future persons are incapable of possessing rights before their conception. 
 
With the above in mind, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that climate change 
represents a unique difficulty for supporters of rights.  As Caney puts it, “if we 
accept a set of fundamental human rights then it follows that any programme to 
combat climate change should not itself also violate these rights.”279  
Unfortunately, those policies required to adapt to and mitigate against climate 
change will, in many cases, impair levels of rights protection/realisation among 
current persons (particularly those in the developing world), and in some cases 
will represent a severe restriction upon – or even a direct violation of - the rights 
of current persons.  What is worse, since future persons are not right-holders, such 
policies will commit such violations solely in pursuit of non-rights-based goods. 
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As Lomborg correctly notes, “[d]oing something about global warming has both 
benefits and costs”.280  The problem for supporters of rights is that, while the 
benefits will primarily be bestowed upon future generations, the costs will be met 
by current persons.  These costs are known as ‘climate burdens’ and are broken 
down into two types: the cost of adapting to climate change and the cost of 
mitigating it.  Such ‘costs’ need not be financial in nature and may also refer to 
restrictions on the ways of life of those individuals who are duty-bound climate 
burdens.
281
 
This chapter will seek to outline exactly how and why meeting climate burdens 
will often prove incompatible with rights-based moralities.  Section 1 will explain 
the difficulties that adaptation burdens represent for a rights-based approach, 
before noting that such obstacles are not ultimately insurmountable.  Section 2 
will then go on to address the area of mitigation. 
The relationship between mitigation and rights is complex and problematic and 
therefore warrants a much deep level of consideration.  With this in mind, the 
chapter examines in-depth two distinct policies for reducing emissions:  global 
prohibitions on air travel and deforestation.  These policies are focused upon 
above others because a) they are one-off, delineable measures which are at least 
theoretically implementable, and b) their successful realisation would significantly 
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reduce global warming.
282
  The section will highlight why each policy must be 
rejected if a coherent support for rights is to be maintained. 
Finally, Section 3 will argue that, even if we could ignore or overcome the direct 
violations/restrictions of rights that climate burdens would entail, a rights-based 
approach to morality still fails to provide its supporters with the necessary 
motivation for dealing with climate change effectively.  This is because, if the 
protection and realisation of rights is our goal, the vast amounts of money and 
effort necessary to make even a minor difference to average global temperatures 
in the relatively distant future could be spent far more effectively on the 
implementation of policies and programmes which concern themselves with non-
climate-related ways of ensuring increased levels of rights protection/realisation. 
 
Adaptation 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as 
“[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities.”283  Examples of adaptation include increasing flood defences to 
combat rising sea levels or vaccinating individuals against malaria in areas where 
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mosquitoes carrying the disease may become prevalent as a result of rising 
temperatures. 
An effective, all-encompassing global adaptation strategy will be highly difficult 
to devise and implement in practice.  As Humphreys notes, “[i]t is widely 
recognised that adaptation funding cannot be delivered effectively until it is 
known where assistance will bring the most benefit.  Unfortunately, it is just this 
information that is generally lacking.”284  Of course, the pattern of such 
information we hold is far from uniform, and tends to be far sparser in relation to 
developing countries which, paradoxically, are likely to witness greater damage 
from climate change than their developed counterparts.
285
 
Aside from this difficulty, there is the further problem of the financial burdens 
involved with such a process.  The cost of adaptation is large, growing and 
difficult to pin down.  Latest estimates suggest it could reach $500bn by 2050.
286
  
While such a figure will be much lower in the present and is not yet so prohibitive 
as to necessitate that a full-scale programme of adaptation becomes untenable, it is 
significant enough to add an additional layer of complexity to any rights-based 
justification of adaptation burdens.  Essentially, the supporter of rights is forced to 
ask whether, in a world where the resources available for the safeguarding of 
rights are limited, the money that would be needed to adapt to climate change 
might not be better spent addressing other, non-climate-related, rights issues. 
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Adaptation and Rights 
The idea of adaptation is not something which would appeal to followers of 
libertarianism.  Being forced to act in advance of harms to the rights of others 
which you did nothing to cause is not something which sits well with a libertarian 
view.  According to the libertarian, if an action I have taken will lead to a 
violation of the rights of others, I simply should not have taken it.  If the rights of 
others are threatened by the actions of someone else, this is not my concern.  In 
either case, the notion of adaptation simply fails to arise.
287288
 
For supporters of Choice and Interest Theory, however, adapting to climate 
change before it occurs is broadly in line with rights-based moral thinking.  As 
Humphreys notes,  
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violation) if the specific violator pays adequate compensation to the specific victim.  His 
discussion, however, does not provide a straightforward parallel with the phenomenon of 
adaptation.  Nozick states that:  
 
“[s]omething fully compensates a person for a loss if and only if it makes him no worse off than 
he otherwise would have been; it compensates person X for person Y’s action A if X is no worse 
off receiving it, Y having done A, than X would have been without receiving it if Y had done A.”  
(Nozick, R., Op.Cit, p.57) 
 
In most cases, adaptation burdens are unable to meet the above criteria.  If my small island state 
is entirely submerged under water, the fact that I am given a house of a similar size in an entirely 
different state is not sufficient compensation to be able to say that I am no worse off than I 
otherwise would have been.  Certain compensatory actions, such as paying for malaria 
vaccinations, might plausibly be argued to entirely negate the rights violation which emerges 
from the increased risk of malaria resulting from climate change and thus render the preceding 
emissions justified.  Most compensatory actions, though, would clearly fail to avoid making the 
victims of climate change any worse off (i.e. would fail to avoid violating any of their rights in any 
way) and would thus fail to enable a policy of adaptation as a way of circumventing those 
climate-related rights violations under a libertarian theory of rights.  And because those climate-
related harms to rights which can be compensated are caused by the same emissions as those 
which cannot be, it is not possible to justify any pollutant actions through a programme of 
adaptation according to the libertarian/Nozickian position. 
 
Issues regarding the libertarian/Nozickian position on whether and when current persons might 
be asked to meet adaptation and/or mitigation burdens will be dealt with in more detail 
throughout this chapter and in Chapter 6. 
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Adaptive interventions before or during climate change impacts reduce the likelihood that rights 
infringements might result from those impacts; adaptation actions after the fact may provide 
redress where rights protection has already suffered.  Indeed, discussions of adaptation at 
international and governmental level (as opposed to autonomous local measures) already assume a 
rights basis for policy construction, even if it is rarely articulated in those terms.
289
 
 
It seems reasonable, then, for supporters of Interest or Choice Theory to claim that 
the concept of adapting to climate change in order to protect its victims from harm 
is in no way at odds with a rights-based approach to morality.  There are, 
however, two issues which arise in relation to adaptation which might be 
considered problematic (though by no means catastrophic) for supporters of 
rights. 
Firstly, Humphreys raises the fact that the very policies we implement in order to 
protect people by adapting to climate change may themselves have a negative 
impact upon rights.
290
  He states that this might occur “for example, if 
communities or individuals are forcibly removed from disaster or flood-prone 
areas, or, less forcibly, expected to conform to new economic policy imperatives 
(by adopting different cash crops or energy sources, for instance).”291  He goes on 
to note that “[m]ore than any previous issue, climate change places the question of 
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human rights fulfilment firmly within the context of development policy.  This is 
because tackling climate change will require revisiting development models and 
making far-reaching decisions about access to and use of resources, questions 
which in turn have direct human rights consequences.”292 
The issue of development policy in relation climate burdens will be returned to in 
more detail shortly.  For now it is enough to note that adaptation policies will not 
be cost free when it comes to the safeguarding of rights and these costs would 
need to be carefully considered in any decisions as to whether particular 
adaptation policies ought to be pursued at the expense of policies which afford a 
more central place to the safeguarding of rights.  This does not mean that such 
policies cannot be pursued by supporters of rights-based moralities.  Adaptation 
will unquestionably require some sacrifices of the rights of current persons.  
However, in line with the reasoning laid out in Chapter 2, where such sacrifices 
amount to a restriction (as opposed to a violation) of rights they will not 
automatically be rendered impermissible under a rights-based morality.  
Specifically, adaptation policies made with the goal of protecting large numbers 
of important rights of existing right-holders might justifiably be implemented.   
There will, of course, be difficult decisions to be made regarding which rights 
may be restricted in which ways under which circumstances, but these will need 
to be made on a case-by-case basis and in no way preclude supporters of rights 
from also being supporters of adaptation.  
A second issue arises as a result of the unique timings involved in climate change.  
As Jamieson highlights, adaptation techniques could be sub-categorised into two 
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types; “some adaptations are anticipatory, while others are reactive.  An example 
of an anticipatory adaptation is constructing sea walls in order to minimize the 
impact of an expected sea-level rise.  An example of a reactive adaptation is the 
efforts of a coastal community, damaged by a hurricane, to rebuild to a more 
secure standard.”293  As Baer correctly asserts, “where such risk-reducing actions 
have costs, it makes sense to make such investments in advance, rather than 
waiting until the harm has occurred to provide compensation (when some of those 
requiring compensation may be dead).”294  However, while Baer is correct in his 
assertion that anticipatory adaptations are a better way of preventing harm (which, 
for supporters of rights, must be preferable to compensating for harm), they are 
not necessarily perfectly aligned with rights-based moral thinking.   
Reactive adaptations seek to repair damage that has already been done to the 
rights of current people and restore them to their previous level.  They are, 
therefore, obviously permissible under (indeed, demanded by) rights-based 
moralities.  The issue of anticipatory adaptation is more complicated.  The 
question of at which point a society must begin to implement policies which will 
prevent future rights violations has no simple answers.  This is particularly true if 
and when a) the adaptations we make to prevent future harm come into conflict 
with rights in the present, and/or b) the costs associated with such adaptation are 
such that the finite funds needed to implement the policy might protect greater 
numbers of more fundamental rights if spent in other areas.  Given that future 
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persons do not possess rights, it is difficult to see how adaptation aimed at 
protecting such persons could be justified in scenarios where the rights of current 
people suffer as a result.   
If we follow the ‘gradualist paradigm’ favoured by the IPCC,295 then there is little 
difficulty in aligning rights-based moral thinking with some form of adaptation 
policy.  If climate change is gradual and predictable, then it should be possible to 
take actions to adapt to it before specific rights violations occur, but not so long 
before that the holders of the rights we aim to protect have yet to come into 
existence.  While questions may remain over how far in advance of potential 
violations we ought to act
296
 (particularly if the adaptations we make infringe 
upon the current rights of some and/or divert limited resources from the avoidance 
of other, more immediate, rights violations), the idea of taking action to prevent 
violations of the rights of current persons as opposed to merely resolving them as 
they arrive is by no means alien to rights-based thinking.
297
  And given the 
inherent uncertainty associated with trying to predict exactly when a rights-
threatening climatic event will occur, it seems that a rights-based morality might 
allow some margin for error in this area.  If it is reasonable to assume that any 
particular policy of adaptation will end up benefitting current people, then a 
rights-based morality holds the potential for justifying that policy even though, in 
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this way, some such policies might accidentally and unknowably end up 
benefitting only future persons.
298
 
Difficulties arise, however, when we move away from the gradualist paradigm 
and consider the effects of tipping points on our thinking.  Tipping points are one-
off events caused by climate change which will dramatically and rapidly increase 
the speed and magnitude of the process.  Such events include, for example, 
massive melting of glaciers and ice sheets caused by a rapid increase in oceanic 
temperatures, leading to a dramatic rise in sea levels.
299
  Clearly, such events 
would require enormous amounts of adaptation (in the form of robust and 
extensive coastal defences) and the process of adapting would need to begin well 
in advance of such tipping points being reached.  The problem is that, as 
McKinnon highlights, “the state of knowledge with respect to tipping-points and 
climate change catastrophes is such that, with respect to many of them, experts do 
not know their proximity to us in time.”300  Given this fact, it is likely that costly, 
large-scale adaptation programmes undertaken with the idea of protecting against 
sudden climate events would benefit only the as yet unborn, despite the fact that 
their costs were met only by current persons.  As previously noted, where these 
costs lead to a reduction in the level of protection/realisation of the rights of 
current persons, this would seem highly problematic for supporters of rights-based 
moralities.  Moreover, even if such costs did not amount to a violation of the 
rights of current persons, it would nonetheless be difficult to see, under a rights-
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based theory, what wrong current persons would commit by not implementing 
them. 
Having said this, the fact that tipping points might, in the future, affect current 
persons could be determined to be of sufficient concern to warrant the 
implementation of adaptation programmes now.  Such a choice, though, would 
not be automatic, and would need to be based on a complex cost/benefit analysis 
which not only carefully considered the impact of adaptation on rights versus the 
impact of tipping points, but also factored in the likelihood that such tipping 
points would occur during the near-medium future.   
It is not clear why governments ought to adopt ‘worst case scenario’ thinking in 
their decisions over climate-based policy decisions (as many campaigners feel 
they should) when they do not do so in other policy areas.  For example, all 
governments (especially those in developed countries) spend a certain amount of 
money planning for and combatting security threats.  Despite this, acts of terror 
sometimes still occur.  It could be argued that the number of these acts of terror 
might be reduced through a combination of greater financial investment and the 
curtailing of certain rights surrounding privacy, freedom of speech and freedom of 
movement.  However, governments determine that the likelihood of any terrorist 
attack – let alone the kind of multiple, largescale attacks that could threaten a 
country’s stability in the longer term – is minimal enough that, while it cannot be 
ignored, it also cannot justify excessive restrictions on either the rights of citizens 
or the funding needed to properly safeguard those rights.
301
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In line with this type of thinking, if their only concern is current persons, 
governments would need to strongly consider the likelihood of a tipping point 
being reached within the next century when deciding whether to commit funds to 
adapt to it.
302
  Such an issue, of course, only truly arises when we frame our 
thinking in terms of rights, since we can say with a great level of certainty that 
tipping points will occur; it is simply that we cannot determine whether any 
current persons will be their victims. 
Overall, while the concept of adaptation to climate change is certainly well-
aligned with rights-based moral thinking in principle, in practice decisions about 
which policies of adaptation to follow and when will be complicated by a rights-
based approach.  Taking action to prevent the damage to rights caused by climate 
change before that damage occurs is in no way ruled out under a rights-based 
morality.  However, decisions about when such actions (particularly those which 
impede the rights of current persons, either directly or through using resources 
which could otherwise be used to enhance rights protection/realisation) ought to 
be taken will be complicated if the primary reason for making such decisions is 
the protection of rights.  This problem emerges largely because future persons do 
not have rights, but also as a result of the complex issue of how far in advance 
governments ought to act to protect against future violations of the rights of 
current persons.
303
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 I do not, here, mean to make assertions regarding exactly how sure a government needs to be.  
If there is any risk that a tipping point could be reached within the next century, then a rights-
based morality would seem to provide a mandate to commence with adaptation.  The issue in 
such circumstances then becomes what level of adaptation (and what level of restriction of other 
rights) is permitted by what level of certainty about a tipping point? 
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None of these problems are insurmountable.  If current persons are the concern of 
rights-based moralities, then acting in advance of climatic events in order to 
prevent the resultant harm to them would seem to be something which is 
demanded by Interest- and Choice-based theories.  Just how far in advance of 
such events such theories might demand that governments act is not a question 
which can be easily answered.  What is clearer, however, is that, given the 
immense levels of uncertainty over when particular climatic events will occur, 
such systems would allow governments to act far in advance of such catastrophes 
provided, a) there was a reasonable risk of such catastrophes arising within the 
lifetimes of current persons, and b) the limitations placed on rights in the present 
in the name of adaptation were proportionate (or better than proportionate) to the 
amount of harm that would be caused by not adapting.
304
 
A more pressing difficulty arises as a result of the fact that adaptation does not, in 
itself, reduce climate change.  While adaptation policies will help to lessen the 
negative effects of climate change on human beings in the short-medium term, in 
the long-term they will not be sufficient.  This is because, if we keep emitting 
GHGs at our current rate, various tipping points will inevitably be reached at 
some point (though the timings on when they will be reached are quite unclear; we 
may still be centuries away), causing runaway climate change of a level far 
exceeding the ability of humanity to adapt to or mitigate.
305
  If we wish to stop the 
eventual catastrophic damage the worst effects of climate change will cause to 
future persons, we will need to drastically reduce our emissions.  Experts broadly 
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agree that, in order to best safeguard against the possibility of reaching various 
tipping points, we need to begin policies designed to reduce emissions ‘now’.306   
 
Mitigation 
The IPCC defines mitigation as “[a]n anthropogenic intervention to reduce the 
anthropogenic forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce 
greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks.”307  
Essentially, rather than seeking to adapt to the effects of climate change, 
mitigation policies aim to reduce the impact of such effects by limiting the level to 
which the climate does in fact change.  Mitigation policies may include those 
designed to reduce the amount of GHGs we emit (such as investing in renewable 
energy as opposed to fossil fuels) and those designed to lessen impact on the 
climate of those we do produce (such as preserving and growing forests which 
absorb GHGs before they affect the climate).
308
 
 
Mitigation and Rights 
At first glance, forming a rights-based argument in favour of implementing 
widespread mitigation techniques seems unproblematic.  As noted earlier, 
adaptation alone will not be sufficient to combat the worst effects of climate 
change (whenever they might occur).  More than this, as Jamieson notes, 
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Even without abrupt climate change, an ‘adaptation only’ policy runs serious moral risks.  For 
such a policy is likely to be an application of the ‘polluted pay’ principle, rather than the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle.  Some of the victims of climate change will be driven to extinction (e.g., some 
small island states and endangered species), and others will bear the costs of their own 
victimization (e.g., those who suffer from more frequent and extreme climate-related disasters).
309
 
 
For Jamieson, then, an effective mitigation regime has two clear advantages over 
an ‘adaptation only’ regime:   
First, slowing down the rate of change allows humans and the rest of the biosphere time to adapt, 
and reduces the threat of catastrophic surprises.  Second, mitigation, if carried out properly, holds 
those who have done the most to produce climate change responsible, at least to some extent, for 
their actions.  It is a form of moral education.
310
 
 
Humphreys agrees with this assertion, and argues that this second advantage is in 
line with the doctrine of human rights.  As he puts it:  “A negative duty not to 
violate basic human rights presumably calls at a minimum for an urgent and 
stringent mitigation regime.”311 
Unfortunately, the unique timescales involved in the climate change process, 
combined with the fact that future persons cannot be said to have rights, calls the 
validity of such a claim into question.  As explained in Chapter 1, emissions 
produced today will not begin to affect the climate for several decades.  Once they 
do begin to affect the climate, they will continue to do so for centuries.  This, 
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combined with numerous other factors, has caused experts to determine that any 
feasible programme of mitigation embarked upon today will only be of significant 
benefit to future persons.
312
  As a result of these factors, it seems difficult to claim 
that a failure to mitigate climate change represents a violation of rights. 
Even taken in isolation, such a fact represents a significant difficulty for 
supporters of rights.  If the protection of rights is our primary concern, then there 
are far more efficient programmes we could implement than those of mitigation in 
order to protect against climate-related harms.  Therefore, rights-based moralities 
are faced with the question of why anybody should be motivated to reduce their 
emissions, given that doing so will, at the very least, cause us significant 
inconvenience while protecting the rights of nobody.  Due to their inability to 
maintain that future persons hold rights, rights-based moralities struggle to find a 
reason as to why future persons should possess any kind of moral value.  Indeed, 
they struggle to even enunciate the concept of non-rights-based moral goods.  This 
issue will be returned to in Section 3.
313
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A much greater problem for supporters of rights arises if/when any programme of 
mitigation has a negative impact upon the rights of current persons.  This is 
because, under a rights-based morality, any violation of rights can ordinarily only 
be justified if taken in the name of protecting other rights, which is not something 
which can be said of mitigation. 
In light of this, this section will consider the ways in which specific mitigation 
policies – global prohibitions on air travel and/or deforestation - violate rights.  
Section 3 will then go on to consider how a dedicated, global mitigation 
programme would limit progress in the developing world and thus indirectly slow 
the growth of the number of people whose rights are properly realised and 
protected due to the direct link between levels of poverty levels and rights 
fulfilment.   
 
Air Travel and Rights 
There are many policies which governments might adopt in order to reduce the 
amount of damage being done to the climate current persons.  In reality, there is 
no single human activity or behaviour that, even taken across the entire global 
population, would be enough to cause climate change in isolation.  Rather, climate 
change results from a hugely variant number of (often only slightly) harmful 
human activities carried out by an enormous and growing global population the 
size of which would have been unimaginable even a century ago.
314
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With the above in mind, there are many policies which governments might adopt 
in order to reduce climate change.  There is not room within this thesis to consider 
each of these individually.  I do, however, feel it to be helpful to consider the 
practical implications of specific policies of mitigation rather than considering the 
phenomenon only in the abstract.  In a certain sense, then, my choice to examine 
the impact of a ban on air travel (and later a ban on deforestation) is arbitrary.  
Certainly, were we to decide that travelling in planes or felling trees constituted an 
irreplaceable good for humanity then we could substitute either policy for an 
alternative of similar value in terms of positive effect on the climate. 
My choice of which policies to analyse, however, is not entirely arbitrary.  Rather, 
I have tried to focus upon those which a) might be viably adopted relatively 
quickly, and b) have less obviously harmful human rights implications.  I could, 
of course, have chosen to examine the impact upon rights of an outright ban on 
the use of fossil fuels in the production of energy.  However, as Lomborg 
correctly points out, “[c]hanging national energy systems takes a long time and 
has huge costs.”315  Therefore, such a policy would either take a very long time to 
implement while we waited for greener energy alternatives to become available, 
or would be implemented immediately resulting in a huge swathe of rights 
violations as billions of people had removed from them their only means of 
heating their homes.  As a result, holding up such a policy as evidence that rights-
based moralities and mitigation policies as a whole are incompatible would seem 
disingenuous.  A prohibition upon air travel, however, appears at first glance to 
represent a more viable, more rights-friendly way of cutting emissions. 
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In fact, Monbiot views a prohibition on air travel as a necessity if we are to avoid 
catastrophic climate change.
316
  Air travel accounts for 4-9% of the total amount 
of anthropogenic CO2 produced each year.  These emissions have increased by 
83% over the past twenty-five years and continue to rise.
317
  As well as 
significantly reducing the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, such a policy seems 
more obviously implementable and justiciable within a relatively short period – if 
a government banned fossil fuels, it seems many people would go ahead and burn 
them anyway rather than freeze/starve to death.  A ban on air travel would seem 
more likely to be obeyed and easier to police.  Perhaps most importantly, as has 
been alluded to above, the link between air travel and rights appears, at first 
glance, less direct than the link between other mitigation policies and rights.  This 
section, however, will demonstrate that even less obviously controversial 
mitigation policies still cause tremendous harm to rights; harm that cannot be 
justified as the unfortunate consequence of a clash of rights. 
 
Air Travel and the Right to Liberty 
There is no specific right to air travel.  Therefore, there is also no correlative duty 
upon states to facilitate their citizens in taking planes through, for example, 
providing subsidies for those who cannot afford to do so.  Despite this, most of us 
(whether supporters of rights or not) would find it in some way wrong for the 
government to prohibit us from ever taking a flight again.  Our sense of injustice 
would not be greatly diminished on discovering that such a policy applied not just 
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to us, but to all citizens, so that we could not claim discrimination to be the root of 
our concern.
318
  For supporters of rights, the disquiet felt at such a policy is best 
explained by an assertion that a violation of the right to liberty has occurred. 
Dworkin defines the right to liberty as “the absence of constraints placed by a 
government upon what a man might do if he wants to.”319  This is something close 
to the way in which Nozick would describe such a right.  Nozick, like Interest and 
Choice theorists (if they endorse such a right at all), would seek to highlight that 
such a right may be legitimately restricted when it clashes with other rights. 
As libertarians, followers of Nozick-style systems of rights must unquestionably 
accept the concept of a moral (and probably also legal) right to liberty.  As Nagel 
explains, “[i]nstead of embracing the ideal of equality and the general welfare, 
libertarianism exalts the claim of individual freedom of action, and asks why state 
power should be permitted even the interference represented by progressive 
taxation and public provision of health care, education, and a minimum standard 
of living.”320  Nozick himself explains that “…the state may not use its coercive 
apparatus…to prohibit activities to people for their own good.”321  And if liberty 
is so strong that the state may not even restrict its use in the name of the welfare 
of the citizen who exercises it, it is clear that Nozick believes in a right to liberty 
in its strongest sense.  This should come as no surprise.  Nozick’s theory of rights 
stems from the idea that we have certain natural rights and that such rights must 
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be respected.  In the state of nature, Nozick would argue, we are certainly free to 
do as we wish. 
So how would a Nozickian right to liberty be impacted by a ban on non-essential 
air travel? 
Most obviously, if I have a right to do as I wish without the interference of 
government, this includes within it the right to get on planes and the right to start 
a business offering air travel to others.  Certainly such rights do not have as their 
correlatives duties to be provided with air fare or start-up capital if I cannot 
otherwise exercise them, but this is not a problem for Nozickians, who do not 
endorse positive duties.  I have a general right to act as I wish provided my doing 
so does no harm to the rights of others.  Setting up a business selling flights to 
others and/or taking advantage of the services of others doing the same certainly 
fall well within a Nozickian notion of freedom which it would be wrong for the 
government to impede without good cause.  Since the emissions from my air 
travel harm no current persons they do not violate rights and thus my right to 
liberty may not be justly limited through their prohibition. 
Outside a Nozickian framework, the existence of a right to liberty becomes less 
concrete.  While it is certainly true that Choice and Interest theorists could 
consistently endorse such a right, it is less clear that they are bound to do so in 
order for their theory to remain coherent.  Neither the rights that Choice and 
Interest theorists endorse nor the manner in which they endorse them necessarily 
rely upon the existence of a right to liberty.  Having said this, even for Choice and 
Interest theorists who choose not to adopt such a right, there remains some sort of 
presumption in favour of liberty. 
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It seems difficult for the Interest Theorist to argue that human beings do not have 
a fundamental interest in being free to do as they wish.  Of course, there need to 
be limitations upon this freedom, and those limitations arrive in the form of rights.  
Whether liberty is itself protected by rights or is simply one of the goals that the 
enforcement of such rights seeks to achieve, it remains something which is highly 
important to Interest theorists. 
For Choice theorists, the centrality of liberty is all the more apparent.  Indeed, 
some Choice theorists such as Hartnack
322
 and Gewirth
323
 maintain that liberty is 
so foundational to rights there must exist a right to liberty.  Unlike Nozickians, 
though, Choice theorists are not compelled to take such a stance.  They might 
instead argue that an ability to make choices is the goal of their system of rights 
and that that ability is best protected (and limited) by rights, but that those rights 
need not include a right to liberty.  In this way, they are able to increase the level 
of liberty people have without the risk of following a Nozickian path and 
assigning it a status so grand as to unduly limit the power of governments to 
restrain liberty through positive actions which might, in the end, increase it; i.e. 
overall levels of liberty might be better served if we restrict the liberty of A by 
placing moderate taxation on her considerable earnings in order to pay for the 
relatively cheap medicine B requires (but cannot afford) to move from her 
hospital bed.  Insisting upon a right to health but not a right to liberty makes such 
positive duties easier to justify. 
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For those Interest and Choice theorists who do endorse a right to liberty, the 
situation with regard to a ban on air travel is much the same as it is for 
Nozickians.  In most cases, Interest and Choice theorists can be distinguished 
from Nozickians by the less extreme conclusions they draw whenever a right 
comes under threat.  As highlighted in Chapter 2, the individual, negative nature 
of rights under Nozick means that they tend not to ‘clash’ and thus rarely require 
restriction.  However, under Choice- and Interest-based systems (particularly 
those which demand positive as well as negative duties) it will often be the case 
that the exercise of one right will be restricted by the exercise of another.  This 
would seem especially true of a right to liberty.  My right to do as I wish will 
usually prove to be the most obvious sacrifice in the frequent clashes such a right 
will create.
324
  My right to drive quickly is limited by the right to life of others.  
My right to property is limited by the taxes I pay in relation to your right to health.  
The situation with air travel, however, does not mirror such scenarios.   
A prohibition upon non-essential air travel unquestionably limits my liberty.  As 
noted earlier, if am not free to travel in the manner I would like, then I am far 
from free to do as I wish.  Under ordinary circumstances, this would be no great 
problem.  Were it the case that the emissions from my air travel would cause a 
tipping point which would harm current persons, a clash of rights would ensue 
and it might well prove that a prohibition on such air travel amounted to a 
permissible restriction upon my right to liberty.  This is because the rights to life 
and other fundamental goods of the current persons who are harmed by air travel 
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outweigh the right of polluters to take non-essential flights.  However, since 
prohibiting non-essential air travel will only benefit future persons, there is no 
clash of rights and thus, if I have a right to liberty, that right automatically wins 
out against non-rights-based moral considerations such as the welfare of future 
persons. 
Supporters of Interest-/Choice-based systems who find such a conclusion 
uncomfortable might justly circumvent it by denying the existence of a right to 
liberty.  If there is no right to liberty, there is one less reason for Interest and 
Choice theorists to object to a prohibition upon non-essential air travel.  There 
remains, however, a question of motivation.  If liberty is so important that it 
represents the goal (or one of the goals) of any rights-based system, it would seem 
that supporters of that system would require a particularly good reason for 
limiting the liberty of so many so widely.  And yet it is difficult to see how they 
could consider protecting future persons to constitute such a reason.  In order to 
do so, they would need to look outside of their own moral system for a 
justification as to why protecting future persons from harm might be considered a 
morally worthy cause.  While this is an option that remains open to those Choice 
and Interest theorists who do not endorse a right to liberty, it is a situation which 
is far from ideal.  If a rights-based morality is unable to provide a rights-based 
reason to restrict one of its key goals, and yet its supporters feel that there is, 
nonetheless, good reason for restricting actions taken in the name of realising that 
goal, one might ask why and to what extent such individuals actually continue to 
follow a rights-based morality at all. 
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Air Travel and Freedom of Movement 
The right to freedom of movement would clearly be negatively impacted upon by 
a ban on non-essential air travel.  Such a right has strong associations with a right 
to liberty and might even be viewed as one of its constituent elements.  Freedom 
of movement, however, is widely accepted as a right in and of itself and has a 
much broader acceptance among Interest theorists, Choice theorists and 
Nozickians alike.  While the positive duties associated with freedom of movement 
may be difficult to ascertain, it seems that such a right must at least necessitate a 
universal negative duty not prohibit me from taking certain forms of 
transportation without a solid (rights-based) reason for doing so.  This is 
particularly true in situations where such forms of transportation are the only 
realistic way I have of accessing many places throughout the globe, and perhaps 
even throughout my own country.  If I am truly to have freedom of movement, I 
must not be prevented from accessing all those methods of transport which I can 
afford to take.  The only circumstance under which any rights-based morality can 
place restrictions on this negative aspect of the right is when its exercise harms the 
rights of others.  This is not the case if the restriction is put in place to protect 
future persons. 
 
Air Travel and the Right to Family Life 
In today’s globalised world, for many people the right to family life might be 
considered to require access to air travel in order for family members living in 
different states (or different parts of the same state) to be able to see one another.  
While we may question whether such a right includes a positive duty to furnish 
Page 197 of 305 
 
such individuals with the financial means to fly (and it seems unlikely that many 
supporters of rights would argue for such a duty), the sudden removal of their 
only means of reaching family members would certainly appear to violate a 
negative duty associated with the right.  This is particularly true given that it is 
only the process of globalisation and the proliferation of affordable air travel that 
caused families to live further away from one another in the first place.  To 
suddenly change the rules without a particularly sound rights-based reason for 
doing so would seem an unreasonable infringement of a right to family life.  Of 
course, it might be argued that, unlike with rights to liberty and freedom of 
movement, supporters of rights could consistently uphold a right to family life 
while simultaneously supporting a prohibition on non-essential air travel, 
depending upon their categorisation of ‘essential’.  However, since it is unlikely 
that airlines would continue to operate on the basis of the limited number of 
customers who could not possibly use another means of transport to visit family, it 
seems likely that even with the inclusion of such an exception, any ban on air 
travel would amount to a de facto violation of the right to family life for many 
people. 
 
Air Travel and Indirect Rights Violations 
Finally, there exists a different, less direct class of rights violations that is highly 
likely to occur as a result of a ban on non-essential air travel.   
The UK is the sixth largest economy in the world, making up 4% of global GDP.  
It is also a country where the human rights are, on the whole, comparatively well 
looked after.  Even in the UK though, removing all industry that surrounded air 
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travel or the exporting and importing of goods by air would do massive damage to 
the economy.  Profits would fall heavily, thousands (perhaps hundreds of 
thousands) of jobs would disappear.  As a result, less tax would be gathered by the 
government, causing there to be less money for the National Health Service, or to 
pay out in welfare payments – at precisely the same time as the market was 
flooded with the newly out of work.  While the UK might be strong enough to 
survive such a policy, the human rights of those living there would suffer as a 
result. 
What would be a huge setback for the UK would represent a catastrophe for 
Thailand.  The Thai economy relies primarily on tourism and the export of fresh 
fruit and vegetables.  The effect of this loss of income on the number of 
unemployed would be immense, with 14.1% of all jobs linked to travel and 
tourism alone.
325
  It is doubtful whether the country’s limited welfare system 
could support such a sudden and dramatic rise in unemployment.  It seems equally 
difficult to believe that the country’s universal healthcare system, on which the 
government currently spends around 4% of GDP,
326
 could withstand the 19.3% 
drop in GDP that would result from the removal of the tourist industry.
327
  
Thailand’s situation is by no means unique, and it seems clear that a prohibition 
on air travel would have a significant impact upon the global economy and that 
                                               
325
World Travel and Tourism Council, ‘Travel and Tourism Economic Impact 2015: Thailand’ 
(London, 2015), p.1.  Available at:  https://www.wttc.org/-
/media/files/reports/economic%20impact%20research/countries%202015/thailand2015.pdf.  
Last accessed:  27/05/2016. 
326
 World Health Organization, “Thailand:  Healthcare for All at a Price”, Bulletin of The World 
Health Organization, Volume 88, No.2 (2010), 81-160.  Available at:  
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/2/10-010210/en/.  Last accessed:  27/05/2016. 
327
 World Travel and Tourism Council, Op.Cit, p.1 
Page 199 of 305 
 
the effect of that impact upon rights would be significant, particularly for the 
global poor.
328
   
Moving away from economic consequences, one might also claim that the process 
of globalisation – fuelled by air travel – has had a significant impact upon the 
universality of rights and the ability of individuals to claim those rights, often 
within extra-territorial courts.  Without air travel, it seems highly possible that 
states may become more isolated and introverted and thus more susceptible to 
autocracies which fail to respect rights. 
In summary, having examined one individual, fairly cheaply and immediately 
implementable mitigation policy, it seems clear that numerous rights of current 
persons will be harmed.  Prohibiting non-essential air travel will directly and 
unavoidably violate rights to liberty and freedom of movement.  It is also likely to 
result in slightly less direct (but no less serious) damage to recognition of other 
rights, such as the right to family life and those rights which are always threatened 
by increases in poverty in developing countries, such as rights to food, work, 
shelter and health. 
 
Deforestation and Rights 
This chapter attempts to highlight examples of blanket policies which might, if 
applied globally, significantly impact upon the reduction of climate change 
                                               
328
 It is of course possible that a comprehensive international climate change policy might include 
compensation for the lost income of the world’s poorest people.  However, such an inclusion 
would significantly increase the already heavy financial burden of such a programme.  It seems 
that the supporter of rights might argue that such funds would be better spent combatting 
existing poverty and the damage to rights it causes than resolving problems which only emerge 
as a result of policies of mitigation aimed at protecting non-right-bearing future persons. 
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without leading to results that would automatically be considered reprehensible by 
followers of all moralities (if we were able to put morality aside, slaughtering 
three-quarters of the world’s population would be a very effective way of 
reducing emissions).  It then seeks to consider whether such policies are 
permissible under any form of rights-based morality.  With this in mind, this 
section will consider the complicated issue of deforestation. 
The importance of reducing deforestation as part of the fight against climate 
change is summarised by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 
Forests are carbon sinks in their natural state (i.e., they store more carbon than they release). Trees 
absorb CO2 and convert carbon into leaves, stems, and roots, while releasing oxygen. Forests 
account for more than a quarter of the land area of the earth, and store more than three quarters of 
the carbon in terrestrial plants and nearly 40% of soil carbon. When forests are cleared, some of 
their carbon is released to the atmosphere—slowly through decay or quickly through burning. One 
estimate shows that land use change, primarily deforestation, releases about 5.9 GtCO2 (gigatons 
or billion metric tons of CO2) annually, about 17% of all annual anthropogenic GHG emissions.
329
 
 
While reforestation/afforestation offers a possible means of combatting 
deforestation, existing research shows that intact mature forests are up to three 
times more effective at absorbing carbon than even mature plantations,
330
 and that 
is before we consider the decades (perhaps centuries) of less than maximally 
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 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, Climate Change 
2007: The Physical Science Basis—Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p.3.  Available at: http://www.ipcc-
wg1.unibe.ch/publications/wg1-ar4/wg1-ar4.html.  Last accessed: 30 June 2016.   The exact 
amount of CO2 emissions from deforestation has a large degree of uncertainty, with estimates 
ranging from 1.8 to 9.9 GtCO2/year for the 1990s. 
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 Mackey, B.G. et al., ‘Green Carbon: The Role of Natural Forests in Carbon Storage, Part 1, A 
Green Carbon Account of Australia’s South-Eastern Eucalypt Forests, and Policy Implications’, The 
Fenner School of Environment & Society (Canberra, Australia:  The Australian National University, 
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effective sequestration which has to be borne before newly planted forests reach 
maturity. 
The significance of eradicating deforestation as a one-off, theoretically achievable 
policy,
331
 then, is clear – especially when we consider that experts feel that it is 
among the least financially costly ways of reducing CO2.
332
  In particular, as 
Gorte notes, “the lowest cost and largest carbon benefit of reducing deforestation 
is with tropical forests.”333 
Moreover, the predominant view among writers on the subject appears to be that 
reducing deforestation would serve to improve human rights.  Of course, much of 
this thinking presupposes that future persons have rights and focuses upon the 
potential benefits a reduction in climate change would have for such individuals.  
More interesting for the purpose of this thesis, though, is the existing discourse 
that reducing deforestation would, on balance, serve to better protect the rights of 
current persons.  Such claims generally surround the rights claims of indigenous 
people, whose culture and livelihoods are frequently destroyed by large-scale, 
commercial logging operations (legal or otherwise).  As this section will attempt 
to demonstrate, however, the answer to the question of whether indigenous people 
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 While critics may argue that the idea of a united, global ban on deforestation seems 
exceptionally unlikely, it remains a theoretical possibility.  Indeed, it could be argued that theory 
is slowly becoming reality.  In 2014 at a UN Climate Summit, Norway, Germany and The UK 
pledged to “promote national commitments that encourage deforestation-free supply chains,” 
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supply chain that contributes to the deforestation of rainforests through the government’s public 
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Huffington Post (06 June 2016).  Available at:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/norway-
first-nation-zero-deforestation_us_57559b5be4b0eb20fa0e7b79.  Last accessed: 30 June 2016. 
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would be made better off, in rights terms, by a prohibition on deforestation 
appears to vary on a case by case basis.  And when it comes to rights claims that 
do not surround indigenous people, supporters of rights-based moralities seem 
compelled to oppose a blanket ban upon deforestation. 
 
Deforestation and the Rights of Indigenous People 
Since forest-dwelling indigenous
334
 communities are most often cited as examples 
of how a ban on deforestation might help to protect rights, it will make sense to 
begin by considering the negative impact on rights such a policy might have for 
people within this group.  To complicate things further, sometimes these negative 
and positive factors can occur simultaneously.  For example, while transforming 
previously forested areas into farmland may displace indigenous people, in doing 
                                               
334
 Before commencing this section it is worth noting that the very issue of who is and is not 
indigenous when it comes to forest-dwelling people is a particularly complex one, at least in 
terms of international law.  The two most prominent pieces of legislation aimed at protecting the 
rights of indigenous people are the 1989 International Labour Organization’s Convention (No. 
169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169) and the 2007 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DECRIPS).  As Lawlor and 
Huberman highlight, “…adherence only to ILO 169 and DECRIPS would leave out many of the 
relevant human rights of indigenous people and members of the many forest-dependent 
communities who are not technically considered indigenous.”  They give the example of the 
people of Bantu descent who have populated the rainforest in the Congo Basin for millennia, but 
who are still not commonly considered indigenous (Lawlor, K. and Huberman, D., ‘Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and Human Rights’ in Campese, J., 
et al. (eds.), Rights-based Approaches:  Exploring Issues and Opportunities for Conservation 
(Bogor Barat, Indonesia: Centre for International Forestry Research, 2009), p.279).  For the 
purposes of this thesis it will not be necessary to go into great detail over who is and is not 
indigenous, sufficed to say that I feel a relatively broad approach to such a matter would be 
appropriate in accordance with a rights-based morality.  None of us are truly indigenous.  We all 
came from somewhere else if we look back far enough into the history of humanity.  It would 
therefore seem absurd not to assert that communities who have lived in a forest for generations 
(much less millennia!) should not be afforded the protection that the special rights aimed at 
indigenous people are intended to provide. 
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so it will provide labour to poverty-stricken people (indigenous or otherwise), 
enabling them to provide themselves with food, shelter and other basic rights.
335
 
There are, however, areas of indigenous rights with which a blanket ban on 
deforestation would more unquestionably come into conflict.  As Moran notes, 
“…indigenous peoples...have an inherent right to land on both historical and 
humanistic grounds. These rights extend to intellectual property rights over the 
resources they have husbanded…”.336  For Nozickians, such rights would 
certainly extend to the right to choose what to do with that land including, if they 
so wish, to allow it to be deforested in exchange for economic gain.  One might 
question whether Choice and Interest theorists would similarly assert that rights 
over property necessarily amount to rights to do as one wishes
337
 with that 
property.  If we turn to human rights law, though, it seems that such a view is 
widely supported by those responsible for drawing up and implementing a far 
from Nozickian concept of how rights should work in practice. 
While this thesis is not legal in nature, there is no reason why existing human 
rights law should not come to inform human rights thinking when appropriate.  
This seems particularly true of the core ideas of human rights declarations and 
treaties, before negotiation and interpretation occasionally renders their practical 
impact less meaningful than supporters of rights-based moralities would like.  In 
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 It might be argued that, at least for the indigenous people, such food and shelter was already 
available before their forest home which provided such things was destroyed.  This, though, will 
not be the case in every scenario.  As previously noted, the relationship between indigenous 
people, rights, and deforestation is complex and makes blanket statements problematic. 
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 Moran, E.F., ‘Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon’ in Sponsel, L.E., Headland, T.N. and Bailey, 
R.C., Tropical Deforestation:  The Human Dimension (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
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 There are obviously strong limits on the idea that one may do as one wishes with one’s 
property (I may not throw my trees at your head).  However, under a rights-based morality these 
limitations most obviously arise when my use of my property violates some right of yours.  Since 
future people are not right-holders, this is not the case with deforestation. 
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particular, there is no obvious reason to think that the articles of the two primary 
pieces of legislation concerned with the rights of indigenous peoples to which I 
shall now refer would not be compatible with rights-based moralities. 
Firstly, the 1989 International Labour Organization’s Convention (No. 169) 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169) 
outlines the special rights which are held by indigenous people in relation to their 
traditional lands.  Two articles are of particular relevance here: 
Article 7:  The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process 
of development as it affects their lives … and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to 
exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. 
In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and 
programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly. 
Article 14:  The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which 
they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. … Governments shall take steps as necessary to 
identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective 
protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 
 
The latter of these articles is backed up by Article 26 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DECRIPS), which states that: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Indigenous peoples have the right to 
own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of 
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have 
otherwise acquired. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
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resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land 
tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
It is easy to see how a prohibition upon deforestation would come into conflict 
with such rights.  Such a policy would unquestionably directly affect indigenous 
peoples, and thus, under Article 7 of ILO 169, their consent for such a policy 
would surely be needed.  More problematically, the same article would seemingly 
give them the right to allow their own land to be deforested if they wish in order 
to profit from such a policy in the name of ‘their own economic, social and 
cultural development.’ 
Similarly, in granting ‘rights of ownership and possession of the peoples 
concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy’, Article 14 of ILO 169 
must surely be interpreted to include the right to deforest that land if such an 
action is wanted by the indigenous people who own it.  This fact is made even 
clearer by the DECRIPS Article 26 when it states that ‘[i]ndigenous peoples have 
the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that 
they possess’.  This is not to say that a right to property enables right-holders to 
do whatever they want with the land they own, but it does mean that any serious 
limitation of that right (i.e. prohibiting people from cutting down the trees they 
own) would need to be justified on some other rights-based ground.  Since future 
persons are not right holders, the claim that the property rights of current 
indigenous people might be legitimately sacrificed in order to protect future 
persons is not acceptable under a rights-based morality. 
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In addition to affording indigenous people the right to profit financially from the 
large-scale deforestation of their lands for the purpose of profit, a rights-based 
morality must also afford such people the right to the kind of small-scale, 
subsistence deforestation which may be necessary to build dwellings or provide 
heating.  Again, such a right cannot easily be overlooked in the name of reducing 
climate change. 
Overall, while protecting indigenous people from illegal and unwanted 
deforestation of their traditional lands seems a very appropriate aim for a rights-
based morality, any kind of blanket ban on deforestation would appear to be in 
direct conflict with the rights of indigenous people.  To the extent that such 
deforestation forms part of the traditional culture of such people, even financial 
recompense for the losses suffered as a result of such a ban would not seem an 
adequate solution to the problem. 
Of course, were harm to the rights of forest-dwelling indigenous people the only 
difficulty with our policy, we might take a more pragmatic approach and suggest 
that such people represented an exception to our blanket ban.  Unfortunately for 
supporters of rights, however, there are many more general reasons to oppose 
such a ban. 
 
Deforestation and Rights to Liberty and Property 
As with so many policies which could feasibly be implemented to combat climate 
change, a blanket prohibition on deforestation would seem to come into direct 
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conflict with the right to liberty.  And when it comes to such a policy, the right to 
liberty and the right to property become intimately connected. 
First and foremost, I cannot be said to have a right to liberty in the sense discussed 
in the previous section if I am not at liberty to chop down trees where my doing so 
will not violate rights.  In a certain sense, however, when it comes to 
deforestation, the right to liberty is less of a problem than it is with other possible 
policies.  In the Twenty-first Century, there is very little in the way of land – 
perhaps especially forested land – that belongs to nobody.  Most forests are in 
some sense owned, whether by indigenous groups, companies, private individuals 
or the state.  As a result, my liberty, as a non-forest-owner, to chop down trees is 
immediately limited by the property rights of others without the need to make 
reference to future persons. 
Clearly, though, if the property rights of forest owners were enough to stop 
deforestation, we would not need a general prohibition on such activity.  Instead, 
it is those very property rights which enable people to deforest and which serve to 
prevent rights-based moralities from doing anything about it. 
There are two plausible ways of viewing the relationship between rights to 
property and liberty.  It might be that the right to property is inclusive of the right 
to liberty, so that to own something is to possess the right to do as I wish with that 
something provided my doing so does not violate rights.  Or we could argue that 
the right to liberty and the right to property are entirely separate, but that since I 
am free to do as I wish until there is a rights-based reason for me not to, if I own 
X one of the strongest reasons for me not using X for purpose Y (the fact that 
some other person has a property right to X and wishes that I do not use X for 
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purpose Y) is removed.  In other words, if I possess the right to property with 
regard to something, that right cannot clash with my own right to liberty. 
The reality of this problem is noted by Gaveau, who states: 
An estimated 735 million people live near remote tropical forests because agricultural land, an 
increasingly scarce resource remains abundant at the forest margin. In the absence of tangible 
benefits to conserve tropical forests, farmers seek to maximize profits by clearing protected forests 
for cash crops.
338
 
 
Given the numbers involved, it is easy to see how quickly deforestation could 
occur on a massive scale as a result of economic demands placed upon farmers 
and farm workers alike.  And yet, under a rights-based morality, there seems no 
obvious reason as to why owners of economically unprofitable forest land should 
not turn it into a business which creates the jobs needed for poor families to feed 
themselves and the tax revenue the government needs to meet other rights-based 
needs of its people, such as the provision of basic healthcare and sanitation.  This 
is particularly true given that, while, as well as combatting climate change, forests 
may provide a number of other positive benefits for the society as a whole such as 
soil retention, waste remediation and clean water, landowners do not generally 
receive any financial reward for the provision of such services.
339
 
In short, it is easy to see how a landowner might legitimately claim that a 
prohibition upon deforestation violates his rights to both liberty and property.  It 
is, on the other hand, very difficult to see how the government implementing such 
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a policy could provide a sufficiently weighty rights-based reason for such a 
violation.
340
 
 
Deforestation and Rights to Work, Food and Subsistence 
A focus on the right to property as the primary reason for denying the validity of a 
prohibition on deforestation may seem problematic for some supporters of rights 
(though not for Nozickians).  Firstly, a great deal of the world’s forests will be 
owned by large, multi-national companies or extremely rich individuals, and the 
idea that a rights-based morality should be used to afford such entities further 
protection in carrying out potentially harmful activities appears to go against what 
many supporters of rights would see as the primary purpose of this doctrine.
341
  
Secondly, if property rights were the main problem here, then supporters of rights 
could simply demand that governments purchase large swathes of forest (perhaps 
through compulsory purchase, or by paying over the market value), and thereby 
purchase the property rights associated with that forest, thus removing the clash 
between the property rights of forest owners and the welfare of future persons.  
Unfortunately, this solution would not resolve many of the other rights-based 
issues which act as subsidiaries of property rights. 
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 In truth this question is broader and more complex than I have the space or expertise to 
discuss here.  In reality, property rights vary widely in scope depending upon what is owned, who 
it is owned by, the particular state in which ownership occurs and the rights which they come 
into conflict with.  I have sought to avoid such complexities by formulating the issue as the more 
general right to liberty over what one might do with one’s own property. 
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supporters of rights to consider it to be a negative worthy of severe restrictions upon the rights 
of current persons.   
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Firstly, in many cases those who own the land they deforest are not large, 
anonymous multi-national companies.  According to Vosti, “small farmers … 
account for about two-thirds of rainforest destruction, by converting land to 
agriculture…”.342  For these individuals, often living in isolated areas, cutting 
down trees is a necessary element of creating the farmland which provides their 
only opportunity for work.  Therefore, any prohibition on deforestation would 
severely and unduly restrict the right to work of these small farmers, as well as the 
people they and larger farms/plantations employ.
343
  Moreover, in developing 
countries (where many of the tropical forests most key to combatting climate 
change are located), this employment is strongly linked to a right to subsistence, 
since alternative employment / state aid are not viable options.
344
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 Critics might argue that this may not amount to a restriction upon the right to work in the 
traditional sense.  The right to work is not a right to any specific type of work.  However, in 
impoverished areas where farming/logging is the only viable industry, the removal of this work 
stream may well amount to a de facto violation of their right to work simply as a result of the lack 
of available alternative employment.  While the farm owner is under no duty to provide such 
employment, by removing such an employment opportunity the government causes increased 
levels of unemployment which benefit nobody.  Even if this does not amount to a rights violation, 
it does make the overall rights situation of many vulnerable people considerably worse without 
bettering the rights situation of anybody.  This does not seem like something a supporter of rights 
would want to endorse. 
344
 In response to this argument, it might be contended that such problems could be overcome 
through the provision of adequate compensation.  There are two problems with such an idea:   
 
Firstly, the right to work is about more than just subsistence.  People work not only so that 
themselves and their families to avoid poverty-related death, but importantly also because they 
wish to be the agents of their own destiny and avoid poverty on their own terms rather than 
relying on charity.  Denying current persons this opportunity through the enforcement of a policy 
of mitigation aimed at protecting future persons places a harmful and unwelcome restriction 
upon their rights in the name of a non-rights-based goal. 
 
Secondly, in line with arguments presented in a previous footnote and later in this chapter, it 
would be difficult for supporters of rights to justify the additional costs of compensation as part 
of policies of mitigation.  They would be forced to argue that such funds would be better spent 
combatting existing situations where rights are not properly met rather than combatting new, 
highly avoidable threats to rights that only result from a desire to protect future persons. 
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Joint Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) specifies that, “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means 
of subsistence”.  In addition to the problem raised above, experts feel that such an 
article could be interpreted to mean that forest-dwelling communities cannot be 
denied access to the fuel wood, food and medicine the forest provides.
345
  
Regardless of the legal strength of such an argument, supporters of rights-based 
moralities would certainly struggle to justify the removal of such basic, essential 
commodities from people living in poverty.  Obtaining fuel wood may well 
involve some element of deforestation.  While this one element could doubtlessly 
be accommodated in some way, it alone is enough to demonstrate that an absolute 
prohibition on deforestation is untenable to supporters of rights. 
As National Geographic puts it, “[f]orests are cut down for many reasons, but 
most of them are related to money or to people’s need to provide for their 
families”.346  While it might not be an absolute necessity that a prohibition upon 
deforestation would violate subsistence-related rights, such a policy would 
certainly endanger those rights and require complex and costly intervention by 
governments in order to redress the balance.  It is difficult to see how or why a 
rights-based morality could or would demand this in the name of protecting non-
right-holders from future harm. 
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Deforestation and Development 
The concept of a right to development is as complex as it is controversial.  While 
it is by no means impossible that some supporters of rights-based moralities may 
wish to endorse it, it seems equally clear that others might deny its validity whilst 
still legitimately maintaining that the morality they follow is rights-based.  This 
latter position seems particularly likely to be adopted if it can be argued (as this 
section would) that such a right stands in the way of a meaningful attempt to curb 
climate change. 
In light of the above, this section begins by making the lesser claim that there 
exists a strong link between rights realisation and development.  Developed 
countries are better able and more likely to protect more of the rights of their 
citizens than their developing neighbours.  While the correlation between a 
country’s wealth and the standards of rights realisation of its citizens is not 
necessarily direct or consistent, the reverse does seem to be true; rights realisation 
is generally poor in countries that are financially poor.  A reasonable level of 
development and economic prosperity does seem to be a necessary prerequisite of 
(though not a guarantee of) societies in which rights-based moral thinking is able 
to flourish.  Development, then, is generally seen as desirable by supporters of 
rights. 
Unfortunately, development requires money much more urgently than it requires 
trees.  As The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) puts it, “…it often makes more 
economic sense - at least in the short term - to manage forests unsustainably or 
clear forests for agriculture, roads and infrastructure than to conserve them or 
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manage them responsibly.”347  Many developing countries rely heavily on the jobs 
and taxes provided by the goods they export.  In tropical areas (where the power 
of forests against climate change is at its strongest), such goods include soy beans, 
palm oil, coffee and bananas grown in previously forested land, as well as the 
wood they have harvested itself.
348
  Globally, there is a strong correlation between 
the market value of such goods and the level of deforestation in the countries that 
produce them, demonstrating that those activities which require deforestation are 
often good for a state’s economy.349  Prohibiting deforestation will harm the 
economies of developing countries, making adequate rights realisation more 
difficult to achieve.  It is difficult to see how or why the supporter of rights should 
seek to justify this in the name of future persons. 
Some of the development that emerges as a result of deforestation is less direct.  
In order to facilitate the deforestation process and ship the goods from the 
resultant farms, roads are built.  These roads frequently provide a well-needed 
boost to a country’s infrastructure, enabling citizens and goods to travel more 
easily to and from areas which were previously impoverished by their isolation.
350
  
Deforestation speeds up the development process in ways that cannot easily be 
priced. 
As a final word on the relationship between deforestation and development, it is 
worth noting that a blanket prohibition on deforestation would do nothing, in and 
of itself, to combat illegal logging.  Illegal logging is a multi-billion dollar 
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industry and is prevalent throughout the developing world.  In some areas it 
accounts for up to 90% of all deforestation.
351
  A blanket prohibition on 
deforestation will, on its own, only serve to increase illegal logging since many of 
those who currently deforest within the bounds of the law may seek to continue 
with their business even after a ban has been put in place.  The problem is that 
illegal logging is far more likely to occur in developing countries.  Developing 
countries lack the resources (in terms of both money and trained personnel) to 
combat illegal logging, and those personnel they do have working on the problem 
are susceptible to bribery and corruption as a result of their low income.  In 
stunting the development of poorer countries by removing it as a source of 
income, a prohibition on deforestation might serve to increase illegal (and perhaps 
overall) logging levels further still by removing governments of both the funds 
and the inclination needed to adequately combat the problem. 
Therefore, in addition to considering the rights violations a prohibition on 
deforestation might cause in theory, we must ask whether such a policy is likely to 
make any actual difference to the number of trees that are lost in practice.  There 
is nothing inherently immoral about either deforestation or the prohibition of it; 
rather, it is the difference each policy will make to the welfare of current and/or 
future persons which makes it of interest.  If a ban on deforestation is largely a 
ban in name only it will only serve to harm the rights of honest, law-abiding 
citizens while doing very little to reduce the amount of emissions in the Earth’s 
atmosphere.   
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It seems clear, then, that deforestation can provide a significant boost to the 
economies and subsequent development of the world’s poorer countries.  
Coincidentally or otherwise, the majority of the world’s forests are located in the 
poorest countries.  In prohibiting deforestation we would not only violate rights, 
we would ask that a significant climate burden be borne almost entirely by the 
people who can least afford it.  To do this in the name of non-right-holding future 
persons seems untenable under a rights-based morality.  This is particularly true 
when we consider that less developed nations are less able to deal with the 
significant problem of illegal logging, meaning that a ban on deforestation might 
end up significantly reducing the revenues received by governments of developing 
countries without similarly reducing the number of trees which are actually being 
cut. 
Overall, it seems that specific mitigation policies are likely to have a direct 
negative effect upon the rights of many current persons without benefitting others 
and are thus rendered untenable under a rights-based morality.  One objection to 
this idea is that it might be the case that some other policy I have not had space to 
consider (or even an adapted version of those I have considered) could be 
acceptable to supporters of rights.  With this in mind, I will now consider some 
more general connections between mitigation and rights as well as the problem of 
motivating supporters of rights to reduce climate change even if climate burdens 
could be met without directly violating the rights of current persons. 
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Indirect Damage and the Motivation Problem 
The remainder of this chapter will focus upon the less direct damage to rights 
which would occur as a result of a fully-fledged programme of mitigation. It will 
demonstrate the ways in which mitigation policies will cause a general increase in 
poverty, and with it, a general reduction in rights realisation.  It will also argue 
that, even disregarding the damage done to rights by a dedicated programme of 
mitigation and the fact that future persons cannot be deemed to be of significant 
moral concern under a rights-based morality, mitigation techniques are a highly 
ineffective way of addressing the harm caused by climate change. 
 
Mitigation and Indirect Harm to Rights 
Having discussed in the previous section the effects of specific policies upon 
specific rights, I now want to consider the more general negative effects of a 
mitigation programme on the rights of current persons.  In response to some of the 
arguments I will make, it might be opposed that these negative effects do not 
amount to a violation of the rights in question.  Therefore, opponents might argue 
that, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2, to the extent that the negative effects of 
mitigation amount only to a restriction of rights, they are not placed wholly 
beyond the countenance of those who follow a rights-based morality.  However, I 
wish to contend that, even if this is the case, a supporter of rights could not 
coherenty support a programme of mitigation which caused (even indirectly) such 
vast damage to (and prevented future improvement of) human rights and which 
did so in the name of non-rights-based concerns. 
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As already noted, generally speaking, levels of rights recognition bear a strong 
correlation to levels of development.  The more developed a state becomes, the 
more rights its citizens enjoy and the more fully they enjoy them.
352
  This is 
particularly true of economic, social and cultural rights.  Thus, while talk of a 
specific right to development would seem problematic, it does not appear 
controversial to claim that without development there can only be limited 
fulfilment of rights.  Indeed, such thinking is demonstrated by the inclusion of 
‘progressive realisation’ clauses in many human rights documents.353 
As Sinnot-Armstrong highlights, “…any steps that mitigate or adapt to global 
warming will slow down our economies, at least in the short run.  That will hurt 
many people, especially many poor people.”354  This is because mitigation will 
severely impact upon humanity’s ability to develop.  This will be all the more true 
for the developing world, where rights realisation is already low.  As Humphreys 
puts it, “climate change mitigation efforts will reorient and fix national 
development paths over the long term, and these in turn will tend to set limits on 
the capacity of countries to fulfil basic human rights, albeit to different 
degrees.”355 
In order to achieve long-term stabilisation, emissions in developing countries will 
need to peak by 2025 before reducing by 30%-60% before 2050.
356
  A significant 
element of any mitigation programme with such a goal in mind would have to be 
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a reduction in the use of fossil fuels and the emissions they produce.  However, as 
Humphreys notes, “since the path to economic growth and prosperity (as 
generally understood) has relied until now on fuels and technologies that produce 
these emissions, a global freeze on their usage will tend to lock-in vast wealth 
disparities between groups in different regions, without offering any obvious or 
reliable means of reducing the gap in future.”357 
Indeed, the problem is potentially worse than this.  Fossil fuels such as coal, 
which produce large amounts of CO2, are relatively cheap, whereas renewable 
energy, which produces no CO2, is far more expensive.
358
  Therefore, any 
mitigation programme which places a freeze upon (or, indeed, reduces) the use of 
the former is actually likely to increase existing wealth disparities, since 
developed countries will be far better able to switch to renewable energy sources 
than their counterparts in the developing world. 
In summary, then, a full scale, global programme of mitigation would be highly 
likely to lead to lower levels of rights realisation in the short-medium term which 
could otherwise have been avoided through the increased levels of development 
achieved by a continued reliance on fossil fuels.  This is because the development 
of those countries where levels of rights-realisation are low is often dependent on 
existing, environmentally-harmful fuel sources and activities.  Removing people’s 
and states’ ability to use such fuel sources or conduct such activities will result in 
a delay to their development while alternative fuel sources / ways of conducting 
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their daily lives are found.  This delay will also amount to a delay to greater levels 
of rights realisation being achieved by people living in developing countries. 
Supporters of rights might argue that such an outcome, while undesirable, does 
not amount to a violation of rights – much less a violation which could be 
attributed to the programme of mitigation.  The fact that a certain policy has 
‘caused’ development to slow within a certain state is not evidence that said 
policy has violated the rights of those living within that state.  Should the EU 
decide to prohibit the importation of fruit from non-EU countries, the rights of 
many people living in certain small developing states might suffer from the 
resultant economic losses.  However, the right to health of a Taiwanese farm 
labourer does not bear a correlative duty on the EU to allow the importation of 
Taiwanese lychees.  Similarly, if countries become wealthy more slowly as a 
result of a policy of mitigation, the resultant increase in the amount of time taken 
to reach suitable minimum levels of rights recognition cannot be said to validate 
the claim that such a policy is in violation of the rights of those affected by it. 
While the above is true it does not represent a valid reason for supporters of rights 
to endorse a wholesale global mitigation programme. 
Firstly, as explained earlier in this chapter, certain specific policies which emerge 
as part of a wholesale global mitigation problem will directly violate the rights of 
certain current individuals.  I have already attempted to demonstrate that such 
claims could be made about prohibitions on air travel and deforestation.  There is 
good reason for thinking the same will be true of other policies which might form 
part of any reasonable global mitigation strategy, such as, for instance, the 
prohibition of fossil fuels which produce soot (estimated to be the cause of 
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anything between 18% and 60% of current warming)
359
 which are most relied 
upon by the world’s poorest people.360  All of these policies would need to be 
implemented at the national level, meaning that the states which enforce them 
would end up violating the rights of their own people.  The fact that the vague 
concept of a global mitigation strategy (which, necessarily, fails to pinpoint which 
actual policies will be implemented, when and on whom) cannot be pinned down 
as directly violating rights is not to say that, in practice, certain elements of such a 
policy would not do so. 
Secondly, even if a wholesale global mitigation programme could not be argued to 
directly violate rights in strict terms, given the facts presented earlier in this 
section, it seems fairly uncontroversial to claim that such a programme would 
cause a worsening of the human rights situation of many current persons.   
This should come as no surprise.  Mitigation is about sacrifice.  It is about making 
current persons worse off than they could be in order that future persons are made 
better off than they would have been.  If this were not the case, current persons 
would not be so reluctant to adopt mitigation strategies.  For supporters of rights, 
though, a familiar problem emerges.  If future persons do not hold rights, it 
becomes difficult to see why states should be allowed to sacrifice the fullest 
possible realisation of the rights of current persons in the name of protecting them.  
This remains the case even if that sacrifice does not, in and of itself, amount to a 
direct violation of rights.  In short, those whose primary moral concern is with 
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rights are not only left with no reason to endorse a programme which causes 
restrictions to and/or violations of the rights of current persons with the aim of 
aiding future persons, but, as a result of an adherence to the kind of rights-friendly 
‘general welfare’ laid out in Chapter 2, are in fact compelled to stand against such 
a programme regardless of whether rights are directly violated by it. 
 
Mitigation and Rights Protection 
As should be clear by now, a key difficulty faced by supporters of rights in 
relation to climate change is the issue of motivation.  For those whose primary 
moral concern is rights, there can be no good reason for violating, or even 
allowing the diminishment of, the rights of current persons through a dedicated 
programme of mitigation.  This section considers the damaging effects of the costs 
of mitigation upon the motivation of supporters of rights to implement even 
‘rights-friendly’ mitigation policies. 
The cost of a full-scale mitigation programme is not easy to estimate.  It will 
always be difficult to calculate the costs associated with any financial decisions 
large enough to affect the economies of every country on Earth.  This difficulty is 
further magnified by the fact that no particular individual programme of 
mitigation has yet been agreed upon.  This is because: a) different programmes 
will have different costs, and; b) the accuracy of predictions about cost will be 
negatively affected by the fact that they are entirely predictions and are not based 
upon an analysis of any existing programme.   
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Having said this, there is widespread agreement that any effective programme of 
mitigation will be expensive.  For example, the policy proposed by the EU – to 
cut emissions to 1990 levels across the globe – would cost an estimated $30 
trillion.
361
  Depending on which programme we follow, the cost is likely to be 
between 1-4% of global GDP in 2030, 2-6% in 2050 and 3-11% in 2100.
362
 
For those for whom rights are of primary moral concern, spending such vast sums 
of money on non-rights-based concerns would seem a poor use of already limited 
and diminishing global resources.  As Schelling puts it, “it would be hard to make 
the case that the countries we now perceive as vulnerable would be better off 50 
or 75 years from now if 10 or 20 trillions of dollars had been invested in carbon 
abatement rather than economic development.”363  Lomborg demonstrates the 
truth of such a statement through the example of the benefit of reducing malaria 
rates through mitigation versus doing so through other policies: 
Malaria will slightly increase through global warming, but if we really care about malaria victims 
we have to ask why we would ever first contemplate helping very few very slowly through climate 
policies.  If we do Kyoto, we can avoid 70 million people getting infected toward the end of the 
century.  If we focus on targeted policies, mosquito nets, medicine and mosquito eradication, we 
could save 28,000 million from malaria – or more than 400 times better.  When we also realize 
that doing so would be 50 times cheaper, we are faced with a stark choice:  every time we save one 
person through climate policies, we could have saved 20,000 people with smarter, simpler malaria 
policies.
364
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In response to these figures, the hard-core rights supporter might seek to claim 
that the number of people affected by a violation of rights is morally irrelevant.  
Such a position, though, is by no means necessitated by a rights-based morality.  
Supporters of rights might well feel that the number of people helped must be of 
some moral value – or, rather, that there may be some moral value in protecting a 
greater number of rights -  particularly when we are making a choice between 
protecting the rights possessed by a relatively small group of people and the exact 
same rights of a much larger group.
365
 
In reality, the supporter of rights need make no reference to the number of people 
affected in the example provided in order to agree with the correctness of 
Lomborg’s position.  The 70 million people who will be saved from malaria by a 
policy of mitigation are not current right-holders; the 28,000 million who will be 
saved by alternative policies are, or will be at the time the cost-bearing action 
necessary to save them is taken.  Therefore, only the policy of protecting current 
persons protects any rights. 
The problem for supporters of rights, then, is not simply that certain mitigation 
techniques are likely to worsen rights recognition, and even directly violate rights.  
Even if some or all of this damage could be avoided (by, for example, a more 
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equitable distribution of the costs of mitigation which meant that wealthier nations 
bore the brunt of the costs so that fewer people were reduced to situations where 
their basic rights were at risk), mitigation remains an unacceptably poor use of 
public funds if our goal is greater rights realisation.  As Lomborg puts it,  
In the battles over whether we should cut 4% or 96% [of current emissions], we might easily 
forget that in the short and medium term we can help real people much better through alternative 
policies…. we can cut diseases, malnutrition, and lack of access to clean drinking water and 
sanitation, while improving the economy with much cheaper policies that will have much greater 
impact.
366
 
 
Of course, in the long term, this focus on ‘real’ (current) people will lead us ever 
closer to tipping points beyond which life for future persons will become 
unbearable.  However, supporters of rights cannot let such a fact influence their 
decisions over the best ways of spending finite, dwindling resources.  If rights are 
our primary concern, and if future people cannot be said to possess rights, then it 
is difficult to see why a policy of mitigation should be given any priority at all 
given the vast number of problems many current people face in seeing even their 
most basic rights realised – problems which could be (but are not currently) 
solved at a fraction of the cost of mitigation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the fact that rights-based moralities 
cannot afford appropriate weight to future persons is not simply an unfortunate 
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ethical oversight which matters only in the lecture hall.  Rather, it greatly impedes 
the practical ability of supporters of rights to effectively combat climate change in 
reality.  As Caney correctly highlights, “…a human rights approach requires us to 
adopt a discriminating approach to the impacts of climate change and would not, 
therefore, take into account all the impacts of climate change.  From a purely 
human rights approach, only those effects that violate rights should be taken into 
account.”367  If rights cannot exist (or be violated) before a person comes into 
existence, then Caney’s assertion means that supporters of rights would have no 
motivation to mitigate climate change, but only to adapt to it (and even the latter 
approach holds certain difficulties). 
Indeed, it is not simply that there is no good rights-based reason for mitigating 
against climate change, but that there are, in fact, several good rights-based 
reasons for not doing so.   
Firstly, even if mitigation caused no actual damage to rights, the supporter of 
rights would still find it exceptionally difficult to justify spending trillions of 
dollars safeguarding future persons against the ill-effects of climate change when 
that money could be spent protecting greater numbers of rights among a greater 
number of current right-holders.   
Secondly, mitigation does cause actual damage to rights.  By significantly 
reducing the use of fossil fuels, any large scale mitigation policy will also 
significantly reduce economic growth and concretise existing inequalities, causing 
rights realisation to take a retrograde step, particularly in the developing world.  
The demands of progressive realisation will be greatly reduced for those countries 
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which are actually worse off than when they signed up to treaties promising to 
protect the rights of their people. 
Thirdly, some of those policies most crucial to an effective programme of 
mitigation directly violate and/or unduly restrict the rights of current persons. 
Under a rights-based morality, then, it seems that not only can a programme of 
mitigation not be endorsed, it must, in fact, be vehemently opposed.  Such a 
position is problematic.  Ultimately, it is mitigation and mitigation alone that will 
stop humanity from reaching the tipping points which will lead to the deaths of 
billions of future people.  Supporters of non-rights-based moralities might well 
question whether the fact that the specific identity of such persons is as of yet 
undecided should entirely remove such beings as objects of our moral concern.  
Similarly, one might hold that the many non-human animals and even plants that 
will die and possibly even become extinct as a result of climate change are worthy 
of greater moral consideration than rights-based moralities are able to offer.  
Many people, then, would consider the safeguarding of both future persons and 
other species to hold enough moral weight to be worthy of certain sacrifices 
among current persons.  Even rights-based sacrifices.  This is not a position 
available to supporters of rights.  The next chapter, then, considers whether there 
might be rights-based solutions to climate change which do not rely solely upon 
the sacrifice of rights in the name of future persons for their justification. 
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CHAPTER 6:  RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Introduction 
Thus far this thesis has sought to highlight the fact that future persons cannot be 
said to have rights and the severe limitations this places on rights-based moralities 
in their attempts to provide viable answers to questions of why we should take 
action to prevent climate change and which actions we might permissibly take.  
This chapter attempts to investigate whether such difficulties might be 
circumnavigated through a rights-friendly focus upon the current and future 
wellbeing of current persons in order that rights-based moralities might offer a 
viable solution to climate change without the need to appeal to future persons at 
all. 
The chapter begins by recapping the dangers associated with tipping points.  It 
goes on to highlight the substantial timespans involved with both climate change 
and implementing an effective programme of mitigation.  As a result of such 
timespans, it is argued that reducing emissions levels in the name of protecting 
against tipping points amounts to mitigating against climate change for the sole 
purpose of protecting future persons from climate-related harm.  Mitigating 
against tipping points thus falls beyond the purview of rights-based moralities.  
With this in mind, the chapter moves on to examine the extent to which action 
against climate change can be justified without recourse to the worst-case 
scenario. 
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Firstly, the relationship between rights-based moralities and adaptation techniques 
is examined.  A wide variety of principles for determining who ought to meet the 
financial costs associated with adaptation are explored and the plausibility of each 
for Interest Theorists, Choice Theorists and Nozickians is considered.  Ultimately, 
it is argued that both Interest- and Choice-based theories of rights are able, 
through a combination of the Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay 
Principle, to provide a strong explanation of who ought to meet adaptation 
burdens and why.  Nozickians, on the other hand, are not similarly able to justify 
imposing the costs of adaptation upon current persons. 
Next, the issue of mitigation in the name of current persons is examined.  Here, 
the situation with regard to adaptation is reversed.  The section highlights that, 
since it is possible to prevent the harm climate change will cause to current 
persons through adaptation alone, Interest and Choice theorists are unable to 
provide any good reason for the lowering of emissions levels.  Indeed, following 
such theories is likely to lead to an increase in emissions.  The section goes on to 
show that, as a result of the Lockean proviso, Nozick would be forced to outlaw 
those emissions which caused climate change which came to violate the rights of 
current persons in the future.  Therefore, Nozickian rights-based moral systems 
not only safeguard current persons from the worst ills of climate change, but also 
inadvertently provide future persons with similar protection due to the fact that the 
substantial lifespan of greenhouse gases means that both groups are similarly 
affected by the same emissions and thus are similarly protected by a reduction in 
emission levels. 
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The chapter concludes that Interest-based, Choice-based and Nozickian theories 
of rights, if universally adopted, would each significantly reduce levels of climate-
related human suffering in comparison with the current status quo.  Despite this, it 
is argued that each theory is so dangerously lacking in ability to simultaneously 
justify both mitigation and adaptation that anybody with a genuine concern for the 
welfare of both future and current persons (let alone non-human animals or the 
Earth in general) would be better to abandon rights-based moral systems 
altogether. 
 
Tipping Points 
Much of the concern surrounding climate change is (understandably) focused 
upon the catastrophe that will ensue under the worst case scenario, i.e. if and when 
we reach one or more tipping points. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the term ‘tipping point’ refers to specific climatic events 
which will result from climate change.  These events will cause rapid and 
dramatic changes to the Earth’s environment which will prove extremely harmful 
to human beings (and most other species) living at the time.  The speed and extent 
of these changes will mean that it will no longer be practically possible to mitigate 
against further climate change to any significant degree.  It will also be impossible 
to adapt to such rapid and drastic climatic changes in a manner that would offer 
sufficient protection against the harms they will cause.  McKinnon presents the 
following simplified summary of some of the more frequently mentioned tipping 
points: 
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…the shutdown of the Atlantic conveyor (which distributes heat to Western Europe) as a result of 
melting ice caps, possibly causing another ice age; rapid and large rises in sea level (again caused 
by massive melting of ice sheets and glaciers) fit to swamp London, Sydney, New York, Tokyo 
and most of the US seaboard, as well as low-lying Bangladesh, and many (probably already 
doomed) small island states; the melting of the permafrost in Siberia, causing the release of huge 
stores of methane (a greenhouse gas twenty times more potent than CO2) from the peatlands 
below (present estimates are that the melting permafrost is releasing 100,000 tons of methane a 
day, which has a warming effect greater than all the US’s daily greenhouse gas emissions); a rapid 
decrease in the Earth’s albeldo as a result of melting ice and decreased snow cover, causing a 
drastic reduction in the Earth’s capacity to reflect sunlight back into space, and leading to runaway 
warming.
368
 
 
This section demonstrates that, while the prospect of tipping points and the 
irreparable harm they will do provides followers of most moralities with a solid 
justification for the enforcement of climate burdens, the same cannot be said for 
supporters of rights. 
There are three key issues surrounding tipping points which impact upon their 
ability to justify and frame our approach to resolving climate-change (particularly 
if such an approach is rights-based): 
1. It is extremely unclear when they will occur. 
2. It is not absolutely certain whether they will occur at all. 
3. If and when they do occur, we cannot be sure how much damage they will do. 
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The third of these issues is the least problematic for supporters of rights-based 
moralities.  It is certainly the case that there is a large amount of disagreement 
over how bad reaching a single tipping point would be for human kind.  It could 
be that we lose billions of lives, or it could be that the death toll is more accurately 
measured in the thousands.  This uncertainty, in and of itself, is not a significant 
difficulty for supporters of rights.  The certainty with which we are able to predict 
that the numerous rights of numerous individuals will be harmed by climate 
change is, in principle, sufficient to warrant the implementation of measures to 
reduce climate change and thus avoid reaching a tipping point.
369
 
I say ‘in principle’ because, for reasons already highlighted, if the damage that 
will be caused by reaching a tipping point only affects future persons, it does not 
amount to a violation of rights and thus cannot justify the kind of restrictions upon 
the rights of current persons that would be necessary to quell climate change for 
the purpose of avoiding a tipping point.  For tipping points to be of moral concern 
to supporters of rights, they would need to occur within the lifetimes of current 
persons.
370
 
This brings us to the questions of when and if tipping points will be reached.  
Firstly, the scientific community is far from reaching a consensus that tipping 
points will be reached at all.  While the majority of experts agree that tipping 
points will eventually occur if humanity continues to pump emissions into the 
atmosphere at the current increasing trajectory for long enough, some suggest that 
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humankind is likely to run out of fossil fuels and/or naturally move over to green 
energy sources long before climate change reaches a level sufficient to cause a 
tipping point to be reached.
371
  Ultimately, then, regardless of our moral leanings, 
when faced with the possibility of tipping points we must weigh up: the chances 
of one ever being reached; the level of harm that would ensue if one was reached; 
and the damage done to people’s lives by the actions we take in order to try to 
avoid such an event.  McKinnon feels that, when faced with such moral 
mathematics, we should adopt what she labels the ‘Strong Precautionary 
Principle,’ which she defines as follows:  “When evidence or information is 
insufficient to establish the nature and/or probability of harms caused by an 
activity, policy makers are required to act in order adequately to protect people 
and other entities from these possible harms.”372  She feels that “the strong 
precautionary principle is justified with respect to many climate change 
catastrophes because the worst consequences of not taking precautionary action 
are worse than the worst consequences of taking precautionary action.”373  Such a 
position is one that is adhered to by other scholars in the field.
374
 
This is a position that many of us would agree with.  Supporters of rights cannot. 
Supporters of rights are unable to assign appropriate moral weight to future 
persons.  As such, it must be current persons which are their key objects of moral 
concern.  The problem is that, while it is unclear exactly when a tipping point will 
be reached, the idea that its occurrence or otherwise within the next century could 
be dictated by the actions of current persons is difficult to pay credence to. 
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In March 2016 the global average surface temperature moved to 1.5°C beyond 
pre-industrial levels, with average temperature in the northern hemisphere briefly 
moving above the recognised ‘tipping point’ level of 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels.
375
  While this is certainly alarming, it must be remembered that the global 
average surface temperature must go 2-2.5°C above pre-industrial levels and 
remain there for some time (nobody knows how long, but certainly years, perhaps 
decades) before tipping points become an immediate threat.  Given that it has 
taken 250 years to reach for global average surface temperatures to reach 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels, it is reasonable to expect that, even with emission 
levels booming globally, it will take a great many decades before we cross the 2-
2.5°C threshold and several more before tipping points are reached. 
All in all, then, while it is not impossible that current persons will witness a 
tipping point, there is a strong chance that they will not.  Therefore, for supporters 
of rights, mitigating against climate change in the name of preventing a tipping 
point means imposing severe restrictions upon the rights of current persons in 
order to safeguard against an event which, in all likelihood, will not come to pass 
within the lifetimes of any of those same current persons. 
Such a fact need not, of itself, represent an insurmountable obstacle.  In line with 
McKinnon’s logic, supporters of rights might want to claim that, given the 
potentially catastrophic damage to the rights of current persons that could occur if 
even a single tipping point was reached within their lifetime, the restrictions upon 
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 Holthaus, E., ‘Our Planet’s Temperature Just Reached a Terrifying Milestone’, Future Tense (12 
March 2016).  Available at:  
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/03/01/february_2016_s_shocking_global_warm
ing_temperature_record.html.  Last accessed:  01 November 2016. 
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their rights in the present necessary to safeguard against such a catastrophe are 
warranted even if the risk of its occurrence is small. 
Unfortunately, in focussing upon current persons as the appropriate object of 
moral concern, supporters of rights promptly run into a much greater difficulty.  
As highlighted in Chapter 1, there is a time-lag of at least thirty years before the 
emissions we produce today begin to affect the climate, which they do by 
combining with existing emissions which remain in the atmosphere from the 
pollution of (at least) the previous 150 years.  Additionally, it would take a 
significant amount of time before emission levels could be safely and significantly 
reduced, even if every government earnestly committed to such a target in the 
immediate future (which is itself highly unlikely).  As a result, it seems 
impossible that implementing a wholesale mitigation programme would do 
anything to prevent a tipping point being reached if that tipping point was already 
so temporally close that its arrival would affect the lives of current persons.   
Imagine that, following current pollution trends, we will reach a tipping point in a 
century.
376
  We must deduct from this figure, 1) the 30-50 years it takes for our 
emissions to take effect (once those emissions are produced, we cannot take back 
the harm that will emerge from them) and 2) the decades that will occur between 
the point at which reaching a tipping point becomes inevitable and the moment 
when that tipping point actually occurs.  Once we do this we are left with an 
inordinately small amount of time to convince every government in the world to 
agree to a widespread programme of mitigation, to enforce that programme, and 
                                               
376
 Note that to do so is to consider a fairly unlikely best case scenario for supporters of rights in 
this situation.  If tipping points are much further than a century away they will not affect current 
persons and thus will not be of concern to supporters of rights.  On the other hand, the nearer 
they are to the present, the less time we will have to combat them. 
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(ideally) to replace existing technologies to an extent which prevents a mitigation 
programme from amounting to a widespread and systematic violation of the most 
basic rights of billions of people.  If tipping points will occur within our lifetime 
then it is already too late for us to stop them. 
For tipping points to remain preventable (which they probably are) they must be 
set to occur so far into the future that no current persons will be their victims.  
Therefore, any restrictions upon the rights of current persons taken in the name of 
preventing tipping points would be restrictions imposed in pursuit of a non-rights-
based good. 
In short, either tipping points will not affect current persons, in which case they 
are of no concern to the supporter of rights, or they unavoidably will, in which 
case mitigation becomes a wholly unjustified infringement upon the rights of 
current persons with no benefit for anyone else.  In light of this, it seems the threat 
of tipping points does little
377
 to inspire action against climate change among 
supporters of rights. 
Such a conclusion seems problematic in terms of theory; the inability to assign 
moral value to future persons might well be viewed as a weakness of rights-based 
moralities.  In terms of practice, though, the fact that such moral systems are 
unable to use tipping points as a reason to combat climate change does not, in and 
of itself, render them incapable of combatting climate change at all and 
                                               
377
 Little, but not nothing.  It would appear to be the case that, was reaching a tipping point 
within current lifetimes considered a reasonable possibility by supporters of rights, they could 
legitimately demand that current persons take adaptation-related actions in advance of that 
tipping point to reduce the harmful effects it will have upon current persons in the future.  
However, as this chapter will show, this argument does not rely on tipping points in order to 
remain justified and is therefore more appropriately based on more predictable and definite 
climate-based harms. 
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incidentally protecting future persons from tipping points in the process.  If rights-
based moralities can provide good reasons for meeting climate burdens based 
upon duties to current persons, then – because the pollution which will harm 
current persons is the same pollution that will harm future persons – they might 
simultaneously (albeit accidentally) lead us to implement policies that will 
ultimately safeguard future persons. 
This chapter shows that this is not the case under Interest- or Choice-based 
approaches to rights (although such theories still offer coherent reasons for taking 
certain actions which will undoubtedly reduce climate-related harms in the short-
medium term).  As counter-intuitive as it may seem, however, a Nozickian 
approach appears to provide good reasons for thinking that mitigation might be 
justified through reference to current persons. 
 
Adaptation and Rights:  Who Pays the Price? 
Issues surrounding the moral relevance of future persons and the duties placed 
upon current persons as a result of tipping points pose important questions for any 
moral theory seeking to provide an adequate response to the problem of climate 
change.  Another such question concerns who (if anybody) ought to meet the costs 
involved in adapting to climate change.  Such costs will be substantial.  They are 
also unpredictable and increasing as our knowledge of climate change increases.  
In 2007, a study by Oxfam projected that the developing world would need to 
spend $28bn a year by 2030.
378
  By 2016, UNEP were estimating that this figure 
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to be anything between $140-300bn per annum, rising to $280-500bn by 2050.
379
 
The broadness involved in such estimates emerges as a result of the significant 
uncertainty over which adaptable effects of climate change will come to occur and 
when
  
as well as similar uncertainty over the financial markets (predicting the 
worth of a US dollar in 2050 would be hard enough without taking into account 
the effect of widespread and potentially extremely harmful climate change might 
have on global financial markets). 
Caney puts forward three plausible answers to the question of who might be 
considered the relevant cost-bearers when it comes to adapting to climate change:  
The Polluter Pays Principle (in various guises); the Beneficiary Pays Principle; 
and the Ability to Pay Principle.
 380
  This section will examine each of these 
approaches in turn, considering whether they might be acceptable to proponents of 
any of the rights-based moralities that this thesis seeks to explore.  The section 
concludes that Nozickians/Libertarians struggle to justify any of the principles 
that Caney lays out, while a mixture of the Ability to Pay Principle and the 
Polluter Pays Principle is the route most obviously suggested by adherence to 
Interest- or Choice-based theories. 
 
Polluter Pays Principle 
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is perhaps the most famous and most obvious 
approach to deciding who ought to be charged with meeting climate burdens and 
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is “one that has been affirmed in a number of international legal agreements”.381  
Essentially, it states that those who pollute ought to be the ones to meet any costs 
associated with that pollution. 
Caney explains that there exist several different versions of the PPP.  Firstly, the 
micro-version states that “if an individual actor, X, performs an action that causes 
pollution, then that actor should pay for the ill effects of that action.”382  This can 
be contrasted with the macro-version, which asserts that “if actors X, Y, and Z 
perform actions that together cause pollution, then they should pay for the cost of 
the ensuing pollution in proportion to the amount of pollution that they have 
caused.”383  He notes that  
[t]his distinction is relevant because the micro-version can be applied only when one can identify a 
specific burden that results from a specific act.  It is, however, inapplicable in cases where one 
cannot trace the specific burdens back to earlier individual acts.  Now climate change clearly falls 
into this category.  If an industrial plant releases a high level of carbon dioxide into the air, we 
cannot pick out specific individual costs that result from that particular actor and that particular 
action.  The macro-version can, however, accommodate the causation of such effects.  Even if one 
cannot say that A has caused this particular bit of global warming, one can say that this increase in 
global warming as a whole results from the actions of these actors.  Furthermore, note that the 
macro-version can allow us to ascribe greater responsibilities to some.  Even if it does not make 
sense to say that we can attribute a specifiable bit of global warming to each of them, we can still 
say that those who emit more carbon dioxide than others are more responsible than others.  In 
principle, then, if one had all the relevant knowledge about agents’ GHG emissions, it would be 
possible to make individualistic assessments of just how much each agent owes.
384
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One problem with the PPP is the fact that, due to the significant amount of time 
GHGs remain in the atmosphere, many of the emissions which cause climate 
change both now and for decades to come are the result of the pollutant activities 
of the now deceased.  The PPP, even its macro-version, struggles to determine 
who ought to pay for this.  As a result of this difficulty, the collectivist-version of 
the PPP emerges.  Caney outlines this position as follows: 
…if we take a collectivist approach, we might say that since Britain (the collective) emitted 
excessive amounts of GHGs during one period in time, then Britain (as a collective) may a 
hundred years later, say, be required to pay for the pollution it has caused, if it has not done so 
already.  To make this collective unit pay is to make the polluter pay.
385
 
 
If we take a collective approach to the PPP, then, it seems we have one plausible 
way of assigning all the climate burdens necessary to adequately combat climate 
change.  It is also worth noting that this kind of collective approach is not alien or 
even particularly controversial for many of us.  Under international law it is quite 
clearly the case that states are responsible for paying reparations in relation to the 
crimes of previous regimes.  This remains the case even if the current regime 
stood in firm opposition to the policies to which such reparations relate.  The most 
obvious example of this would be the billions of pounds paid out in the form of 
reparations by Germany to the victims of the Nazis,
386
 but there have also been 
many others.  Such payments can be to both other countries and to individual 
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 Ibid, p.129.  In principle, the collectivist position could be applied to other entities such 
companies as well as countries. 
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 As recently as 2015 Greece demanded almost €279bn in reparation for the crimes of the Third 
Reich (Khan, M., ‘Greece demands €279bn from Germany in Nazi war reparations’, The Telegraph 
(07 April 2015).  Available at:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11518862/Greece-demands-279bn-from-
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victims from within the violating state.  For example, the Chilean government has 
paid out over $1.6bn in pensions to victims of the Pinochet regime as well as 
establishing a specialised health care programme for survivors of violations.
387
 
There are, however, problems with a collectivist approach. 
By assigning climate burdens on a collective basis we demand that individual 
current persons ultimately pay the costs, not only of their own pollution, but of 
that of millions of other people whom they have never met for no other reason 
than the fact that they inhabit the same land as their forefathers.  In terms of 
justice, this is problematic.  These problems increase when we consider that the 
current residents of nations who have polluted significantly in the past may 
currently be living in impoverished circumstances with low levels of rights 
fulfilment.  The problems of such individuals are likely to be exacerbated if their 
states are further weakened economically by the demands of adaptation burdens. 
For supporters of rights, the idea that people ought to pay the cost of fixing the 
damage to rights that results from their actions is far from controversial.  It is, 
however, less clear in the relatively individualistic world of rights that current 
persons ought to pay the price for the sins of their forefathers.  For Nozickians, 
such an idea would seem preposterous, and would clearly amount to a violation of 
rights under any circumstances, since their libertarian position states that the 
wrongs of others are no responsibility of ours.
388
  And in cases where following 
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 ‘Reparations’, International Center for Transitional Justice.  Available at:  
https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations.  Last accessed:  01 January 
2017. 
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Nozick does advocate the use of compensation, but his interpretation of it would, if anything, 
appear to endorse the opposite point of view.  Far from claiming that individuals should pay for 
harms caused to the rights of others, Nozick instead suggests that it might, under certain limited 
circumstances, be permissible to limit the rights of some to take certain actions (he gives the 
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the PPP will further damage the already low levels of rights fulfilment among the 
global poor – despite the fact that there exist sufficient numbers of current persons 
who could adequately meet the necessary climate burdens without causing 
similarly significant harm to their rights – the notion of a collective version of the 
PPP becomes wholly untenable under any form of rights-based morality.
389
 
 
Beneficiary Pays Principle 
In light of the various difficulties with the PPP, scholars such as Shue and 
Neumayer endorse various versions of an alternative approach known as the 
Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP).  Loosely stated, the BPP asserts that the 
individuals who have benefited from pollution ought to be the individuals who are 
                                                                                                                                                  
example of the right of the epileptic to drive) provided we compensate the victims of the 
prohibition for this loss of freedom (Nozick, R., Op.Cit, p.110-111).  The Nozickian would view the 
situation between polluter and victim as a clash of rights.  If the exercise of the polluter’s right to 
pollute harms the rights to health/life/etc. of some current person other than the polluter may 
find that particular exercise of his/her right prohibited and may or may not be entitled to 
compensation for that prohibition.  However, if the harms done by climate change are indeed 
harms to the rights of current persons - as opposed to the mere “risky activities” that might 
legitimately be prohibited and compensated (Ibid, p.56) – they are automatically outlawed for 
anyone who believes in Lockean rights.  One cannot be fully compensated (i.e. made no worse off 
than one otherwise would have been (Ibid, p.57)) for the fact that their state is now under water, 
but they have been moved elsewhere as part of an adaptation programme. 
 
These issues are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter and in Chapter 5.  For now, 
the point is to recognise that a Nozickian idea of compensation in no way suggests that 
individuals should compensate others for harms which they have done nothing to cause.  As 
Nozick puts it, “…the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some 
citizens to aid others…” (Ibid, p.ix). 
389
 Critics might object that climate burdens would, in the first instance, fall upon states.  
Therefore they might argue, as Caney appears to, that ‘the state’ in some sense exists as an 
entity which is separable from the individuals that make it up.  This is, in and of itself, a 
conceptually difficult argument for supporters of rights-based moral systems which are founded 
upon a deeply-held conviction surrounding the sanctity of the individual.  However, given that 
human rights treaties are addressed at states, such a conceptual difficulty is not necessarily 
insurmountable.  The greater problem with the idea that the ‘polluter’ in the PPP be a state is not 
the fact that it is the individual members of that state who did nothing to pollute who must pay 
for the pollution, but the notion that they can be asked to do so even if doing so will lower their 
levels of rights recognition (possibly even taking them below an acceptable minimum). 
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responsible for meeting its associated climate burdens associated, regardless of 
how much they contributed to the pollution themselves.  Under the BPP, 
if the current inhabitants of industrialized countries have benefitted from a policy of fossil-fuel 
consumption and that policy contributes to a process that harms others, then they are not entitled to 
consume fossil fuels to the same degree.  Their standard of living is higher than it otherwise would 
have been, and they must pay a cost for that.
390
 
 
In addition to reducing their own emission levels, beneficiaries of pollution are 
also placed under a duty to meet the adaptation burdens that others face as a result 
of that pollution.
391
 
It is worth noting that, while developed in response to the problems with the PPP, 
the BPP is not an adjustment of that principle, but an abandonment of it.
392
  In 
moving the cost-bearing responsibility from the polluter to the beneficiary, the 
BPP moves away from assigning blame and demanding retribution to a system 
where those who are made better off are called upon to aid those made worse 
off.
393
  In doing so, it removes both the problem of what to do about the emissions 
of the dead and the injustice associated with worsening the lives of many of the 
global poor yet further by charging them for emissions which have done little to 
improve their current status.  Of course, one might argue that a similar injustice 
ensues when proponents of the BPP demand significant climate burdens from 
individuals who have done little to contribute to climate change purely on the 
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who pollutes will also benefit from that pollution. 
Page 243 of 305 
 
basis that they have benefitted from the harmful policies of others; policies they 
had no choice in and may have been vehemently opposed to.
394
   
For Nozickians, this injustice is enough to rule out the BPP as a viable option.  In 
insisting upon infringing on my rights just because I have benefitted from actions 
over which I had no control, the BPP is no better than the PPP and must be paid 
similarly little credence.   
For supporters of most Interest- or Choice-based theories, though, the apparent 
injustice of paying for harms I have done nothing to cause is not, in itself, of 
tremendous concern.  Provided we add the caveat that the beneficiaries of 
pollution have benefitted to such a level that they are able to meet the climate 
burdens associated with that pollution without causing damage to their own rights, 
the BPP is an acceptable way of delineating who should meet climate burdens. 
                                               
394
 Such a scenario raises interesting questions about what constitutes opposition and whether 
and how one’s level of opposition affects the level to which they might justly be held accountable 
for their forefathers’ pollution.  It is easy to voice disapproval at our ancestors’ pollution and 
argue that we would, given the choice, have foregone the benefits that came from it rather than 
allowing other current persons to be harmed.  However, in order to be taken seriously, it seems 
that those who benefitted from their ancestors’ pollution should at least do their best not to 
inflict similar harm upon others by, for example, avoiding using planes etc.  Moreover, it seems 
questionable whether individuals (particularly supporters of rights) who were genuinely opposed 
to the pollutant actions of previous generations would really find so unjust the idea that they 
ought to pay an affordable sum to protect others from the harm those actions caused.  This is not 
to say that such a position would be theoretically incoherent – the Nozickian would certainly be 
against the idea that they might be compelled to pay for the sins of others while recognising that 
they were indeed sins – but, in practice, one wonders whether genuine objectors to previous 
pollution would also be genuine objectors of the PPP (although Nozickians who were opposed to 
the previous generations’ pollution would certainly object to the PPP’s mandatory enforcement 
and would regard any subsequent adaptation payments as supererogatory). 
 
For more on these issues, and on the morality of benefitting from injustice more generally, see:  
Haydar, B. and Øverland, G., ‘The Normative Implications of Benefitting from Injustice’, Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, Volume 31, Issue 4 (2014), 349-362; Parr, T., ‘The Moral Taintedness of 
Benefitting from Injustice’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Volume 19, Issue 4 (2016), 985-
997; Butt, D., ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 37, Issue 1 
(2007), 129-152. 
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There remain, however, several significant problems with the BPP from even 
Interest or Choice Theory perspectives.   
Firstly, as will be discussed throughout this chapter, if future persons are not of 
moral concern, and if the rights of current persons can be safeguarded through 
adaptation alone, it is unclear why even the beneficiaries of pollution ought to be 
asked to make sacrifices in the form of mitigation burdens.   
Secondly, under the rights-friendly version of the BPP noted above it may be 
difficult to justify imposing climate burdens upon individuals who have benefitted 
only marginally from the pollution of others.  In such cases, climate burdens may 
have a significant negative effect upon their levels of rights-fulfilment.  There 
seems no reason, under a rights-based approach, why such a negative effect would 
have to be so significant as to reduce the beneficiaries of pollution to a level of 
rights fulfilment equal or below that of the victims of climate change before it 
became impermissible. 
Finally, as a more general version of the above objection, who is to pay for the 
harm associated with the many emissions from which no current persons have 
benefitted at all? 
It seems, then, that a particularly stringent version of the BPP could theoretically 
be adopted by those supporters of rights who are not Nozickians.  However, in 
light of the numerous and substantial difficulties noted above, such individuals 
might want to consider an alternative approach. 
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The Ability to Pay Principle 
A key problem with the BPP and PPP for supporters of rights is highlighted by 
Caney: 
Even if climate change were not anthropogenic, there remains a human right not to suffer from its 
effects as long as humans could do something to protect the victims from such effects and as long 
as the duties imposed were not excessively onerous.
395
 
 
Proponents of the PPP and the BPP might contend that, since climate change is 
anthropogenic, this fact is irrelevant.  For supporters of rights, however, Caney’s 
assertion is of great relevance.  It highlights the fact that, under rights-based 
moralities, the main concern is to stop the harm resulting from rights violations; 
the causes of that harm are of concern only to the extent that they demonstrate 
how to combat it.  The problem with climate change is not the activities which 
produce emissions; these are predominantly mundane, morally-neutral actions 
taken without malicious intent.  The problem is the damage climate change does 
to rights.  Thus, to the extent that it is possible for that damage to be avoided, it is 
not unreasonable to investigate the notion that the best solution to the problem 
might not be to attack its perceived cause.
396
 
Caney outlines the Ability to Pay Principle (APP) in the following way:   
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 Caney, S., ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, Op.Cit, p.136.  
Caney (correctly) follows these words with the sentence “[a]lthough such duties would be 
adaptation-related, not mitigation-related.”  I will explain why this must be the case in due 
course. 
396
 I do not mean, by the term ‘perceived’, to suggest that emissions do not cause climate change.  
Rather, as I will argue in more detail later, if we focus on the effects of climate change as being 
the harm it causes to the rights of current persons, one might argue that such effects have 
multiple causes.  An increased number of deaths from malaria are caused by increased 
temperatures which increase mosquito numbers, but these deaths might equally be attributed to 
the inability of the victims to afford vaccinations.  
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The most advantaged can perform the roles attributed to them, and, moreover, it is reasonable to 
ask them (rather than the needy) to bear this burden since they can bear such burdens more easily.  
It is true that they may not have caused the problem, but this does not mean that they have no duty 
to solve this problem.
397
   
 
Such an approach seems, in principle, to be well-aligned with most interpretations 
of Interest- and Choice-based approaches to rights.  Human beings have rights 
because they are human beings.  We
398
 owe duties to other human beings which 
are correlative to these rights.  Supporters of rights might coherently assert that 
these correlative duties include positive duties.
399
  The exact point at which one is 
excused from meeting one’s positive duties to others will vary across different 
interpretations of Interest and Choice Theory, but where Individual A is able to 
meet the rights of Individual B at little or no cost to his/her own rights s/he has an 
obligation to do so regardless of whether the rights of Individual B need 
protecting as a result of his/her (Individual A’s) actions.  The idea that we ought 
to take action to protect against violations of the rights of current persons before 
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 As noted elsewhere in this thesis, under rights-based moralities, it is states who are most 
obviously and directly the bearers of those duties correlative to the rights of individual citizens.  
In practice, however, such systems are required to (albeit less straightforwardly) demand that 
such duties place limits on the behaviour of individuals.  For example, even under the Nozickian 
minimal state, the duty upon governments to protect us from torture by others means that those 
governments must prohibit individual citizens from performing acts of torture on one another, 
effectively meaning that those individual citizens are themselves placed under a duty not to 
torture which is correlative to the rights of their potential victims.  Moreover, even a Nozickian 
would allow that governments are placed under some positive duties to ensure that those who 
torture are arrested, tried and punished.  Since systems of justice like this are paid for through 
taxation, it seems even these positive duties ultimately fall upon individuals. 
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 This is not to say that supporters of Interest or Choice theory must endorse positive duties in 
order to remain coherent.  It seems possible that one could endorse such a theory without the 
need to simultaneously endorse positive duties.  However, the purpose of this chapter is to try to 
discover whether it is possible to derive a moral system which is both legitimately rights-based 
and effective in combatting climate change.  With this in mind, it is enough to say that supporters 
of both and Interest and Choice theory might coherently endorse rights-based moralities which 
place individuals under positive duties to help others and that such an interpretation of these 
theories of rights will offer an improved chance of enabling adaptation burdens to be met. 
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those violations occur (flood defences, for example, need to be built before the 
floods they protect against arrive) also does not seem alien to Interest- and 
Choice-based approaches to rights.  The funding of police forces and hospitals are 
justified, in large part, by the future violations of rights they will guard against.  
This need for supporters of rights to take action in advance of potential violations 
is demonstrated by the recent focus of human rights law on the “Ruggie 
Principles”, developed by UN Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 
which outline that protecting against violations of human rights should be placed 
on a par with respecting human rights and remedying their violation.
400
 
The APP would mean that individuals are placed under a duty to meet adaptation 
burdens simply because they can.  What constitutes an ability to pay (without 
causing significant damage to the rights of those meeting such burdens) would 
need to be closely examined.  However, given the amount of wealth in the world 
and the number of people who live lives of standards far beyond the bare 
minimum required by rights, it does not seem that even the upper figure needed to 
pay for adequate adaptation would be prohibitive.  The APP, then, seems to 
provide an effective, rights-friendly way of ensuring that current persons are 
protected from the ills of climate change through adaptation. 
The APP, though, does have some downsides when taken in exclusivity. 
In terms of justice, it seems problematic to assert that the level to which an 
individual contributes to climate change should have no bearing upon how much 
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that individual pays towards guarding against the effects of their emissions.  To a 
certain extent this is reasonable; we may wish to contend that the costs associated 
with subsistence emissions not be met by those members of the global poor who 
create them and that these, along with the emissions of past persons, be met by 
current individuals who can reasonably afford such burdens.  However, it seems 
difficult to justify a situation in which A, who has become very wealthy from a 
better than carbon-neutral venture producing wind farms, is required to pay more 
towards the costs of adaptation than B, who has become moderately wealthy by 
building a carbon-heavy coal-fired power station. 
Were this purely a matter of justice, such an anomaly might be overlooked as 
falling outside the purview of a rights-based approach.  The problem, however, is 
that if the cost of pollution is not met by the polluter even when that polluter 
benefits greatly from said pollution, the APP provides little incentive not to 
pollute.  Therefore, when taken in isolation, the APP would not seem to be 
maximally effective in terms of reducing the harms of climate change.  Indeed, in 
the longer term, it might actually serve to increase emission levels by lowering 
their costs when compared to the BPP or PPP. 
Such problems might be somewhat assuaged through the adoption of a rights-
friendly combination of the APP and the PPP. 
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Internalising the Externality 
The key problem with the APP, when taken in isolation, is that it would in a 
certain sense serve to re-enforce and even legitimise one of the key existing 
problems with climate change.   
As Tol observes, climate change currently represents “the mother of all 
externalities.”401  An externality is a term used by economists to describe the 
benefits or costs of a particular activity which fall upon third parties rather than 
those individuals who conducted the activity.  The relationship between climate 
change and externalities is summarised by Broome: 
…because of climate change, people rarely pay the full cost of what they do.  Almost all economic 
activities and almost all consumer activities cause greenhouse gas to be emitted.  This gas adds a 
little bit to global warming, so it does harm around the world.  The harm it does is among the costs 
of the activity, but the person who causes the gas to be emitted does not pay this cost.  It is borne 
by all the people who suffer the harm. 
In economists’ terminology, it is an ‘external cost’ of the activity.  Economists contrast it with the 
activity’s ‘internal costs,’ which are the ones that are paid by the person whose activity it is.  The 
emission of greenhouse gas is known as an ‘externality’ because it has external costs.  
Externalities always waste resources.  People emit greenhouse gas even when the benefit they get 
from doing so is less than the cost of doing so, because they do not pay all the cost.
402 
 
The adoption of the APP would represent an improvement upon this situation.  It 
would mean that the external cost of emissions would no longer arrive solely in 
the form of a harm borne by those who suffer climate change’s ill effects.  Instead, 
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at least some of these external costs would be financial in nature – arriving in the 
form of adaptation burdens – and would be met by large numbers of people who 
could afford to meet them without causing themselves significant harm. 
The problem is, under the APP, there would remain no incentive for people to 
reduce their emissions.  Indeed, its adoption may serve to increase emissions 
levels.  If we do not have to pay the full cost of our emissions and we know that, 
due to adaptation burdens being met by others, no harm will come to current 
persons as a result of those emissions, we are left with little reason not to pollute.   
Such a problem can be at least partially met through Interest- and Choice-based 
approaches to rights. 
The APP emerges from the idea that we have duties to protect the rights of others 
regardless of whether we placed those rights in jeopardy ourselves.  This, though, 
is not the only type of duty we have under Interest- and Choice-based approaches.  
It is commonly recognised that we have a duty not to cause harm to the rights of 
others if we are reasonably able to avoid doing so.  The right to health of others 
might place me under a duty to pay taxes to help cover the treatment of diseases I 
have done nothing to cause, but it also places me under a duty not to deliberately 
infect others with disease for my own pleasure.  Indeed, this latter duty might be 
viewed as more primary. 
With regard to climate change, then, it would not seem illegitimate under an 
Interest- or Choice-based system to demand that the polluter pays an additional 
tax upon his/her emissions to ensure that the cost of adapting to those emissions is 
met in order that it can legitimately be claimed that such emissions are no longer 
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harmful to rights.
403
  This is known as a Pigovian tax and is designed to internalise 
the external costs of the activity so that the full cost of the action is paid by the 
actor and not unjustly levied on some other individual.
404
 
There will, of course, be situations where this is not appropriate.  As earlier noted, 
charging polluters the full cost of their actions when those actions relate to 
subsistence activity seems unduly harsh and would actually serve to further 
damage the rights of the global poor in the present.  Similarly, there is no obvious 
reason why a rights-based morality should insist that current polluters must also 
pay the adaptation burdens associated with past emissions which continue to 
affect the climate, particularly when those emissions were produced by the now 
dead.  Under such circumstances, the APP would seem an effective way of 
delineating who should meet these leftover adaptation burdens. 
 
Conclusions on Adaptation and Rights-based Moralities 
It seems that a non-Nozickian rights-based approach to the issue of which 
individuals ought to meet adaptation burdens would be best realised from a fusion 
between the APP and the PPP.  Perhaps the fundamental principle of rights-based 
moralities is that we ought not cause avoidable harm to the rights of others.  Due 
to their focus upon current persons, Interest- and Choice-based theories are, to a 
certain extent, able to simply circumvent the effects of emission-producing actions 
not by reducing emission levels, but by eliminating the harm those emissions 
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cause to current persons.  In this way, by including the cost of adapting to the 
effects of climate change in the price of emissions, the PPP means that those 
emissions cease to be harmful to the rights of other current persons even in the 
future.  When it comes to the emissions of the very poor and the deceased, the 
secondary duty of supporters of rights to protect the rights of others regardless of 
who caused the threat comes into play.  The APP explains that wealthier 
individuals should be charged with meeting these remaining costs.
405
  Such an 
approach, however, is not open to Nozickians.  As noted in Chapter 2, Nozick 
plainly rules out the idea of taxing individuals for the purpose of protecting the 
rights of others.  He states that 
…there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.  There are 
only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.  Using one of 
these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others.  Nothing more.  What happens 
is that something is done to him for the sake of others.  Talk of an overall social good covers this 
up.  (Intentionally?)  To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of 
the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.  He does not get some 
overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him – least of all a 
state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore 
scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.
406
 
 
For Nozick, taxation of the kind required to meet adaptation burdens would be 
akin to forced labour and would thus plainly represent a violation of the rights of 
current persons in the present.  Under a Nozickian rights-based morality, there is 
no legitimate way of enforcing the kind of adaptation regime necessary to 
                                               
405
 Such a policy has significant implications for an Interest-/Choice-based approach.  These will 
be discussed in great detail in the next section. 
406
 Ibid, p.32-33 
Page 253 of 305 
 
safeguard the rights of current people from climate-related harm.  As the next 
section will demonstrate, however, the more favourable attitude of Interest- and 
Choice-based approaches to adaptation does not render such theories ideal 
solutions to climate change, just as Nozickians’ prohibition upon adaptation 
burdens does not render their approach implausible. 
 
Mitigation and Rights:  Are They Mutually Exclusive? 
For many people, the question of how we ought to combat climate change is 
primarily concerned not with how we might adapt to the effects of our emissions, 
but rather with how we might reduce the number of those emissions.  If climate 
change is a problem, they would argue, we should surely aim to tackle that 
problem at its cause.   For supporters of rights-based moralities, though, the 
question of whether we should mitigate against climate change and why is not so 
straightforward and the answer will vary significantly according which rights-
based morality one follows. 
The costs of mitigation are more difficult to pin down than those associated with 
adaptation.   Some mitigation techniques will have a potentially knowable 
financial burden.  For example, researching, developing and implementing green 
energy in place of traditional fossil fuels will incur a cost which, at least in the 
short-term, will be greater than maintaining existing energy regimes.  Other areas 
of mitigation unavoidably impose burdens upon current persons which have costs 
that go beyond the financial realm.  While cars might possibly be powered by 
green energy, this option is not currently compatible with modern aviation and 
shipping.  In this and many other areas, mitigating against climate change will 
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mean making significant changes to our ways of life which will reduce the 
number of options which are open to us, often to a point which amounts to a 
significant restriction upon our ability to fully enjoy our rights.
407
 
Given these significant costs, supporters of any moral system must provide good 
reasons for the imposition of mitigation burdens upon current persons.  For 
supporters of rights-based moralities this issue is particularly complex. 
 
Interest Theory, Choice Theory and Mitigation 
As this chapter has already demonstrated, when it comes to adaptation burdens, 
supporters of Interest and Choice Theory are able to justify combatting the ill-
effects of climate change through reference to the well-being of current persons.  
Since current persons will now and in the future see their rights harmed by climate 
change, those who can afford to pay are placed under a duty to meet the costs of 
making those adaptations which are necessary to prevent such harm from 
occurring before it occurs and to remedy any harm which is already occurring.  
Moreover, because the emissions we produce today will, in future, come to 
contribute to climate-related harm to the rights of current persons, it is 
reasonable
408
 under an Interest- or Choice-based approach to charge polluters for 
the cost of making the adaptions necessary to prevent any harm to rights from 
occurring. 
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This successful approach to adaptation, though, does nothing, in and of itself, to 
reduce the amount of emissions being released.
409
  Taken in isolation, it leaves us 
in a situation where emission levels continue to rise, causing significant damage 
to non-human species and pushing us closer to the tipping points which will cause 
irreparable harm to future persons.  Worse than this, following an Interest- or 
Choice-based approach might actually lead to an increase in the speed at which 
emission levels rise.  There are two reasons for this: 
Firstly, Interest- and Choice-based approaches are market solutions.  They 
prescribe that our pollutant actions are permissible provided we: a) pay the full 
costs of those actions (i.e. we internalise the externality) and, b) agree to meet the 
costs of those pollutant actions of others which they cannot be reasonably 
expected to meet themselves (either by reason of their poverty or death).  The 
problem with such an attitude is that it legitimises the production of emissions.  
Our emissions are not inherently wrong, but, rather, are deemed so because of the 
harm they cause.  Under Interest/Choice Theory, that harm must be harm to the 
rights of current persons.  Therefore, if we are able to avoid said harm through 
adaptation, there ceases to be any problem with those emissions.  And if the 
                                               
409
 This is not to say that increasing the cost of emissions to cover the costs of adaptation will not 
ultimately cause some sort of reduction in emission levels.  It could be that this increased cost 
changes the preference structure of consumers by, for example, encouraging people to take less 
environmentally harmful (and, thus, cheaper) trains instead of internal flights.  There is, however, 
no guarantee that this increased cost would be enough to encourage people to significantly 
reduce their emissions – indeed, as this section goes on to explain, it may have the opposite 
effect.  Moreover, global financial markets are highly complicated and it might be that market 
forces mean that, even with the full costs of the resultant emissions included within the price, 
highly pollutant actions remain at least comparatively cheaper than environmentally friendly 
alternatives.  If the cost of a (less convenient) train option was currently twenty per cent less 
than an internal flight over the same journey, any increase in the cost of that flight might be 
mirrored by the train provider even if they were not similarly burdened with an adaptation levy.  
There is good reason to suspect that private companies set their prices based on what they 
believe they can get people to pay, rather than some sort of rigorous structure of making a 
certain percentage profit.  If the price of environmentally harmful actions increases, there is 
every chance that the price of their environmentally friendly alternatives will also do so. 
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morality we follow tells us that our pollutant actions are acceptable, any guilt we 
might have felt over them is removed.  As a result, supporters of Interest/Choice 
Theory may no longer see any need to take even the smallest mitigating action 
against climate change. 
This point can be better demonstrated through the work of Gneezy and Rustichini, 
who conducted an experiment in which they demonstrated that mothers at a 
kindergarten were more likely to be late picking up their children after a fine for 
lateness was introduced than before said fine existed.
410
  In relation to such an 
outcome, they state that “[w]hat this field study teaches us, we believe, is that the 
introduction of the fine changes the perception of people regarding the 
environment in which they operate.”411  They summarise their analysis of their 
findings as follows: 
Parents may have interpreted the action of the teachers in the first period as a generous, nonmarket 
activity. They may have thought: ‘The contract with the day-care center only covers the period 
until four in the afternoon. After that time, the teacher is just a nice and generous person. I should 
not take advantage of her patience.’ The introduction of the fine changes the perception into the 
following: ‘The teacher is taking care of the child in much the same way as she did earlier in the 
day. In fact this activity has a price (which is called a “fine”). Therefore, I can buy this service as 
much as needed.’ Parents feel justified in their behavior by a social norm that states, 
approximately: ‘When help is offered for no compensation in a moment of need, accept it with 
restraint. When a service is offered for a price, buy as much as you find convenient.’ 412 
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It is not difficult to see the relevance of Gneezy’s and Rustichini’s work to an 
Interest/Choice Theory-friendly approach to adaptation.  Currently, most polluters 
feel some guilt about their pollution and attempt to curb it (with varying levels of 
success and/or volition).  However, if I am paying the full price of my pollutant 
activity, this guilt is removed.  Thus, if I enjoy driving around without purpose, 
using petrol I could very easily have saved, why should I not do so if the cost of 
my pollution is built-in to the price of the petrol? 
The problem is the idea that including adaptation burdens in the price of emission-
producing activity amounts to paying the full cost of that activity is a fallacy.   
Firstly, the increased levels of climate change that emerge as a result of our new, 
guilt-free emissions mean that runaway climate change will arrive sooner and may 
harm greater numbers of future persons than it otherwise would have.  This is a 
cost.  If it is a cost which is deemed irrelevant by a moral system, we must 
question the validity of that moral system. 
Secondly, even from a rights-based perspective, there seems to be something 
fundamentally wrong in commodifying the suffering of others.  Can it really be 
the case that any moral system can think it ethically acceptable to knowingly and 
avoidably cause major and unwanted disruption to the lives of other current 
persons (by, say, forcing them to move from their now-submerged small island 
state) as long as we are willing to meet the costs associated with that disruption?  
While it is true that rights-based moralities might demand that people be 
compensated for past violations they have suffered, the idea that one might 
knowingly purchase this suffering in advance for the sake of convenience seems 
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obscene.
413
  Regardless of whether or not adaptation burdens are met, the climate 
change we cause in thirty years through today’s emissions will violate the rights 
of current persons.  If my house (and indeed my entire nation) is permanently 
submerged under water as a result of the emissions of others, then the fact that I 
am compensated for my loss does little to change the fact that my right is violated.  
I may have been very attached to my home and even more so to my entire country 
and my way of life, which is now irrevocably changed.  It seems exceptionally 
callous to say that it is okay for you to knowingly violate my fundamental rights 
provided you are willing to pay the relevant amount of compensation.   
Despite this, it is not clear that this callousness is enough to automatically rule out 
the suggested approach to adaptation according to Interest or Choice Theorists.  
As Chapter 5 made clear, asking people to meet climate burdens – especially 
mitigation burdens – will often amount to a violation of their rights.  This 
violation must automatically be considered impermissible if demanded in the 
name of non-right-holding future persons.  It does not follow, however, that such 
violations should automatically be considered permissible if made in the name of 
other current persons.  Certainly the relatively few people whose homes (states?) 
are submerged within our lifetime will have their rights violated, but if such 
violations can be compensated, it is not immediately clear that millions (perhaps 
billions) more people should have their rights restricted and/or violated in the 
present (through, for instance, severe restrictions on air travel) in order to protect 
                                               
413
 Critics might object that it is not the suffering which is purchased but the ability of others to 
avoid it, but this does little to address the problem.  In creating a situation in which other current 
persons are forced to take dramatic evasive action in order to avoid death, we knowingly remove 
them of precisely the kind of choices that choice-based theories of rights are designed to protect.  
It seems reasonable to similarly assert that the victims of climate change have a fundamental 
interest in not letting others take actions which will fundamentally impact upon their life choices. 
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against future violations.  This amounts to a clash of rights.  And in such a clash, 
it is not obvious that the future rights of a lesser number of current people should 
prevail, particularly when such rights are a) more compensable, and b) might 
occur anyway as a result of pre-existing emissions.
414
 
There is one further, unrelated reason for thinking that an Interest-/Choice-based 
approach to adaptation might actually serve to increase emission levels.  It is 
important to remember that those who adopt a rights-based approach to morality 
do so in all walks of life, not just in relation to climate change.  This means that 
they would also advocate the protection of rights from non-climate related harms.  
There is an undeniable link between poverty and sub-standard levels of rights-
fulfilment.
415
  Whether through a direct attack on the former or an unavoidable 
commitment to the latter, Interest-/Choice-based theories of rights, if rigidly 
adhered to on a global scale, would lead to a significant increase in the minimum 
living standards of the world’s poorest people. 
The relationship between the level of emissions a country produces and its level of 
development complex.  According to The Center for Global Development, 63% of 
current emissions are produced by developing countries, as opposed to 37% in the 
                                               
414
 Due to the length of time our emissions remain in the atmosphere, severely lessening 
emissions in the present will only lessen the climate-related harms faced by current persons in 
thirty years.  Such harms will not be removed entirely and, for some victims, our new lower level 
of emissions will make no difference at all – it does not matter whether my country is submerged 
under 10 or 100 feet of water.  In any case, the effects of climate change are unlikely to be so 
gradualist.  If reaching, say, 3°C above pre-industrial mean surface temperature is enough to 
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developed world.
416
  Such statistics would, at first glance, appear to refute the 
notion that more development leads to more pollution, but on closer inspection 
there are two reasons for thinking that these figures support my argument.   
Firstly, the areas counted as ‘developing’ include India, China, Africa and South 
America as well as significant parts of the rest of Asia.  Such countries may 
produce 63% of global emissions, but the people producing those emissions 
number 81% of the global population.
417
  In terms of per-head emissions, then, 
poorer people are far less environmentally harmful than their wealthier 
counterparts. 
Secondly, the term ‘developing’ means different things for different countries at 
different times and might be used to describe countries with significant variance 
in levels of economic prosperity and rights- realisation.  During the period from 
the start of the industrial revolution in 1850 up until 2011 the same developing 
countries now responsible for 63% of global emissions were responsible for just a 
third of this figure.
418
  While comparative rises in population in developing 
countries are partly responsible for this increase, it is also demonstrative of the 
fact that the level of development in so-called developing countries has increased 
significantly in recent years and that such development goes hand-in-hand with 
increased emission levels.  As Busch notes,  
[h]istorically, growing wealth has been closely tied to increasing industry, energy usage, and 
carbon emissions….The industry, energy, and wealth that were long the preserve of a handful of 
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developed countries are finally expanding rapidly in the developing world, and that’s a very good 
thing. But this welcome economic growth has a dangerous side effect—carbon emissions.419 
 
By tackling poverty and thereby increasing development, Interest-/Choice-based 
moral systems, if implemented globally, would increase the level of economic 
empowerment of  billions and would simultaneously increase the number of 
emissions each was able to produce. 
Overall, Interest- and Choice-based theories not only fail to provide a reason to 
mitigate climate change, but might actually encourage an increase in emissions by 
legitimising pollution (provided we are willing to meet adaptation costs) and 
increasing the pollutant capacity of people in the developing world.  Such results 
are not anomalies or idiosyncrasies.  Theories of rights aiming to better protect the 
interests or choices of right-holders must give the welfare of those right-holders 
absolute priority over non-rights-based concerns, such as the welfare of future 
persons.  By these standards (and not only by these standards), such theories can 
be judged to offer an improvement upon the status quo.  They not only provide 
strong reasons as to why we ought to adapt to climate change, but also provide a 
coherent framework by which we might judge which individuals should meet 
such costs and when.  They provide an appealing solution to the short-term 
problems of climate change.  Unfortunately, this solution comes at the cost of 
increasing the likelihood of catastrophic and irreversible climate change. 
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Nozick and Mitigation 
Until this point many readers may have questioned why this thesis has placed the 
same level of focus upon Nozick’s controversial theory of rights as it has on more 
widely accepted theories based upon Interest or Choice.  There are two reasons for 
this.   
Firstly, as highlighted in Chapter 2, the purpose of this thesis is to explore whether 
rights-based moralities in general are able to provide adequate responses to 
climate change in light of the inability of future persons to possess rights under 
any rights-based system.  Any conclusions drawn by the thesis will therefore only 
be adequate if the widest possible range of rights-based moral systems are 
considered, and that includes a libertarian perspective.  In order to give more 
focus to the libertarian perspective, this thesis has opted to concentrate on the 
work of Nozick, who puts forth a theory which is both undeniably rights-based 
and undeniably different from other rights-based systems. 
The second reason for a focus upon Nozick’s work is that the theory of rights he 
puts forward is the only such theory which is potentially capable of preventing 
catastrophic climate change through an insistence upon mitigation.  This section 
will explain why this might be the case. 
Needless to say, nowhere in Anarchy, State, and Utopia does Nozick address the 
issue of climate change.  As a result, the Nozickian attitude to the problem must 
be derived from the general principles he sets out. 
As should be clear by now, supporters of rights are unable to assign rights to 
future persons and must therefore focus upon current persons as the key objects of 
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their moral concern.  With this in mind, a preliminary question arising in relation 
to Nozick’s theory is whether the amount of time that occurs between cause and 
effect during violations of rights should have any bearing on our moral decision 
making.   
If the action I take today causes harm to another currently existing individual, is 
the fact that said harm will not occur for another thirty years of any moral 
significance?  There is nothing within Nozick’s work to suggest that it should be.  
In fact, Nozickians are firmer on such a point than Interest/Choice theorists.  In 
terms of theory, there is no reason that supporters of any rights-based morality 
would view the time between cause and effect to be of ethical significance.  In 
practice, however, as this chapter has demonstrated, this gap in time has a 
profound effect on the approaches of Interest- /Choice-based theories as it affords 
current persons the opportunity to take action to safeguard the potential victims of 
their emissions from harm through programmes of adaptation.  Those emissions 
therefore cease to amount to violations of current persons’ rights and thus become 
permissible.  As already noted, adaptation is not an option for Nozickians, so they 
must accept that if it can be shown that pollutant actions amount to a violation of 
rights of current persons, the time at which the violation occurs is irrelevant. 
The second question Nozickians must ask themselves is whether, given the 
collective nature of climate change, my producing emissions as an individual 
amounts to me violating the rights of other (current) individuals?  And, if so, 
which of my emissions might be permissibly prohibited? 
Perhaps the most important substantive ethical idea Nozick puts forward in 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia is what he labels “the libertarian constraint”, an idea 
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which “prohibits aggression against another”.420  As Hunt explains, this 
effectively means that “…force can only be justified as an appropriate response to 
unprovoked force, or as such a response to some other act that is wrongful in the 
same sort of way that force is wrong, such as fraud.”421  For Nozick, the 
libertarian constraint is a constraint on aggression against each other
422
 and one of 
the key justifications of the minimal state is to protect citizens against the undue 
use of force by others.
423
  If we accept that the time between cause and effect is 
not of moral significance provided the effect is still felt by current persons, the 
question becomes whether our emission-producing actions constitute undue force? 
Not all of our emission-producing actions can be legitimately banned under any 
moral system.  Subsistence emissions cannot be outlawed by any theory which 
purports to be concerned with human wellbeing.  This fact is not of great 
significance since current persons can be restricted to a subsistence level (and, 
indeed, something far above it) without their emissions reaching the cumulative 
levels necessary to cause climate-related harm.
424
  It does, however, highlight that 
producing emissions is not something which can be as straightforwardly labelled 
an act of aggression as other actions (e.g. physical violence) which Nozick may 
have had in mind while penning his theory.  This leads to significant potential 
difficulties with a Nozickian demand for mitigation. 
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Page 265 of 305 
 
Nozickians - unlike Interest/Choice theorists – cannot subvert any future harm 
their emissions do to current persons by implementing adaptation techniques to 
prevent such harm before it occurs.  For Nozickians, if my emission-producing 
action amounts to a violation of the rights of others, I am placed under a duty not 
to take it.  The problem is that, due to the stringently individualist nature of 
Nozick’s theory, it is not immediately clear that its proponents can claim that any 
of my emission-producing actions amount to a future violation of the rights of 
current persons. 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, Waldron explains that Nozickians are not typically 
concerned with the actions of others.  If you violate the rights of others then you 
fail to follow the rules of Nozickian morality and you have done something 
wrong.  Provided I have done nothing to violate rights, I have fulfilled my moral 
duty and am under no obligation (aside, perhaps, from funding the protective 
government of the minimal state) to prevent you from violating the rights of 
others, even if I am able to do so at little or no cost to myself.
425
  While non-
Nozickians might be uncomfortable with such a conclusion, under ordinary 
circumstances such reasoning does not seem incoherent from a Nozickian 
perspective.  Unfortunately, the circumstances surrounding climate change are far 
from ordinary. 
My normal, everyday emission-producing actions
426
 harm nobody, in and of 
themselves.  As Sinnot-Armstrong puts it, “…global warming will not occur 
unless lots of other people also expel greenhouse gases.  So my individual act is 
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neither necessary nor sufficient for global warming.”427  As a result, the rampant 
individualism demanded by Nozick’s theory leads to questions over what effect 
the communal, cumulative nature of climate change has on our ability to claim 
that my emission-producing actions harm others.   
If they are to justify a demand for mitigation, Nozickians must provide 
satisfactory responses to two key questions: 
1. If I am not responsible for the rights-violating actions of others, can I be held 
accountable for my own rights-violating actions given that they are only rights-
violating when taken in tandem with the similar acts of others? 
2. Can I be prohibited from taking certain actions even though those actions are not, 
in and of themselves, harmful and when taken in the correct quantities will not 
violate rights? 
 
The answers to these issues centre upon how we interpret Nozick’s 
implementation of the Lockean proviso. 
Locke essentially argues that individuals acquire property rights by taking an 
unowned object which was available in nature and mixing their labour with it.
428
  
The extent to which such activity is permissible is limited by the proviso that there 
be ‘enough and as good left in common for others’.429  Locke explains his 
reasoning by noting that: 
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[no man, through] …his appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it [caused] any 
prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet 
unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his 
enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take 
nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of an-other man, though he took 
a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst; and the case 
of land and water where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
430
 
 
In other words, Locke feels that it cannot be wrong to claim property rights over 
something you have mixed your labour with provided that, after you have done 
so, there remains enough unowned property that everybody else can do the same 
if they wish.  This is because to do so would be to exercise your natural rights 
without causing harm to others.  Nozick determines that this proviso “is meant to 
ensure that the situation of others is not worsened.”431  He goes on to note that 
there are two ways in which one may be made worse off by another’s 
appropriation:  “first, by losing the opportunity to improve his situation by a 
particular appropriation or any one; and second, by no longer being able to use 
freely (without appropriation) what he previously could.”432  Nozick asserts that 
only the first, weaker, proviso need apply to “any adequate theory of justice in 
acquisition”.433 
In order to illustrate how the Lockean proviso operates in practice, Nozick gives 
the example of the only waterhole in a desert.  He states that the Lockean proviso 
prevents one from appropriating this waterhole and charging whatever one will for 
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water.  This remains the case regardless of when one acquired the waterhole (i.e. 
possibly before it became the only waterhole in said desert) or what caused the 
other waterholes to dry up.
434
  Importantly, he notes that “the theory does not say 
that owners do have these rights, but that the rights are overridden to avoid some 
catastrophe.”435   
Taking the waterhole scenario in mind, Ryan concludes that “Nozick seems to 
grant, in this case, that the manner in which a holding is acquired is not definitive 
in determining whether that holding may be privately owned.  Certain 
considerations (for Nozick, those contained in the Lockean Proviso) simply 
exclude certain types of holdings from private ownership.”436 
When it comes to issues surrounding Nozick and mitigation, then, we need to 
examine the ways in which clean air is and is not like the only waterhole in the 
desert.  Is there a duty not to ‘worsen the situation of others’ by not leaving 
‘enough and as good’ emission-free air to prevent them from being harmed by 
climate change? 
Certainly, the period of time between cause and effect does not seem to be of 
great concern.  The harm I caused by owning the only waterhole in the desert need 
not have occurred at the time at which I acquired the waterhole.  Similarly, the 
damage from my emissions need not harm others at the moment I produce them.  
If my emissions harm my contemporaries, it is not important when that harm 
occurs. 
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What seems more difficult is establishing that I fail to leave ‘enough and as good’ 
emission-free air through my pollutant acts.  Climate change is caused by the 
collective pollution of a great many current persons.  Thus, it is hard to claim that 
the particular amount of emission-free air I use up through my non-essential 
activities is the last of the emission-free air.   
But can this really matter?  If there were only two waterholes in the desert and 
two different people acquired them simultaneously, would it really be the case that 
neither person was under a duty not to keep all of the water for themselves simply 
because the other also could (but did not) opt to share the water from their own 
well?  Surely we are all placed under an equal duty to ensure that ‘enough and as 
good’ of a particular resource remains for others not to be made worse off in the 
relevant manner.
437
  Therefore, the Nozickian might claim that we each have a 
legitimate quota of emissions (the amount below which, if we all produced them, 
climate change would occur) and that to exceed said quota would be to violate the 
Lockean proviso and thus be impermissible.   
 
Objections to a Nozickian solution to climate change 
The individualist objection 
In objection to the above argument that the Lockean proviso affords Nozickians a 
way of preventing catastrophic climate change, critics might argue that the fact 
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that it cannot be shown that my specific emissions failed to leave enough and as 
good for others means that I cannot be prevented from producing them under the 
Lockean proviso.  There is no evidence that I, personally, used up the last of the 
resource of clean air so that there was not enough left for others to be protected 
from climate-related harm.  Indeed, it is categorically the case that I did not do so; 
this resource is simultaneously used up by me and billions of others.  If this is of 
relevance then the Lockean proviso cannot be implemented and Nozick’s theory 
of rights does nothing to demand either adaptation or mitigation.  There are, 
however, two good reasons for thinking this is not the case. 
The concept of ‘joint enterprise’ is well-recognised.  It states that if the 
participation of more than one person is needed for a harmful act to occur, each of 
the participants may be held equally responsible for the outcome.  Cassese 
explains the idea as follows: 
…in most national legal systems… [and] in international criminal law all participants in a common 
criminal action are equally responsible if they (i) participate in the action, whatever their position 
and the extent of their contribution, and in addition (ii) intend to engage in the common criminal 
action.
438
 
While the production of emissions is not currently a criminal offence, it is not 
difficult to see the relevance of joint enterprise when it comes to climate change.  
If it is immoral to harm the rights of others through our actions, then, if we look at 
the number of emissions necessary to cause climate change as one giant and 
extremely harmful ‘super-action’, the participation of individuals in said ‘super-
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action’ is immoral regardless of the fact that it could not have occurred without 
the participation of many other people.   
As for the second condition put forward Cassese, only through an extraordinarily 
generous application of the principle of double effect could we assert that 
individual polluters do not intend to cause harm through the actions they choose 
to take in full knowledge of the harm that will result from said actions.  Indeed, 
the principle of joint enterprise specifically states that all participating in the joint 
enterprise may be held responsible for any crimes committed as part of that 
enterprise providing those crimes were foreseeable and the parties to the joint 
enterprise willingly took the risk that they would occur.
439
  Following the same 
logic with regard to moral rights, if individuals willingly pollute knowing that 
their pollution is likely to join with that of others to cause future harm to the rights 
of current people, their actions may be deemed immoral under the principle of 
joint enterprise. 
There is nothing about the manner in which Nozick focuses upon individuals 
which prevents him from applying the principle of joint enterprise.  This fact is 
alluded to in the very first sentence of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which reads:  
“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them 
(without violating their rights).”440  The very fact that Nozick mentions the 
possibility of rights being violated by a group qua group (as opposed to a number 
of separate individuals) – something he only does with regard to potential 
violators of rights, not their potential victims – is suggestive of an implicit 
assumption in favour of joint enterprise when it comes to rights violations. 
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This implicit assumption is further underlined by Nozick’s focus upon the state as 
the primary potential violator of rights.  While one might coherently follow a 
Libertarian/Nozickian view of rights which maintains that individuals can violate 
the rights of other individuals (unlike under human rights law), it is certainly the 
case that states are also able to violate human rights.  This is indicative of the kind 
of thinking that lies behind the principle of joint enterprise.  To claim a ‘state’ is 
responsible for an action is, in reality, to claim that a large group of individuals 
are jointly (though not necessarily equally) responsible for that action.  It is hard 
to imagine one person committing a state-sponsored genocide.  Ordinarily, 
genocide involves a great many people: some to do the killing, some to give the 
order, some to organise the plan, some to transport the victims to their death, etc.  
Even if we treated each death within the genocide as a separate, state-sponsored 
killing, each would be a killing for which multiple individuals (under the guise of 
‘the state’) were jointly responsible.  In focusing upon what states can and cannot 
do in relation to the rights of their citizens, then, Nozick implicitly accepts the 
principle of joint enterprise. 
Given that Nozick’s minimal state emerges naturally from the state of nature 
without violating individuals’ natural rights, it stands to reason that, if states are 
able to jointly violate rights, so must individuals be able to do so.  Nor can such a 
claim be overcome through an insistence that only states can violate rights, 
because individuals can doubtlessly act in conjunction with others to commit the 
type of actions which it is the purpose of states to protect other individuals from.  
If multiple individuals all choose to take certain actions in full knowledge that 
others will do the same, then if said actions in total violate the Lockean proviso it 
follows that each individual has contributed to that violation. 
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Secondly, it must be remembered that Nozick’s reason for the inclusion of the 
proviso is the avoidance of ‘catastrophe’ (which, for him, under the right 
circumstances, might be constituted by the death of a single current person).  
Indeed, Paul notes that Nozick insists on the proviso solely for this reason.  He 
argues that, rather than naturally emerging from Nozick’s theory, Nozick’s 
Lockean proviso represents an “exception to his view of property rights which is 
introduced for no reason other than the fact that it saves the theory from 
unpalatable implications that it seems to have.”441  And if Nozick introduces the 
proviso purely in order to avoid his theory leading to catastrophe, why would he 
not allow such an exception to stretch to cover jointly-taken actions, the 
consequences of which will severely damage the rights of vast numbers of current 
persons? 
 
The problem of determining ‘my share’ 
As earlier noted, the application of the Lockean proviso in the context of climate 
change would involve the development of a quota of emissions each human being 
would be allowed to safely produce without harming the rights of other current 
persons once those emissions began to affect the climate.  It is worth noting that, 
in practice, establishing exactly what such a quota might amount to (i.e. deciding 
what constitutes ‘my share’ of emissions) would be no easy task.   
Firstly, we would need to determine the total cumulative amount of emissions that 
might be produced by mankind in any one year without causing future harm to 
current persons.  This would doubtlessly be a highly complex equation, the 
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outcome of which highly-qualified, right-thinking people would likely disagree 
over.  It would be made more complicated by the issue of whether and how we 
factored in the ongoing effects of the emissions of past persons. 
Secondly, even if this cumulative total could be arrived at, difficult questions 
would remain with regard to how it ought to be divided.  Should it be split evenly 
across every person on Earth (and thus get progressively smaller in parallel with 
population growth)?  Or should those individuals in developed countries whose 
lives (and levels of rights realisation) would be dramatically negatively affected 
by the imposition of such a quota be allowed a larger share of the safe emissions 
total than people living in remote tribal communities who would never reach their 
fair share anyway?  Or should we look at things the other way around and 
consider that people with higher past emissions be awarded lower permissible 
levels of emissions in the present in order to guard against the potential future 
harm they have already contributed to? 
Whilst such questions are not easily answered, I am not convinced that they truly 
amount to an objection to my application of the Lockean proviso.  The 
practicalities of any real-life, globally co-ordinated effort to prevent catastrophic 
climate change will be immense no matter which programme of mitigation we 
follow or why.  The fact that a Nozickian approach is also plagued by such 
difficult questions regarding its practical application should not, then, be seen as 
damaging its validity in terms of theory. 
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Rights to property and their effect upon ‘my share’ of emissions 
In response to the previous criticism, the Nozickean might legitimately argue that 
the idea of an emissions quota is neither alien nor unreasonable as a potential 
means for avoiding catastrophic climate change.  As a result, the practical 
difficulties associated with such an idea are far from unique to Nozickians and are 
thus weakened in their status as reasons not to employ a theory of climate ethics 
centred around the Lockean proviso.  There exists, however, a series of secondary 
difficulties in relation to the emissions quota system as framed in this chapter that 
does seem to emerge as a result of the Nozickian system of rights from which said 
quota system emerged. 
As has already been noted, Nozickians endorse a range of rights which are held 
extremely strongly in terms of both the negative duties they impose on others and 
the limitations upon the positive duties that can be asked of their holders.  Among 
the rights Nozickians feel we have are property rights.  It is these extensive 
property rights which render the morality of an emissions quota more complex 
under a Nozickian system of rights than it might be if proposed by other moral 
theories. 
Consider the following scenarios: 
Person A inherits a large swathe of land under which there are enormous reserves 
of coal.  Person A thus sets up a coal mine and coal-fired power station.  This 
provides employment and affordable energy to a local community which 
previously had neither while simultaneously making Person A very wealthy and 
producing an enormous amount of additional emissions. 
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Person B inherits a large swathe of land in the desert upon which she builds a 
significant number of solar panels.  These panels, while still producing a 
significant amount of emissions, provide affordable energy to the local 
community, removing their reliance on fossil fuels and thus reducing their overall 
emission levels.  They also make Person B very wealthy. 
Person C inherits a large swathe of densely forested land.  The forest removes 
significant amounts of GHGs from the atmosphere, but makes no money.  Person 
C thus adopts to fell all of the trees and sell the timber.  She does this in a 
traditional way so that the actual cutting of the trees produces only minimal levels 
of emissions well within her personal quota. 
How should we judge the exercise of property rights of these three people in 
accordance with Nozick’s Lockean proviso? 
If all of the emissions of the power which comes from the coal mine are attributed 
to Person A then she undoubtedly exceeds her emissions quota.  However, 
attributing all of these emissions to Person A would surely absolve all of the 
individuals who actually used the power (and without the demand of whom no 
coal would have been mined and burned) of responsibility for their emissions.  On 
the other hand, if the end-consumers are held responsible for the individual 
emissions they make by using the coal power where before they had no power, 
then Person A has not exceeded her emissions quota despite having caused a great 
deal more emissions than would otherwise have existed. 
The situation of Person B is even more complicated.  If all of the emissions 
associated with the building and maintaining of the solar panels are attributed to 
her then she will have exceeded her emissions quota and thus violated the rights 
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of others despite having actually caused a reduction in the overall emissions levels 
of the communities.  This, of course, might be seen as an indicator that it is the 
emissions of the end-user of the power that should count, as opposed to those of 
the producer of the power.  There are, however, two problems with such an idea.  
Firstly, it means that Person A is under no duty not to build her coal-fired power 
station, which causes a significant increase in overall emission levels.  Secondly, 
Person B is left with the same personal emissions quota as everybody else despite 
significantly reducing overall emissions levels.  This seems unjust in terms of 
theory and, in practice, does little to encourage a reduction in climate change 
when even actions which produce large-scale reductions in emissions are not 
incentivised. 
The problems raised in relation to the situations of Person A and Person B are 
complex and require careful consideration if a solution is to be reached.  However, 
this remains the case regardless of which moral system one follows in attempting 
to mitigate catastrophic climate change.  Whilst the range of answers to the 
questions raised will undoubtedly be limited by adherence to a Nozickian rights-
based moral system, there are still answers available.  The problems raised above, 
then, are not problems with a Nozickian morality per se and, as such, should not 
be seen as evidence against the argument that Nozickians provide us with a very 
plausible and coherent reason for reducing our emissions (i.e. the harm they will 
cause to current persons in the future).  This is not necessarily the case with the 
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scenario of Person C, which seems to present a set of difficulties which arise 
specifically due to the nature of a Nozickian system of rights.
442
 
Persons C has strongly-held property rights to her land and all the trees within it.  
Under a Nozickian morality, she is under no duty to restrain her own rights in the 
name of improving (as opposed to avoiding violating) the rights of others.  While 
she has a negative duty not to deliberately infect me with malaria, she has no 
positive duty to pay for the drugs to treat an infection I have obtained from a third 
party.  To demand that she do so would be to violate her property right to her own 
wealth.  Similarly, while she may not produce a level of emissions which would 
cause the future violation of my rights, she is under no duty whatsoever to take 
positive action to help absorb her own emissions and (especially) those of others 
by maintaining an unprofitable forest on her land. 
The fact that Nozickians are unable to provide any moral reason not to deforest 
certainly constitutes a black mark against their ability to effectively combat 
climate change.  It does not, however, remove their theory of such an ability 
altogether.  If there is less forest covering the Earth’s surface, the total amount of 
cumulative emissions humanity is able to produce without causing harm to current 
persons in the future will also be lessened.  Therefore, the less forest, the fewer 
emissions each individual might permissibly make without harming the rights of 
others.  Obviously, there might eventually come a point where humanity has 
wiped out so much forest while rising to such vast population levels that the quota 
of emissions available to each person is less than they require to live a minimally 
good existence.  Such a fact might be seen as good reason for searching for a 
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moral theory which handles the climate change problems better than Nozick’s by 
insisting individuals lower their emissions and avoid deforestation.  It is not, 
however, evidence that Nozick’s theory does not still represent a valid option for 
tackling climate change which is not only better than any other rights-based 
morality, but is also an improvement on the status quo.  Currently, there is, in 
reality, little to restrict either deforestation or the number of emissions individuals 
produce. 
A Nozickian approach, then, provides good, rights-based reasons for mitigating 
climate change.  Since Nozickians cannot allow enforced programmes of 
adaptation, they are instead forced to claim that, at the point where an emission-
producing action causes future harm to the rights of current persons, that action 
becomes immoral and can be justly prohibited.  They are therefore able to demand 
that current persons reduce their emissions.  What is more, since those emissions 
which will harm current persons cannot be separated from those that will harm 
future persons, Nozickians inadvertently endorse a programme of mitigation 
which will protect both groups and, in so doing, create a situation where humanity 
is safeguarded from reaching tipping points in the long-term. 
In summary, provided that Nozickians are able to delineate which of our 
emission-producing actions can be said to violate the rights of current persons in 
the future, they can legitimately demand that we not take those actions.  As a 
result, a Nozickian morality leads to a reduction in emissions which ends up 
safeguarding both current and future persons from climate-related harm. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, while rights-based moralities put forward solutions 
to climate change which are far from ideal, their enforcement might nonetheless 
represent a significant improvement upon the status quo. 
Interest-/Choice-based theories provide us with a strong reason for implementing 
a comprehensive programme of adaptation (the prevention of future violations of 
current persons’ rights) and are even able to clearly and coherently delineate who 
should meet the costs of such a programme.  Given the vast numbers of current 
people who will both now and in future suffer severe damage to their rights as a 
result of climate change, universal adherence to an Interest-/Choice-based rights-
based system would have a significant positive impact which cannot be casually 
overlooked.  Moreover, in insisting upon adequate adaptation to climate change, 
supporters of such theories increase the time available to humanity to replace 
fossil fuels with green energy before a tipping point is reached. 
However, while an effective adaptation programme may indeed give us more time 
to mitigate climate change, Interest-/Choice-based theories afford us no incentive 
to do so.  If current people are the object of our concern, and if we are willing to 
meet the adaptation burdens necessary to prevent our emissions from causing 
harm to their rights in the future (and are also willing to pay to prevent emission-
related harm we did not cause), then all our emission-producing actions cease to 
be immoral.  As a result, it seems likely that overall emission levels will continue 
to rise (and may end up rising at a faster rate).  This continued rise in emission 
levels will eventually lead to us reaching one or more environmental tipping 
points, at which point adaptation will cease to be a viable means of protecting 
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rights.  Ultimately, then, following Interest-/Choice-based systems will lead to 
tremendous suffering for billions of future persons.  For most of us, such an 
outcome is so distasteful as to render such approaches to climate change 
unacceptable, regardless of the increase in well-being they provide for current 
persons.  Indeed, it might even be argued that, by increasing overall levels of 
climate change, such approaches are less desirable than the status quo. 
When it comes to Nozickian systems, this situation is reversed.  Under such 
systems the welfare of future persons is safeguarded against the worst ills of 
climate change (albeit inadvertently), but the cost that would need to be borne by 
current persons in order to achieve such a result will, for those of us who do not 
adhere to Nozick’s world view, prove unduly burdensome.   
Nozick’s insistence on the sanctity of rights is to be commended and potentially 
enables supporters to end climate change.  To the extent that our emissions are 
harmful to the rights of current persons in the future, those emissions become 
impermissible and may be legitimately outlawed by governments of the minimal 
states Nozick endorses (although defining which of our emission-producing 
actions might be deemed harmful and thus justly prohibited will be no easy task).  
And because the emissions we produce effect the climate for centuries, those that 
will harm future persons cannot be separated from those that will harm current 
persons.  As a result, in prohibiting emissions which will come to harm current 
persons we unavoidably and simultaneously prohibit emissions which would 
otherwise have harmed future persons.
443
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Taken in isolation, then, the strength of the status Nozick ascribes to rights might 
be seen as a positive.  Severe problems emerge, though, when such strong status is 
applied to such a broad range of rights.  To adopt a Nozickian morality is to 
accept that we bear no moral responsibility for the severe suffering of others that 
we have not caused.  This means abandoning tax-funded healthcare and social 
services, so that those individuals who cannot afford to meet their most basic 
needs such as food, clean water and healthcare are left to suffer.  Adopting a 
Nozickian approach means allowing billions of lives to be made substantially 
worse by refusing to protect them from harms we have not (by Nozick’s logic) 
caused, while simultaneously safeguarding them and others from those that we 
would have caused had we polluted.  This is not a compromise that most people 
(including those sympathetic to rights) can happily accept. 
Ultimately, people who harbour deep concerns about climate change might, if 
pushed, reluctantly accept that any of the rights-based theories examined 
throughout this thesis represent an improvement upon the current situation.  
Interest/Choice theorists provide us with theories that would significantly improve 
the lives of current persons at the cost of the suffering of billions of future people.  
Nozickians, on the other hand, endorse a scenario in which the world’s most 
vulnerable people will be made severely worse off, but which is capable of 
providing a strong, coherent reason for preventing emissions-related harms which, 
by pure happenstance, serves to protect future people from climate change.  
Despite the significant advantages of rights-based theories, the tremendous 
drawbacks they come with would lead most of us to want to thoroughly 
investigate whether an alternative, non-rights-based moral system might provide 
us with a solution to climate change which enables the welfare of both current and 
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future persons to be adequately safeguarded both now and in the future, from all 
threats, climate-related or otherwise.   
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of climate change has not proved a welcome addition to the geo-
political dialogue for either politicians or the general public.  Citizens and 
governments alike are often unenthusiastic about implementing wide-ranging and 
unpopular measures which may prove expensive and highly disruptive in the 
name of protecting temporally and geographically remote others.  During the 
process of writing this thesis, this attitude seems to have become stronger and 
more pervasive even among legitimate leaders of wealthy, developed, liberal 
democracies.  One of Theresa May’s first acts as UK Prime Minister was to 
rename the Department for Energy and Climate Change, the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.  She then appointed Andrea Leadsom as 
Environment Secretary – a woman whose first question in her previous role as 
Energy Minister was “Is climate change real?”444  Similarly, US President-elect 
Donald Trump (who has repeatedly described climate change as a ‘hoax’)445 has 
appointed notorious climate skeptic Scott Pruitt as head of the country’s 
Environmental Protection Agency and promised to ‘cancel’ November 2016’s 
Paris climate deal.
446
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In the face of such opposition, proponents of specific moral systems who are 
concerned about climate-related harm need to work hard to delineate exactly why 
climate change is wrong and what ought to be done to combat it.  The fact that 
climate change is real, is worsening, is harming many current people and will also 
harm countless future people is undeniable.  It is equally undeniable that, 
regardless of the uncertainty surrounding the timings, tipping points will at some 
point occur and will be immensely damaging to the welfare of people living at the 
time.  In light of this, it would seem that any adequate moral system ought to be 
capable of protecting both current and future persons from climate-related threats 
to their wellbeing.  The best way of doing this would be to provide clear 
justifications and demands for the implementation of extensive programmes of 
both adaptation and mitigation. 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that rights-based moral systems not only 
struggle to provide adequate reasons as to why current persons ought to reduce 
their emissions, but in fact actively prohibit states from imposing meaningful 
mitigation programmes.   
The emissions we produce today will not even begin to affect the climate for 25-
50 years.  Additionally, even if all the world’s governments unilaterally decided to 
begin implementing drastic programmes of mitigation today, it would be many 
decades before any substantial reduction in emission levels was realised.  This is 
particularly true if, as supporters of rights would demand, such mitigation was 
carried out in a manner which avoided severely harming the basic rights of 
millions (by, for example, depriving them of existing attainable fuel sources 
before environmentally-friendly alternatives were available).  As a result of these 
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factors, it becomes clear that the vast majority of those who will benefit from 
mitigation will be future persons.
447
 
As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, future persons are not capable of possessing 
rights.  This does not, in itself, cause an insurmountable problem for supporters of 
rights.  Since rights-based moralities are political moralities (i.e. they are 
primarily about relationships between states and their citizens), it is entirely 
plausible that their followers might adopt other moral philosophies to define those 
elements of their behaviour which fall outside the scope of rights.  I might, for 
example, feel a duty not to treat non-human animals cruelly, and perhaps even to 
provide funds to charities aiming to prevent others from committing such cruelty, 
without thinking that non-human animals have rights.  Importantly, though, the 
non-rights-based beliefs I hold must always be secondary to rights if I am truly to 
follow a rights-based morality.  The state, even if it follows my views, may not 
violate the rights of its citizens in order to protect animals from cruelty.  Similarly, 
to the extent that I am under a duty to furnish the state with taxes so that it may 
meet the rights of others (thus facilitating my own personal correlative duties to 
those rights), I may not relinquish any element of this duty in order to provide the 
animal charity with the funds I feel morally required to provide. 
Under a rights-based morality, rights at least hold primary moral status – indeed 
some would view morality as being derived from rights.  While they might think 
it good that both states and individuals take certain supererogatory actions, 
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 This is not to say that current persons would not benefit from mitigation.  Implementing 
mitigation programmes would probably slightly lessen both the level of harm current persons 
faced as a result of climate change and the number of current persons facing such harm.  It would 
also probably slightly prolong the period before such harm arose.  However, as Chapter 5 sought 
to demonstrate, current persons will be significantly more effectively and efficiently protected by 
programmes of adaptation than those of mitigation. 
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supporters of rights feel that they and their states must meet the duties they hold 
which are the correlatives of rights.  As a result, when non-rights-based ideals 
clash with rights-based moral duties, it is always the latter which prevail. 
Unfortunately, as Chapter 5 showed, seemingly all policies of mitigation - and 
even of adaptation - will harm current persons’ rights in some way.  Moreover, 
such programmes come with significant financial costs, meaning that supporters 
of rights who endorse positive duties (which they would need to do in order to 
justify effective programmes of adaptation) would need to find a very good reason 
as to why government finances were being spent combatting climate change while 
the rights of millions went unmet in ways which could be successfully combatted 
with money.  Since future persons do not possess rights, they cannot provide 
supporters of rights with an appropriate justification for introducing the type of 
mitigation and adaptation programmes which would be necessary to effectively 
combat the negative effects of climate change.   
Rights-based moralities, then, must justify any serious attempt to combat climate 
change and its effects through reference to the rights of current persons.  As 
Chapter 6 demonstrated, such an approach has highly variant results depending 
upon which rights-based morality we follow. 
For Interest/Choice theorists, the time delay involved in the climate change 
process means that we are able to pay for and implement the adaptation 
techniques to guard against the harm that would otherwise be caused by our 
emissions.  Doing so ensures that we do not fail in our duty not to harm the rights 
of other current persons when we pollute.  This represents a significant 
improvement on the current reality of climate change, where the costs of our 
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emissions arrive in the form of widespread rights violations and are 
predominantly borne by individuals who can least afford to protect themselves 
against them and who have done little to exacerbate the climate change process. 
Indeed, if it is an improvement in the status quo we are looking for, we could 
endorse a stronger version of Interest/Choice theories under which states (and, 
indirectly through taxation, their citizens) are placed under a duty to protect the 
rights of current persons even if the harm to those rights was caused by some 
other party.  Under these strong versions of Interest/Choice theories, states would 
be placed under a duty to adapt to those climate-related harms which emerge from 
the emissions of past persons and the subsistence emissions of current persons.  
Since the effect of these latter emissions cannot be easily separated from the effect 
of the luxury emissions of current persons,
448
 this stronger version of the policy 
would seem preferable. 
Unfortunately, as explained in Chapter 6, the short-term improvement that would 
be witnessed as a result of following Interest-/Choice-based theories comes with 
an immense cost when it comes to climate-related harm to future persons.  If the 
moral system we follow tells us that it is current persons that should be our 
concern, then, if we follow a system of adaptation under which the price of our 
emissions includes the cost of stopping current persons from being harmed by 
those emissions, there ceases to be any significant reason not to pollute.  It 
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 If sea levels rise by two metres, but only one metre can be attributed to the luxury emissions 
of current persons, it would not make sense to demand that current persons pay for a one metre 
wall.  And, in reality, climate change can rarely be measured from such a gradualist perspective.  
Rather, it is more likely to be the case that the luxury emissions of current persons would be 
entirely harmless if it were not for the subsistence emissions of others and the emissions of past 
persons but that, since these other emissions do exist, the luxury emissions of current persons do 
cause harm.  If this harm is to be adapted to, then current persons must meet the costs 
associated with all harmful emissions – you cannot half vaccinate somebody against malaria. 
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therefore seems likely that the amount of emissions the current generation is 
producing would increase under a unilaterally enforced rights-based morality 
based on Choice/Interest theories. 
In short, following a Choice-/Interest-based system would lead to a dramatic 
upturn in the well-being of current persons both now and in the near future, but 
would make the prospect of the widespread, drastic and irreversible harm caused 
by tipping points a larger and more immediate threat. 
Supporters of rights who are uncomfortable with such a conclusion are forced to 
turn to the kind of Libertarian approach put forward by Nozick, which leads to 
near polar opposite conclusions about where the costs and benefits of a rights-
based approach to climate change should fall. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, followers of Nozick are stringently against the idea that 
rights should have positive duties as their correlatives.  The state may not ask that 
I pay taxes in order that the rights of others be better met.  Therefore, the idea that 
I might be forced to meet adaptation burdens associated with avoiding harm to 
others becomes untenable.  However, Nozick’s adoption of the Lockean Proviso 
means that current persons are forced to leave ‘enough and as good’ for other 
current persons (i.e. a healthy enough environment so that they are protected from 
the worst ills of climate change).  Since Nozickians are unable to endorse the 
adaptation programmes necessary to make an environment artificially ‘healthy’ - 
by, for example, building sea walls – they are instead forced not to exceed their 
designated quota of emissions in order that they cannot be said to have caused 
future climate-related harm to the rights of current persons.  As a result of this 
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policy of mitigation in the name of current persons, future persons are incidentally 
also better protected against the harms of tipping points. 
Overall, whether one favours current or future persons more heavily, there is a 
rights-based morality which is able to offer an improvement on the current 
situation when it comes to climate change.   
If it is current persons one holds to be of primary moral concern, then Interest-
/Choice-based theories provide a solid reason to adapt to the worst ills of climate 
change and ensure that the costs of doing so are justly distributed.  More than this, 
they also demand that we go some way to protecting others from non-climate-
related harm to their rights by safeguarding them against the violations of others, 
and by meeting the costs of adapting to those harms to their rights which cannot 
straightforwardly be attributed to the behaviour of any other individual (by, say, 
providing healthcare and housing for those otherwise unable to afford such 
things). 
On the other hand, if future persons are our concern, we might adopt a Nozickian 
position which safeguards them from the catastrophic consequences of the Earth 
reaching an environmental tipping point as well as asserting that current persons 
have incredibly extensive and stringently observed sets of rights.  The downside 
to such a position is that the positive duties which are, in practice, needed by the 
vast majority of the world’s inhabitants if they are to fully enjoy the type of things 
we normally feel them to have rights to are actively prohibited by a Nozickian 
system, which outlaws taxation for such purposes.  Of course, when it comes to 
future persons, such limitations are acceptable.  The damage to rights that will be 
caused by tipping points will be so prolific that, for its victims, no amount of free 
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healthcare or education will be able to reverse it.  When faced with catastrophe, 
prevention is the only option – there is no cure. 
The problem is that many people (myself included) have great sympathy for the 
type of values Interest-/Choice-based theories endorse whilst simultaneously 
feeling that future persons are worthy of such significant moral concern that their 
protection might warrant some relatively stringent restrictions upon the activities 
of current persons.   
It seems that many people might find the basic tenets of the human rights doctrine 
to be morally appealing without holding those rights to have anything more than 
an instrumental value.  Such persons might feel that everyone should be free to 
believe what they wish, to be free from torture, to have enough food, etc.  Indeed, 
they might hold these basic moral goods to be of such importance that, in addition 
to not actively preventing others from achieving them, we are also duty-bound to 
take positive action to help others to achieve them.  An Interest-/Choice-based 
theory would appear to represent a good way of articulating, delineating and 
justifying these beliefs.  If we have a fundamental interest in not being tortured 
(which Choice theorists would argue stems from the fact that we are not free to 
make choices unless we are free from torture), it seems reasonable to argue that 
included within this is a fundamental interest in having states take positive action 
to prevent others from torturing us by, for example, providing police forces and 
justice systems. 
Adopting an Interest-/Choice-based theories, however, would prevent us from 
assigning what many of us would see as appropriate levels of moral value to 
future persons; the kind of moral value which would enable us to make significant 
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demands of current persons in the name of protecting future persons from climate 
change.  As this thesis has explained, the only alternative if we hold rights to be of 
ultimate value is to adopt a Nozickian viewpoint through which future persons can 
be safeguarded (albeit inadvertently).  Adopting such a viewpoint, however, 
removes from us the kind of extensive positive duties which made rights-based 
moralities so appealing in the first place. 
In light of all this, one might legitimately question the extent to which anybody 
should hold rights to be of ultimate moral value.  Rights-based moralities are not 
like religions.  We do not generally believe in rights because God says we have 
them,
449
 or because rights are in some sense inherently good.  Rights, rather, are 
tools for expressing the basic moral views we hold and for articulating what ought 
to be done to protect those views and by whom.  And if the tools we employ for 
realising our key beliefs about right and wrong are unable to accommodate some 
of those key beliefs, surely it would be more appropriate to disregard these tools 
than to draw the conclusion that it is our beliefs which are the problem. 
It seems, then, that if no rights-based morality is able to accommodate basic 
rights, positive duties and the well-being of future persons, perhaps this speaks of 
a significant flaw with rights-based moralities.  In light of this flaw, it might be 
more appropriate to abandon rights-based moralities in favour of some other 
system which better enabled us to protect both current and future persons from the 
biggest threat to their welfare in history. 
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 Although Perry offers something like an exception to this rule, arguing that the morality which 
justifies human rights can be derived from religious arguments.  See:  Perry, M., Toward a Theory 
of Human Rights:  Religion, Law, Courts (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.7-13. 
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Before we risk throwing the baby out with the bath water, though, greater 
examination will be needed of the alternatives to rights-based systems. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the problems climate change gives rights-based 
moralities primarily stem from the inability of those moralities to assign 
significant moral status to future persons.  Future persons cannot possess rights 
and, therefore, rights-based moralities cannot adequately protect future persons. 
The question, then, is whether any non-rights-based systems are able to find 
appropriate ways of assigning moral worth to future persons whilst 
simultaneously enhancing the welfare of current persons both by prohibiting harm 
to them and by demanding that positive action be taken to protect them from harm 
at the hands of others and/or nature. 
For example, what moral status should utilitarians assign to future persons?  If 
they are considered to be human and thus hold the same status as currently 
existing persons then, because their number will always outweigh the number of 
people who are currently alive, the welfare of future persons would seemingly 
always need to be placed before that of current persons.  If, on the other hand, 
future persons are considered inhuman, then their welfare ceases to play any role 
in our moral calculations, and utilitarians are left in much the same position as 
supporters of rights. 
I do not propose to provide any remotely conclusive revelations about the 
relationship between utilitarianism and rights.  Rather, I mean to highlight that in 
focusing upon a single moral doctrine’s approach to climate change (that of 
rights-based moralities), this thesis unavoidably ends up highlighting the failures 
of that particular doctrine in isolation without holding up any (let alone all) 
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alternative moral systems against which the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
rights-based systems might be compared and contrasted.  A comprehensive 
analysis of all moral systems would be required before we could conclude that 
rights-based moralities should be disregarded on the basis that they are unusually 
and unduly incapable of accommodating the welfare of both current and future 
persons.  Such an analysis might conclude that similar problems are faced by all 
overarching moral systems and thus afford us no reason to reject systems of rights 
in particular on the basis of their universally shared inability to simultaneously 
and adequately safeguard current and future persons from climate-related harm.
450
 
I expect that further investigation would reveal that there does exist a universal (or 
at least universalisable) moral system out there that is capable of providing good 
reasons as to why its followers ought to protect both current and future persons 
from climate-related harm.  Rights-based moralities are incapable of fulfilling 
such a role.  In light of this fact – and given the extent of the climate change 
problem – one must seriously question whether rights are an appropriate way of 
speaking of morality at all.  Perhaps, instead, the role of rights would be more 
appropriately viewed as being an exclusively legal one, with a primary universal 
function of enshrining in law those values we hold dear which and which we 
derive from an entirely unrelated moral system (or – ideally – from an overlapping 
consensus on such values derived from a range of different moral systems). 
In terms of an original contribution to research, this thesis has sought to 
investigate the overall relationship between moral rights and climate change.  Few 
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 One way of avoiding such a problem could be to adopt a so-called ‘deep ecology’ position, 
where one holds non-human entities to hold a similar moral status to human beings, thus 
removing at least some of the inherent difficulties which emerge from an anthropocentric system 
of moral belief.  Again, there is not room to pay adequate attention to such theories here. 
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existing scholars have paid close attention to the area of moral (as opposed to 
legal) rights and the ways in which they effect and are affected by the climate 
change process.  Those that have done so tend to assume rights to be a positive 
tool for combatting climate change.  This is because they automatically consider 
future persons to possess rights.  Similarly, those scholars who do focus on the 
moral status of future persons through the non-identity problem tend not to do so 
in the context of the ability of such persons to hold rights.  Perhaps the foremost 
original contribution to research this thesis has made, then, is to demonstrate that 
the present non-existence of future persons and, subsequently, the non-identity 
problem prohibit future persons from possessing rights, which in turn leads to 
inherent difficulties for supporters of rights when it comes to justifying reductions 
in the welfare of current persons taken in the name of protecting future persons 
from what amounts to non-rights-based harm. 
Additionally, the application of Nozick’s work to the problem of climate change is 
not a move I have come across during my research in this area.  I feel that this is 
an area which would benefit from further investigation from scholars who are 
more intellectually gifted than me.  In particular, the idea that the Lockean Proviso 
that we leave ‘enough and as good’ for others might provide a powerful reason for 
limiting our emissions seems something which warrants deeper consideration than 
I have been able to give it.  This is especially true when we consider that such a 
proviso need not only be applied within a Nozickian framework, and might 
therefore provide good reason for protecting against future violations of the rights 
of current people through the release of undue levels of emissions (and thus 
inadvertently protecting future persons from those same emissions) without the 
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need to endorse a rights-based morality with such great disregard for positive 
duties.
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 Chapter 6 of this thesis asserted that it is largely an inability to allow positive duties which 
prevents Nozickians from making adaptations to safeguard against the harm which results from 
their emissions.  This fact, when paired with the Lockean Proviso, means that Nozickians must 
reduce their emission levels.  However, it seems possible that the inability to make adaptations 
due to a prohibition on positive duties is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor in such a 
calculation.  If we are indeed bound by a Lockean Proviso to leave enough and as good clean air 
for other current persons to use throughout their lives, there is no reason to believe such a duty 
to have been met through adaptation techniques which, while reducing harm, actually serve to 
further decrease the level of clean air which is available to current persons in the future.  It is 
therefore plausible to suggest that other scholars might seek to use the Lockean Proviso to 
provide a firm grounding for their objections to emissions without simultaneously endorsing a 
controversial Nozickian system of morality. 
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